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Abstract
This thesis compares the historical development of housing in two Asian Tigers, 
Korea and Singapore. The thesis adopts comparative historical analysis for 
systematic and contextualised comparison across nation states.
The thesis starts by reviewing the previous literature on the evolving views of 
housing policy and housing regimes in the Western welfare states and the newly 
industrialised countries in Asian-Pacific region. With these theoretical backgrounds, 
the thesis investigates and compares the developments of the housing systems, its 
causal factors and consequences through comparative historical analysis. When it 
comes to accounting for variations in housing between Korea and Singapore, the 
case studies highlight how institutional characteristics established under colonial 
rule e.g. viewpoints on social policy including housing or the designs of schemes, 
were combined with different developmental strategies during the industrialisation 
period. In addition, the case studies pose and examine the new relationship between 
housing and other welfare pillars in Asia, which can be differentiated from those in 
Western contexts.
The findings from the case studies reveal that the different ways in which 
development models and enduring institutional arrangements were combined acted 
as the critical factor determining the considerable variations apparent in housing 
policy and outcomes in Korea and Singapore. The thesis demonstrates that the 
emphasis on the variable of ‘institutions’ furthers the understanding of how path 
dependency dominated most housing policy developments in Korea and Singapore. 
When it comes to implications for comparative housing study, the findings support 
the interpretation that Asian housing regimes with several sub-groups can be 
differentiated from Western housing regimes. Finally, the findings indicate that it is 
time for both states to think over how to live with ‘institutional legacies’ generating 
considerable social costs.
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Chapter one
Introduction: Encompassing the ignored dimensions of 
comparative social policy
l . i  Background
Since social insurance schemes were first introduced in the last quarter of the 19th 
century under the authoritarian German regime, the welfare state has been 
embedded across the Western industrialised democracies as the principal 
mechanism for managing social risks. A number of major policies have contributed 
to the complex constellation of the welfare state. However, despite widespread 
acceptance of the basic principles set out by the first industrial nations, many 
aspects of the welfare state have been gradually shaped and altered by varying forces 
over time and at different tempos. Each major policy pillar - pension, health, 
employment, education and housing - has been structured or reformed by feedback 
from systems established in different contexts, in accordance with varying goals and 
driving forces. The intricate nature of the welfare state is well-demonstrated by the 
fact that diverse theories accounting for dynamic changes in the welfare state have 
existed for more than a century, but there is as yet little general consensus on the 
question of what drives welfare. Even some previously plausible perspectives are 
losing their validity to explain the reality of the welfare state as social conditions and 
economic circumstances undergo fundamental changes in the era of globalisation 
and post-industrialisation.
The steadily accumulating literature on the welfare state has contributed to our 
understanding of the differences and similarities between the main social policies 
developed in welfare states around the world. However, in spite of these 
achievements, there are still considerable academic deficiencies in our knowledge of 
the major policy pillars of the welfare state. First of all, the regional boundary 
highlighted by numerous comparative studies is largely confined to the 
industrialised Western welfare states. As a consequence, bounded debates on the 
welfare states in Europe and America have overwhelmed the academic discourse. 
Discussions about social policy in non-Western developing countries have been 
relatively neglected due to partial academic concerns and narrowly defined
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frameworks. As a result, many key questions in comparative social policy remain 
unsolved puzzles, particularly those concerning non-Western countries. Have, for 
example, countries beyond Europe and America developed their welfare states in 
parallel with the systems devised by the industrialised Western societies during their 
industrialisation and démocratisation? If not, then what are the fundamental 
differences between Western and non-Western societies in terms of both ideology 
and concrete policy instruments ensuring social welfare? Moreover, if there are 
qualitatively different types of welfare models in non-Western societies, what social 
or political factors account for the formation of these different models? These 
questions will never be fully answered by unbalanced approaches to global social 
policy and without systematic understanding of social policy outside of Europe and 
America.
Another serious academic deficiency is evident at the policy level in that some 
policies have been frequently disregarded by mainstream comparative social policy 
studies. Modern welfare states have attempted to cope with various social risks that 
might jeopardise human welfare through the introduction of many different kinds of 
policy instruments. Five ‘Giant Evils’ (want, idleness, squalor, ignorance and 
disease) were identified in the British context by William Beveridge (1942) during 
the Second World War, to be handled by the modern welfare state to ensure human 
welfare above a socially acceptable level. A series of social policies - on social security, 
employment, housing, education, health - were introduced as the principal pillars of 
the welfare state to manage the risks posed by the ‘five giants’ (Hudson et ah, 2008: 
6-7). Although similar concerns have dominated social policy in other countries, 
there are apparent differences between the resources allocated and the structures 
designed to support service delivery across the welfare states. This is mainly because 
welfare states are historical entities, the results of changing preferences about which 
pillar is more important and what combinations of policy means are more effective 
when it comes to providing social protection in a specific context.
Notwithstanding the varying status of individual policy pillar, the academic focus 
in comparative research has mainly been confined to the comparison of social 
security policies, pensions and health or the comparison of employment policies in 
different nation states. Other major pillars such as housing and education have been 
largely ignored by mainstream comparativists. The main reason for the scant 
attention paid to ‘housing’ is probably its distinctive characteristics compared with 
other welfare goods and services; because of these characteristics, housing 
provisions have been more market-based than in other fields where the public sector
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dominates the provision of goods and services. Housing is frequently recognised as 
not only a pure consumption commodity for dwelling services, but also a profitable 
family asset for the difficult periods of the life cycle e.g. retirement. Hence it has 
been taken for granted that a large proportion of housing production and allocation 
should be determined by the market and consequently housing policy is normally 
designed to bolster the operation of the housing market in capitalist democracies. 
This claim, however, fails to fully integrate the other fundamental political 
mechanism of ‘democracy’ into the argument of which factors are crucial in framing 
the housing system. Economic and political resources allocated by the market can be 
significantly redistributed through democratic policy processes - policy-making, 
policy-implementing and feedback processes which modern welfare states have 
innovated. Housing policy and its consequences, therefore, can portray the non- 
negligible variations insofar as historical paths of unfolding democracy vary across 
nation states. The necessity to investigate real cases lies in the substantial possibility 
that different causal factors in capitalist democracies structure distinctive housing 
systems in contextualised environments.
1.2 Research subject: The development of the housing in Korea 
and Singapore
This study attempts to address the aforementioned academic deficiencies by 
examining the historical development of the housing systems, its causal factors and 
consequences, in two Asian Tigers: South Korea (hereafter Korea) and Singapore.
Regarding the choice of cases, the newly industrialised Asian countries are 
extraordinary cases in the history of global capitalism. A modicum of countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region has achieved rapid industrialisation and economic prosperity. 
These states are the ‘Big Tiger’ Japan, the first industrialised country outside Europe 
and America, and the four ‘Little Tigers’ - Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan 
- which began to pursue nation building and economic growth in the aftermath of 
the Second World War (WW2). The economic success of these countries is even 
more distinguished in that it has been accomplished in spite of unfavourable 
internal conditions at the outset of their industrialisation. These states were typical 
agrarian societies that experienced colonial rule by the UK or Japan and thus the 
states had to undertake industrialisation and social development projects without
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the natural resources or efficient socio-political system at post-independence period. 
Nonetheless, the Asian Tigers succeeded in maintaining the highest rates of 
economic growth in the world over the next two decades since the end of WW2, 
while significantly reducing income inequality. The Miracle of the Asian Tigers has 
given momentum to the reconsideration of the relationship between global 
capitalism and Third World economic development (Henderson and Appelbaum, 
1992: Si-
Why then have Korea and Singapore been selected for the comparative study of 
housing amongst the newly industrialised countries? It is widely accepted that the 
development strategies adopted by the Asian Tigers in their pursuit of economic 
growth share many common characteristics and they are loosely gathered under the 
title of the ‘developmental states.’ One of the distinguishing features of 
developmental states is their active embrace of ‘strategic’ industrial policy, the 
selection of primary sectors for economic growth (Weiss, 2000: 26). Under active 
guidance of successive governments, the Asian Tigers in general sought to attain 
economic growth as the prime goal across all policy areas, but each government 
followed its peculiar direction in detail. Korea and Singapore arrived at different 
economic models based on their distinctive strategies, thereby establishing their 
own developmental paths to economic success. As for the differences between the 
developmental strategies in Korea and Singapore, the “internationalist model of 
development” and “nationalistic model of development” proposed by Shin (2005: 
386) capture the dissimilar attributes of the two models. While the Singaporean 
government ‘hosted foreign transnational corporations,’ the Korean government 
nurtured ‘home-grown transnational capacity’ through close connection with the 
‘chaebol’ conglomerates (Dent, 2003: 247). In terms of foreign investment for 
financing capital and economic growth, the Singaporean government strove to 
attract as much Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as possible, whereas the Korean 
government preferred foreign loans to FDI, secured by guaranteeing the credibility 
of domestic financial agents (Shin, 2005: 387).
Apart from the differences in economic policy, other policy variations have come to 
be recognised as essential aspects of the Asian development models. In particular, 
the Korean and Singaporean approaches to social policies including housing policy 
are as substantially different as the approaches to economic policies which the two 
states implemented. In the 1990s noteworthy regional studies of social policy began 
to be published by Western and Asian students. These studies tended to emphasise 
the regional social forces affecting the development of social policy beyond the
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Western-oriented interpretation (see Jones, 1990,1993, White and Goodman, 1998, 
Kwon, 1997, 2005, Holliday, 2000, 2005, Midgley, 1986, Goodman and Peng, 1996, 
Deyo, 1992). As academic interest in Asian social policy grew, the idea of Asian 
welfare models became a disputed issue in comparative social policy (see Holliday, 
2000, Esping-Andersen, 1997 for a brief review). The debate moved beyond simply 
suggesting the existence of Asian welfare models to observe the variations not only 
between the Asian welfare states, but also between social policies within a state. The 
social policies of Korea and Singapore are sometimes compared as constituents of a 
common single model and sometimes as dissimilar welfare models within the region. 
For instance, Deyo (1992: 302-305) argues that Korean and Singaporean 
governments share a common policy direction, in contrast with the one embraced by 
Taiwanese and Hong Kong governments. According to Deyo, while education and 
other social policies in Korea and Singapore were designed with the intention of 
directly contributing to economic growth, in Taiwan and Hong Kong they were only 
indirectly or loosely connected with economic growth in many cases. On the other 
hand, Ramesh (1995: 230) argues in his comparison of social security programmes 
in Korea and Singapore that the Korean social security system, where most income 
maintenance programmes are operated in the form of social insurance schemes, is 
more comprehensive than the highly contribution-centred Singaporean system 
consisting of mandatory savings schemes and voluntary insurance. Moreover, in 
Holliday’s (2000) three variants of the “Productivist World of Welfare Capitalism” in 
Asia, Korea and Singapore are not located in the same variant, because of the 
different structures of welfare mix between market, state and family. In other case 
studies of North-East Asia, the three countries of Japan, Korea and Taiwan are 
regarded as a single regional welfare regime (e.g. Goodman and Peng, 1996, Kwon, 
1997, 2005). These studies seem to implicitly presume that the welfare system of 
industrialised East Asian states is distinctive from that of the South-East Asian city 
states.
More specifically in housing, several studies pose a single homogeneous Asian 
model or identify variations within the region and thus classify a couple of regional 
models amongst the Asian NICs, even though the academic interest in Asian housing 
regimes was relatively late and low. The housing policies of Korea and Singapore are 
sometimes compared as constituents of a common single model and sometimes as 
dissimilar housing regimes as seen in the previous comparative studies of social 
policy. For instance, some studies place Korea and Singapore into a single model 
(Doling, 1999b, Ronald, 2007) or separate them in different regimes (Ramesh, 2003, 
Groves et al., 2007c). As for key policy measures and housing indicators, the housing
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systems of the two states show many differences within the context of the Asian- 
Pacific region. The two states perhaps are located on the opposite sides of the 
continuum regarding key housing indicators, as <Table i.i> (summing up the 
differences between the four Little Tigers) shows.
< Table 1.1 > Comparison of key housing indicators in the Asian Tigers
Hong Kong Singapore Korea Taiwan
Key policy 
instruments
Direct provision 
and purchaser 
subsidy
Direct provision 
and regulation 
of housing 
finance
Regulation of 
sale and 
purchase
Tax subsidy for 
mortgage and 
purchaser 
subsidy
Percentage of 
public stock to 
total stock (%, 
year)
44 (2000) 81 (1995) 19 (1990) 4 (1990)
Home
ownership rate 
(%, year)
55 (2000) 92 (2000) 54(2000) 83 (2000)
Source: Ramesh (2003:135), Groves et al (2007b: various pages)
These academic discourses on housing regimes and varying outcomes in housing 
are interesting enough to warrant further investigation, in order to ascertain the 
critical factors that brought about the differences insofar as the states share many of 
the features of developmental states in common. In particular, by focusing on policy 
changes and their subsequent impacts we may be able to discern the essential circuit 
underpinning the development of the housing system in the Asian Tigers where 
strong states backed up by professional and meritocratic bureaucracies have played 
the dominant role in structuring the social system, relatively unchallenged by 
political opponents. Hence by comparing Korean and Singaporean housing policy 
we may be able to uncover promising clues about the nature of each housing system, 
illuminating why they embraced distinctive policy approaches to housing and how 
housing policy was related to other policies such as economic or social policy in 
contextualised settings.
1.3 Theories and methods for comparison
Housing studies have been frequently criticised for their failure to develop a 
refined theoretical framework (see Kemeny, 1992, 2001). Despite the low level of
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interest shown in theoretical matters by housing researchers, several prominent 
camps grounded in varying perspectives have emerged and improved the theoretical 
frameworks available for analysing the development of housing systems in 
comparative contexts. Clapham (2005: 7-11) categorises the existing theoretical 
approaches to housing into four broad clusters. The first of these approaches 
underscores the importance of government policy in determining the consequences 
of housing systems. The institutional structure of a housing system and surrounding 
socio-political systems are prioritised in this tradition. While this point of view has 
produced useful insights, the approach has substantial theoretical and empirical 
flaws e.g. its neglect of the other relevant actors in housing, the withdrawal of 
government from housing and concurrent growing privatisation. The second 
approach weighs the significance of the housing market against government 
intervention. This neo-classical viewpoint argues that government intervention 
should be kept to a minimum and take place only when certain conditions cannot be 
met for efficient allocation of the market. Like the policy-oriented approach, it has 
theoretical and empirical drawbacks. In particular, the underlying assumption of 
rational actors was so incomplete not to fully account for real decision making, but 
also the prosperity of the public rental sector in housing history. The other 
approaches - geographical and sociological - are interested in the factors influencing 
the residential choices of individual households and the application of general 
sociological theories to housing respectively. While these two approaches provide 
new perspectives on housing issues, they are relatively limited in many respects 
when compared with the policy-oriented and neo-classical models.
Which perspective is the most appropriate for analysing the development of 
housing systems in the newly industrialised Asian countries, insofar as each 
approach has its advantages and drawbacks? This study leans towards the policy- 
oriented analysis and will focus on how a range of housing policies has affected 
various housing outcomes as well as the relationship between related institutional 
arrangements and subsequent policy reforms. Given the overwhelming acceptance 
of comprehensive government intervention at the onset of the industrialisation 
process in Asian NICs, tracking the unfolding of policies is essential if we are to 
ascertain how the housing systems of Asian Tigers were formed. Investigating the 
locus of policy and relevant institutions would appear to be the more convincing 
approach when working with all cases where the housing system experienced radical 
transformation at a certain point (e.g. Korea in this study) or has been maintained in 
the framed structure from the early stage of development (like Singapore). This is 
because, for reasons I will be exploring throughout the thesis, changes in policy or
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associated institutional arrangements are central variables when it comes to 
explaining the variations between cases in the region, both as a barrier hindering 
far-reaching reforms or as a facilitator assisting drastic shifts in direction.
Next, there is question of which methodological approach to adopt i.e. how to 
achieve the research objectives by the most effective means. This is a decision that 
entails taking into account three conditions according to Yin (2009: 8): ‘the type of 
research question’, ‘the extent of control over behavioural events’, ‘the degree of 
focus on contemporary events.’ With respect to the first criterion, the principal 
research questions that this study seeks to address are why the two states followed 
Contrasting pathways in housing policy and how housing policy and related 
institutions acted as stimulating or hindering arrangements in each case. When 
attempting to answer questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’, three methods - case studies, 
experiments and histories - are generally considered appropriate (Yin, 2009: 10). 
Experiments have been ruled out, because it is not possible to undertake research 
into macro-social phenomena in a controlled laboratory setting. This leaves case 
studies and histories, two methods which can be applied to social phenomena where 
control over behavioural events is not possible. Tracing the temporal process of 
contemporary events is an inevitable part of analysing policy development, since 
even current policy frequently turns out to be the accumulated outcome of dynamic 
policy making and the implementing process over a long-term period. Thus, the 
ideal method would appear to be combining the two approaches.
In conclusion, I have chosen to conduct an historical case study of housing policy, 
a compromise between the two options remaining. Although case studies of a single 
country have been accumulated, comparative studies with coherent frameworks are 
much less prominent in the housing field, particularly in the housing research of 
newly industrialised Asian countries. Only a small section of the literature is devoted 
to cross-states comparative analysis, but it is likely that even the existing 
frameworks are too incomplete to reach a reliable conclusion about the significant 
differences in both policy and outcomes between states. There are many reasons why 
the problems from incomplete frameworks are aggravated but it is believed that lack 
of knowledge of case study methods and inactive use of them are possibly the main 
culprits. Despite the methodological advantages of the comparative historical 
method, it seems odd that it has rarely been adopted by comparative housing 
researchers, especially given the popularity of the method in studies of other social 
policy areas. In conclusion, the comparative historical method potentially provides a 
useful link between theory and practice as it allows for the systematic comparison of
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housing policy, hence the reliance on this method when comparing the cases in this 
study.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
Here is an overview of how the thesis will be unfolded in the following chapters. 
Chapter 2, as a part of general theoretical issues about housing, reviews how housing 
has come to be widely perceived as more than just ‘shelter’ under capitalism and 
considers the previous literature on the evolving views of housing policy in the 
Western welfare states. Theoretical reviews of ‘housing’ and ‘housing policy’ are 
followed by an investigation of what takes place in the housing sector across the 
developed Western democracies based on key housing indicators. In the latter part 
of Chapter 2, two pertinent issues are examined: the impact home ownership can 
have on the welfare state and the concept of ‘Asset-based’ welfare states in the 
Western democracies. Chapter 3 moves to the newly industrialised countries in 
Asian-Pacific region for the investigation of how housing and housing policy have 
been perceived and developed beyond Europe and America. The first part of the 
chapter considers the unique developmental routes of the region in terms of 
economic policy and welfare policy, the essence of the developmental models in Asia. 
In the latter part of the chapter, existing comparative studies of housing policy in 
Asian Tigers are reviewed in order to establish the key factors which need to be 
taken into account when comparing housing in the Occidental and Oriental worlds. 
The final section in Chapter 3 draws some general conclusions about the Asian 
housing policy model from the previous studies, for further analysis in the 
comparative context. Chapter 4 addresses the methodology adopted for the case 
study and explains the defining characteristics of the comparative historical analysis 
and why the method is suitable for comparing cases in both general and housing 
research.
Against the background of this method, the two cases - the historical development of 
housing in Korea and Singapore - will be analysed in the main body of Chapters 5 to 
8. The descriptive chapters - Chapters 5 and 7, respectively for Korea and Singapore 
- will precede the analytical chapters - Chapters 6 and 8 - to ascertain what policies 
were brought about prior to the analysis of them. In terms of the time span of the 
historical analysis, each case study will focus on the last half a century during which
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the two states commenced their industrialisation projects and underwent 
unprecedented economic and social development.1 However, this study can be 
differentiated from many other studies in that the temporal coverage of the 
historical analysis is extended to the colonial era when path-breaking institutional 
reforms or transfers were made, several of which were carried over into the post­
independence period. The missing temporal section disregarded by previous studies 
will be integrated into the analysis of housing in this study and it is hoped that this 
will yield novel insights into the development of Asian housing. Chapters 6 and 8 
illustrate how the housing schemes and interconnected arrangements were designed 
and gradually embedded in a complementary manner with arguments and evidence 
from varying sources. These chapters relate housing developments to the questions 
of ‘why’ and ‘how’ housing was handled by two developmental states pursuing 
economic growth and political stability. In the following Chapter 9, the findings from 
the previous chapters are used to analyse how housing institutions originated and 
evolved at the comparative level. Key theoretical concepts are assessed and applied 
to the findings from the case study of Korea and Singapore. There is also some 
additional analysis of the implications of the findings for the key theories, especially 
when the findings are connected with the concepts of path dependency and critical 
junctures. Chapter 10 concludes the thesis, summing up the results of the historical 
analysis and its implications in the comparative context. In particular, the 
conclusion will pay special attention to the point that housing research and two key 
theories- historical institutionalism and the developmental states mutually benefit 
from the case study of Korea and Singapore in this thesis.
1 The impacts and responses are not examined here after the global economic crisis (2007- 
09) triggered by the US mortgage crisis. Because the crisis is not thoroughly over yet and 
thus housing reforms are in progress in many cases, it seems to be quite early to analyse and 
evaluate them at this stage. Therefore, this thesis explores and compares what happened 
before the global banking crisis in 2007.
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Chapter two
The pillar of housing in the Western welfare states
2.1 The characteristics of housing under welfare capitalism
Throughout history, housing has always been more than just a form of shelter but 
there have been significant changes in the social implications of housing since 
capitalistic market mechanisms dominated resource allocation and further 
rearranged the social order. People began to recognise that housing could be a 
profitable commodity in capitalist society as the market became the locus of all 
social activities. It is, therefore, often argued that housing is conceptually a private 
good in that its consumption is rival2 as well as excludable and the degree of utility 
which people obtain from housing consumption is very different (Whitehead, 2003: 
138). Nevertheless, housing has several distinctive features when compared with 
pure private goods, features which even laissez-faire economists see as justifying 
government interventions in the housing market. These characteristics provide 
indispensable support for those seeking to rationalise the active role of the state in 
the housing sector. This is why exploring the characteristics of housing is the first 
necessary step towards understanding variations in housing policies and housing 
systems in capitalist democracies.
Firstly, both the production and consumption of housing require huge amounts of 
financial resources. On the supply side, the precondition for investment in house 
building is securing access to substantial capital for the development of land and 
infrastructure, the purchase of building materials and the employment of workers at 
the construction sites. In the consumption of housing, home ownership calls for a 
large lump sum that most wage earners or self-employed households cannot afford 
without financial aid. The capital-intensive nature of housing necessitates the 
existence of private or public financial institutions through which development loans 
can be provided so that house builders can fund construction projects or mortgages 
can be made available to consumers to spread payment over the long-term period.
When a good is referred to as ‘rival’ in economics, it is a good whose consumption by one 
consumer prevents consumption by other consumers at the same time (Mankiw, 2011: 218).
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In conclusion, the question of financing and subsidising in both housing 
construction and consumption is much more important than it is in other fields of 
social policy.
Secondly, dwelling services are offered through physical housing stock, which 
contrasts with other types of services provided by the major pillars of the welfare 
state. Transfer benefits such as pensions and unemployment benefit are directly 
delivered to the individual beneficiary in cash. In-kind benefits in health and 
education are generally delivered by professional staff. While both cash transfers 
and human services require a continuous input of resources in the form of cash or 
wages, the housing services provided by built stocks do not require large amounts of 
additional resources over the next few decades insofar as management costs are 
relatively small. Yet this attribute of housing services becomes more complex in the 
case of home ownership. Owned houses not only deliver dwelling services to the 
occupying households, but also usually function as the most valuable asset in the 
portfolio of most households. In this sense, the purchased house is a vital source of 
wealth as private property, more than merely a source of dwelling service. The 
accumulation of wealth makes housing distinctive when compared with other 
welfare goods or services that are normally non-transferrable and given for 
immediate use in cash or in-kind benefits.
Thirdly, in relation to the neo-classical economic view, it is often assumed that 
when a discrepancy between demand and supply happens in the housing market, the 
market mechanism will restore a stable equilibrium even without the intervention of 
government. From this point of view, it could be argued that housing is such a visible 
and easily measurable unit that all participants in the housing market are able to 
diagnose the market conditions and take action to return it to the stable equilibrium. 
In addition, many economists would argue that key standard assumptions e.g. 
perfect information are largely satisfied in the housing market and thus efficient 
equilibrium can be achieved. Therefore, government intervention should be 
confined to extraordinary cases so as not to distort production and allocation, apart 
from when these standard assumptions cannot be met. Furthermore, if the 
government does intervene in the market, its actions should be limited to curing 
problems directly related to these assumptions. Based on these premises, a general 
belief has come to dominate the discourse in housing policy that the market has to 
supply the majority of housing operated by the principle of the ‘invisible hand.’3 3
3 When referring to the ‘housing market’ in this context, there is no differentiation between 
the rental market and the home ownership market.
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Moreover, influenced by the prevailing orthodoxy, it has been claimed that housing 
has never been ‘an integral component of the system of public provision of goods 
and services’ (Kleinman, 1996: 1) or never been ‘decommodified’ (Harloe, 1995: 539) 
in the history of the welfare state. Therefore, housing has been frequently depicted 
as “the wobbly pillar under the welfare state” (Torgersen, 1987: 116) or “an 
ambiguous and shifting status on the margins of the welfare state” (Harloe, 1995: 2) 
in comparative housing studies.
Does housing policy always remain an unstable constituent of the welfare state, 
insofar as the housing market normally operates without massive disasters such as 
wars or natural catastrophes? Firstly, the necessity of government intervention can 
partially be justified by the reasons which lead to ‘market failure’, failing to achieve 
efficient allocations by the market mechanism. Hills (1998: 122-123) refers to two 
rationales for why housing became a part of the welfare state to cure this market 
failure. The first rationale comes from capital market failure, which fails to provide 
long-term mortgages for consumers, particularly low-income families. The other one 
stems from the externalities of housing, which means the decision of a consumer 
influences other consumers’ utility. In terms of the externalities of housing, it is 
unlikely that homeowners in the housing market carefully consider how their 
behaviours influence others’ utility. History illustrates the evidence of the negative 
externalities e.g. diseases due to insanitary houses in the neighbourhood and 
thereby government intervention was justified (e.g. Malpass and Murie, 1999: 31-32). 
Hence the externalities of housing provide a rationale for government intervention 
to prevent market failure.
More importantly, it is not economic analysis, but moral values or political 
ideology that determines what objectives society should seek and which society is 
superior to another society (Winch, 1971: 13-4 cited in Oxley, 2004: 49). The 
housing domain should also be concerned with the analysis of ideological stances 
towards housing and the variety of institutional structures supporting them. As 
Whitehead (2003: 143) argues, the strongest political case for social housing has 
never been grounded on efficiency, but on equity and how to effectively redistribute 
unequal resources to meet housing needs. State regulation of the housing market 
and public provision of housing can be justified if it reduces inequality in housing 
consumption or to ensure minimum standards as well as to increase efficiency in the 
collective distribution of resources. The means of intervention in the housing market 
and their consequences will vary according to the prior objectives that a society 
wishes to pursue. Hence, we should not overlook the values of solidarity, social
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justice or social inclusion and will examine the different entities of institutional 
arrangements to embody the values in housing.
2.2 Perspectives on housing policy in the Western welfare states
2.2.1 Early ‘convergence’ explanations of housing policy
The intuitive way to understand how housing policy analysis has developed is 
catching up with the changing perspectives on housing policy. In particular, 
classifying the diverse works of the development of housing policy in advanced 
democracies can help us to discern which causal variables should be focused on in 
housing policy analysis. The vast majority of comparative housing studies can be 
placed into one of three schools according to the varying levels of generalisations in 
their research findings: from “juxtapositional analysis”, the studies without any 
challenge towards generalisation of the findings, through the diverse approach to the 
broad generalisations of the “convergence approach” (Kemeny and Lowe, 1998: 161- 
162). Given the impossibility of drawing theoretical insights from extreme 
juxtapositional analysis, this study concentrates on examining the ‘convergence’ 
and ’divergence’ perspectives in the field of comparative housing studies.
The ‘logic of industrialism’ is a representative viewpoint advocating the 
convergence of housing policy. This perspective is broadly concerned with the scope 
of social changes that accompany the process of industrialisation and thereby it 
emphasises the importance of economic growth when accounting for the 
development of the welfare state. From this perspective, traditional agencies such as 
the family and local communities, which once took full responsibility for offering 
social protection, start to collapse as industrialisation accelerates. Faced with the 
failure of the out-dated bodies, the state becomes an alternative provider to hedge 
against the new social risks of industrial society insofar as it can sustain the material 
resources necessary to carry out its new tasks. Economic growth is therefore looked 
upon as the most important variable pushing the development of the welfare state by 
advocates of the logic of industrialism (see Wilensky, 1975: 15-18 for a general 
review).
Donnison’s idea of developmental stages in housing policy is often categorised as a 
convergence approach based on the logic of industrialism. Although his explanation
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of housing policy contains some elements of divergence, he put much more 
emphasis on economic and demographic factors than other factors like political 
system and ideology. Donnison (1967: 87-112) and afterwards Donnison and 
Ungerson (1982: 67-85) claim that housing policies in Europe and America have 
undergone the three different developmental patterns. According to them, housing 
responsibilities in the first intervention phase are witnessed in Southern Europe like 
Turkey, Portugal, Greece, and Spain. The countries in Southern Europe initiated 
industrialisation relatively late when compared with the developed countries in 
Western and Northern Europe. Countries in this stage lack financial resources for 
investment in the housing sector (Donnison and Ungerson, 1982: 67, Donnison, 
1967: 87-8). Given insufficient capital means for industrialisation, available financial 
resources are channelled into other key sectors for higher economic growth in these 
states. Because of the low priority accorded to housing, large-scale public provision 
of housing is very rare in the region and the majority of housing is privately owned 
(Donnison and Ungerson, 1982: 68-9). In the second phase of housing policy 
observed in the UK and USA, the main role of government in the UK and USA is to 
give selective assistance to people who cannot access affordable housing on the free 
market (Donnison and Ungerson, 1982: 75, Donnison, 1967: 93)- Government 
housing measures are viewed as exceptional actions to supplement the normal 
market system and are not intended to be a policy instrument for the majority of the 
population (Donnison and Ungerson, 1982: 75, Donnison, 1967: 93)- In the final 
phase of development, comprehensive housing policies are pursued in ways well- 
documented in Donnison (1967: 99-101) and Donnison and Ungerson (1982: 79- 
80):
■  Estimates and projections of housing requirements for the whole country are 
made
■ Long-term plans are drawn-up including all forms of houses provided by 
government
■  There is governmental control over not only the national savings for 
sustainable house building, but also the total output of housing in relation to 
other sectors of economy
■ Government endeavours to relate the entire domestic outputs and geographical 
distribution to particular industries and regions within a country
■  Governmental control is exercised over existing housing stocks and housing 
standards
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■  The state is increasingly responsible for improving the general efficiency of the 
building industry
The other literature associated with the convergence perspective can be located 
under the broad umbrella of “structural Marxist political economy” according to 
Kemeny and Lowe (1998: 165). The convergent Marxist view on housing is perhaps 
best understood by stating a number of expected propositions when Marxist theory 
is imported into housing policy analysis. Lund (2006: 8-9) provides a consistent and 
informative summary of the application of Marxism to the field of housing policy 
analysis. Firstly, the building industry exploits its working class labourers, whose 
wages are less than the exchange value of the houses built. Secondly, even though 
the controllers of different housing capitals - industrial capital, land capital and 
development capital - have their own short-term interests, they share a common 
long-term interest in ensuring sustainable capitalism. At the same time, the state, an 
alliance with various types of capitals, attempts to secure the long-term profitability 
of the capital class and to reconcile diverse short-term interests. Finally, housing 
policy is an effective governmental instrument for reproducing a stable labour force, 
because it is designed to conform to the interests of the capitalist class. This 
deductive inference is the foundational framework for housing policy analysis from 
the viewpoint of structural Marxist political economy.
Regardless of the theoretical discourses within Marxist tradition, Castells is a 
practitioner who deals with historical cases regarding the urban and housing 
problems in order to verify the Marxist theory at the empirical level. In The Urban 
Question: A Marxist Approach (1977), he starts from the premise that the urban 
question is inherently ideological, because it is principally the process of 
reproducing labour power and the “cultural specificity of modern society” (1977: 
429). More specifically to housing, he captures the characteristics of the housing 
question from the historical experience of France. He argues that the failure of the 
private housing market to meet housing needs necessitates permanent public 
intervention (1977: 158). Nevertheless, Castells admits the limitations of public 
intervention, which cannot alter fundamental aspects such as land ownership or 
controls on rent and house prices and thus the basic rules of the capitalist economy 
are not significantly undermined by any government activities (1977: 158).
Harloe’s (1995) case study of housing policy in Europe and America also leans 
towards the Marxist view. Although he does not explicitly adopt the orthodox 
Marxist framework for analysing housing policy, his case study seems to be located 
within the tradition of Marxist political economy, as far as the central points that it
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poses are concerned.4 Firstly, housing is always a commodity transacted in the 
market and the exclusive right of private property must not be denied. Harloe argues 
that the group of capitals involved in the provision of housing - land, finance and 
industrial capital - are not likely to allow any form of decommodified housing to the 
extent that it threatens the status quo and wealth accumulation in capitalism (1995: 
3). Secondly, he highlights the substantial cross-national similarities confirming this 
and that similar elements underpin the converging models of housing policy in the 
advanced capitalist societies, as the following excerpt from the conclusion sums up:
The findings of this study suggest that the Marxist theories which, in 
varying shapes and forms, link capitalist social policy development to the 
functional imperatives of accumulation and legitimation, do have some 
relevance to the understanding of cross-national similarities (Harloe, 
1995: 529)-
Finally, Harloe (1995: 523-524) claims that the six countries he studied in Europe 
and America are converging towards residual social housing provision i.e. small- 
scale public housing programmes for poor households to supplement the workings 
of the market, when it is unable to provide cheap and low-quality housing for lower 
income groups. From this perspective, large-scale social housing programmes, 
widespread in the aftermath of the Second World War until the 1970s, were an 
‘abnormal’ form of housing provision, a temporary measure to re-stabilise the 
capitalist order and complete industrialisation and urbanisation. On the basis of his 
findings, Harloe (1995: 539) concludes that whenever the market has been able to 
offer alternative options, universalistic and decommodified provision of housing has 
been restricted due to the strong resistance of capitalist interests.
Convergence perspectives, in spite of their apparent resemblance to recent 
Western history, have serious limitations in terms of both their internal logic and 
capacity to explain reality. The logic of industrialism is so functionalistic that it 
oversimplifies the development of housing policy, which is a complicated 
configuration of historical events surrounding policy-making and policy- 
implementing processes. Neither Marxism nor the logic of industrialism can account 
for the existence of organised and dynamic actors responding to changing interests. 
Moreover, neither can identify and incorporate the ever-lasting relationships
4 Harloe cannot be regarded as a genuine sense of neo-Marxists in some respects. For 
example, he admits and criticises that neo-Marxism fails to illuminate why housing policy 
plays a functionalistic role in capitalism (Harloe, 1995: 4). 1
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between the involved agents and the variety of institutions in the policy process.5 
From an empirical perspective, the argument that industrialisation accompanied by 
economic growth simultaneously leads to a specific type of housing policy and 
develops through identical stages is not strongly supported by the statistical 
evidence (see Schmidt, 1989, Doling, 1990). It seems, at least so far, that little 
credible evidence has been found to justify the Marxist view on housing policy at the 
comparative level. In addition, the Marxist perspective is not able to clarify how 
several radical measures e.g. rent control after the two World Wars, were introduced 
and survived for decades in some cases. The measures seriously infringed private 
property rights and were a substantial threat to the maintenance of capitalist order. 
In terms of methodology, the convergence models have methodological flaws when 
they are empirically tested. For instance, the convergence literature in comparative 
housing research is hugely reliant upon macro-statistical indicators, but this over­
dependence makes it insensitive to qualitative data (Kemeny and Lowe, 1998: 170).
2.2.2 ‘Divergence’ analyses of housing policy: “Housing regimes”
Because of the shortcomings of the grand theories, middle-range perspectives have 
been formulated in the comparative housing field for explaining the development of 
housing policy. The studies produced from these alternative viewpoints tend to 
highlight the differences rather than the similarities between housing policies. It is 
academically noteworthy that many analysts become interested in clustering existing 
housing policy systems, ‘housing regimes’, into a couple of distinctive groups. 
Significant case studies of housing regimes contest the arguments put forward in 
convergence models. In these studies, representative cases are identified and 
examined to discern what policy combinations have contributed to the formation of 
different types of housing regimes in Europe and America. Case studies can be 
largely classified into two kinds. The first explicitly imports Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990) framework (Barlow and Duncan, 1994, Doling, 1999a) which has been 
influential since he identified three types of welfare capitalism. The second, 
proposed by Kemeny (1995, 2006) focuses on the nexus between the housing market 
and housing policy, particularly policy measures in the rental sector.
Barlow and Duncan (1994: 146-148) accept Esping-Andersen’s core argument that
J Of course, neo-Marxism assumes that a capital class and a class-conscious state serving the 
interests of capital are the main actors in the social policy process. Yet few analyses have 
successfully tested the hypotheses of neo-Marxism in relation to the key actors (Skocpol and 
Amenta, 1986:136).
18
there are three welfare capitalisms - liberal, conservative and social democratic 
welfare states - but modify it slightly by adding an additional housing regime - the 
rudimentary housing regime - found mainly in the Southern European states. In the 
liberal regime, the fundamental nature of official state intervention in housing is 
residual. Provision of housing is normally via the market. Only the poor who cannot 
meet housing needs through the market without financial support are targeted for 
highly stigmatised public housing. Therefore, the public housing sector covers a very 
small proportion of the population and the vast majority of public sector tenants 
belong to the most vulnerable groups in society. In the corporatist welfare regime 
where Germany is a typical case, the public sector has never sought to be 
universalistic in the provision of public housing. Disinterest in universalistic public 
housing mirrors the dominant ideology that the social hierarchy determined by the 
market should be maintained and the role of the traditional family is of importance 
in the provision of care affected by conservative and Catholic culture. Hence self- 
provided housing is common in the regime and this shows the importance of family 
in the house-building sector. Individual households are involved from the 
development of land for housing to the construction of housing to a certain extent.
In the social democratic regime, every citizen has access to many types of rented 
housing. Pervasive government interventions are identified in the production 
process and they contribute to the maintenance of dwelling standards and reducing 
housing costs. Finally, in the rudimentary regime, active public interventions have 
not been observed in the housing sector contrasted with the social democratic 
regime. The social role of providing housing has been given to the traditional 
extended family in this type of society and self-provided housing accounts for the 
lion’s share of total house stocks. Based on the general characteristics of the housing 
regimes, Barlow and Duncan carry out case studies of three countries - Britain, 
France and Sweden - close to the ideal types of each regime. By examining the fast­
growing regions in these three states, they refute the general belief that free-market 
mechanisms are the most efficient way to solve housing problems, before concluding 
that the relatively regulated Swedish housing system has performed best on key 
indicators such as output levels, building costs and housing prices.
Doling (1999a: 156-164) uses the conceptual definition of 'decommodification' 
proposed by Esping-Andersen to investigate the decommodifying effect of housing 
policy in the UK, West Germany and Sweden. In defining the concept, he argues that 
the degree of de-commodification in housing depends on both the rules of access 
and the rules of exit. According to the rules of access, the fewer financial criteria of
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access to housing there are, the more decommodified housing is provided. By the 
other criterion, the rules of exit, the less rigid the changes in income level by which 
tenancy is commenced or terminated in the non-market allocation, the more 
decommodified housing is provided. Based on these rules, Doling measures the 
degree of decommodification in the UK, Sweden, and West Germany which are 
typical states of the three welfare regimes. The results of his analysis reveal a 
ranking order for housing policy that approximately runs counter to Esping- 
Andersen's ranking of general welfare orientations. UK social policy is generally 
characterised by its low level of decommodification by Esping-Andersen. Yet its 
score on housing indicators is higher than that of Sweden, which is regarded as a 
social democratic welfare state with a high level of decommodification by Esping- 
Andersen.
Some students of housing policy have questioned the application of Esping- 
Andersen's typology to the analysis of housing, since the mix of state-market in the 
provision of housing provision is quite different from the mix of state-market in 
other welfare pillars. Kemeny (2006, 1995) in particular is representative of this 
view and proposes an alternative framework for typology work. He divides the 
housing policy clusters of the industrialised societies into two regimes: dualist rental 
systems and integrated (or unitary) rental markets. He criticises the Anglo-Saxon 
bias prevalent in academia and Kemeny (1995: Ch 1) strongly opposes the 
conventional wisdom favouring the free market, a typical Anglo-Saxon concept and 
disregarding the German social market in the analysis of the market system. 
Affected by this tendency, it has been presumed that the free market has been the 
overwhelming or sometimes a single concept in housing policy analysis. To 
challenge this analytical myth, two sorts of housing market are suggested by Kemeny 
and different ideological rationales are identified for the two housing regimes. The 
laissez-faire ideology is that market participants are able to maximise their utility in 
the ‘free’ (or ‘profit-driven’ as Kemeny puts it) market without governmental 
intervention and provides a rationale for minimum government intervention. In 
contrast, the values of social market theory aim “to strike a balance between 
economic and social priorities and thereby ameliorate the undesirable effects of the 
market from within” (Kemeny, 1995: n)- Advocates of social market theory believe 
that government intervention in the market is necessary and simultaneously 
desirable, but it must be ‘market-conforming’ (Müller-Armack, 1989: 84 cited in 
Kemeny, 1995:12).
Grounded in these distinctive approaches to the market, Kemeny’s analysis (1995:
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Ch 2-3, 2006: 1-3) identifies two different housing policy regimes. He argues that 
the critical element determining the organisation of the whole housing system is 
how the rental system is structured. The specific way in which a rental system is 
structured results from "the interplay between processes of economic change in 
rental housing stocks and the development of policy strategies to channel that 
change" (1995: 38). To understand how the two regimes work, it is first necessary to 
break down the logic of the two core mechanisms: ‘economic change in rental 
housing stock’ and ‘the dynamic of policy strategy.’ The important process related to 
the former mechanism is maturation, and the power structure surrounding policy 
strategy is critical in the understanding of the latter.
Kemeny (1995: 42) defines maturation as "the decline in the real value of the debt 
of a stock of dwellings as measured by the growing differentials between the average 
outstanding debt per dwelling for a given stock of dwellings expressed as a 
percentage of the value of outstanding debt per newly acquired or renovated 
dwelling.” Following this definition, it can be said that the faster the cost of 
obtaining new stocks increases, the faster the existing stocks mature. Besides the 
speed of adding new stocks, the process of maturation also depends on factors like 
tenure, degree of investment on existing stocks, the extent of equity leakage in a sale 
of dwelling stock (Kemeny, 1995: 44-46). According to Kemeny (1995: 42_48) given 
the variations in the degree of maturation, politicians must devise strategies for cost 
renting when cost renting matures and falls below private market rent. From the 
strategic choices, two contrasting policy responses to matured cost renting can be 
observed in the developed welfare states: encouraging and suppressing. The purpose 
of the encouraging strategy is to make cost renting competitive with profit renting 
and owner-occupation, by taking advantage of maturation through increasing new 
stocks and gradually phasing out rent regulations and subsidies. The suppressing 
strategy is intended to restrict cost renting to the residualised public sector by 
undermining the advantage of maturation through a range of measures such as 
limiting the access to cost renting, charging surplus-generating rent and the 
discounted sales of dwelling stocks. The different strategies adopted towards cost 
renting have created two rental systems in the advanced economies: a dualist rental 
system and a unitary rental market. In the dualist rental system, only the poor who 
cannot afford housing on the market have access to the state-controlled public sector. 
The vast majority of the population must rely on owner occupation or the profit 
renting sector to meet their housing needs. On the other hand, any households in the 
integrated rental market can have access to rental housing provided by non-profit 
organisations. Assisted by regulations or subsidies for the growth of non-profit
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organisations, they are able to compete with other profit-pursuing firms or agencies 
on the open market in the ideal integrated rental market.
In a later publication, Kemeny (2006: 1-18) discusses the political power structure 
that affects the formation of different strategies towards cost renting in a more 
concrete but nevertheless hypothetical way. The typology proposed in the article is 
more refined in the sense that it matches the integrated lental market with the 
various sorts of corporatism and categorises it into a couple of sub-regimes shown in 
<Table 2.1>. The subtle treatment of the integrated rental market indicates that the 
corporatist political system and social forces leading the corporatism are core 
variables for explaining the variants of the integrated rental market. Kemeny argues 
that corporatism is the political background of the integrated rental market by 
identifying the affinity between the variations of corporatism and the integrated 
rental market. What makes his argument even more interesting is the weak 
rationales for the Scandinavian regime as an independent model in housing. The 
Scandinavian regime has long been seen as one of the distinctive regimes not only in 
Esping-Andersen’s typology but also in most comparative studies. Yet the solid 
status of the Nordic countries is collapsed in Kemeny’s housing regime. To Kemeny, 
the social democratic regime in Esping-Andersen’s classification is a variant of 
corporatism. It is, on the whole, observed that there is a close link between the 
absence of corporatism with the right-wing hegemonic coalition and the dualist 
rental system.
< Table 2.1 > Systems of power and housing regimes
A Left-Rieht scale system of power Housing regime
Right-wing hegemonic coalition Dualist rental system
Capital-led corporatism Non-profit influenced integrated rental market
Power-balanced corporatism Non-profit led integrated rental market
Labour-led corporatism Non-profit dominated integrated rental market
Source: Kemeny (2006:13)
2.2.3 New ‘convergence’ analyses of housing policy
Despite their substantial differences in the historical development of their housing 
policies, the following common phenomenon in housing policy can be identified 
across European countries recently: the increasing involvement of the market in the 
provision of housing, encouragement of home ownership, the introduction of market 
principles into the social housing sector and the deregulation of housing finance 
markets (Kleinman, . 996 : 174). Each of these changes is associated with 
overwhelming neoliberal reforms and spreading globalisation. These interrelated
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streams prompt the revival of the convergence theme in comparative housing policy. 
For example ‘Right to Buy’ in Britain during the Thatcher government was radical 
enough to break down the fundamental structure of the existing housing system (see 
Forrest and Murie, 1991, Malpass and Murie, 1999, Pierson, 1994, Jones and Murie, 
2006 for the review of the British case). The sale of council housing was the 
principal driving force behind the ‘property-owning democracy’ created by the 
Thatcher government and the reform came to symbolise ‘a central part of the 
ideological crusade’ (Forrest and Murie, 1991: 6). The overall size of the social 
housing sector has shrunk in those countries experiencing drastic housing reforms 
as the sales of social housing increased and the construction of new public stock 
simultaneously decreased. Along with the sale of public housing units, neo-liberal 
remedies were also adopted to manage the social housing sector. The price 
mechanism and the principle of competition were introduced to manage the 
remaining public housing. These neo-liberal changes to social housing were 
frequently described with terms such as ‘residualization’ (Malpass, 1990) or 
‘privatization’ (Forrest and Murie, 1991) to depict the withdrawal of government 
intervention in public housing and the shrinking role of the public sector in meeting
housing needs.
Neo-liberalism has in some cases been reinforced by globalisation, a combination 
causing further significant transformations in domestic housing policy. Notable 
dimensions of globalisation are easy access to global financial markets and the 
existence of freely-moving international capital. Globalisation is “a process through 
which national economies are becoming more open and thus more subject to 
supranational economic influences and less amenable to national control” (Mishra, 
1999: 3-4 )- This puts governments under enormous pressure to reform domestic 
housing policy in accordance with the principles of laissez-faire. The transformation 
of global financial market is systematically linked to the restructure of the domestic 
housing market where the market participants have relied on the domestic financial 
institutions to borrow long-term loans for house building and house purchasing. 
Housing systems, particularly with respect to regulations on housing finance, are 
under considerable pressure to reorganise in the restructuring process by the 
demands of supranational capital for maximising their profits. The potency of these 
demands means that globalisation has provoked a general withdrawal of state 
intervention in the regulation of finance for home ownership in the light of the 
deregulation of general finance markets (Clapham, 2006: 58)- Once again, there is 
a possibility housing policies may ‘converge’ in line with the deregulation of the 
housing finance system. Globalisation might bring about convergence in the
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intermediation system for financing mortgages, because a more open economy 
makes it easy for domestic lenders to raise funds on the international capital market 
and to supply cheaper mortgages with competitive terms (Stephens, 2003: 1013).
With respect to the impact of globalisation on housing policy, it is necessary to 
ascertain the development of a new technique, ‘securitisation’ in financial 
derivatives. ‘Securitisation’ refers to the process of pooling mortgage loans to sell as 
‘mortgaged backed securities’ (MBS) on the financial markets. Liquidity is increased 
through the securitisation and risks from original mortgages are reduced by leaving 
the original loans out of balance sheets when lenders sell MBS in the bond market 
(Dennis and Pinkowish, 2004: 208-9). Securitisation allows lenders like banks and 
building societies to create extra credits for further loans, and to ‘collect’ debts which 
would otherwise take more than two decades to be repaid. The recent development 
of securitisation introduced in the 1970s made the technique a principal “pillar of 
the structured finance revolution in modern finance” as the practice flourished in 
the US sub-prime mortgage market (Kim and Renaud, 2009: 14). Total values of 
residential backed mortgage securities (RMBS) issued reached over US $3,000 
billion in 2003 and even in Europe where securitisation was late to be introduced, 
the total values of issued RMBS in 2005 (€326 billion) were almost three times 
those of issued RMBS in 2001 (€112 billion) for less than 4 years (Aalbers, 2009: 
402).
The deregulation of the housing finance system in combination with securitisation 
in the global capital market has enabled the continued growth in rates of home 
ownership in many advanced economies for the last two decades. The steady growth 
of home ownership and the global house price boom have been fuelled by the 
rocketing provision of credit created by deregulation of intermediation system for 
housing finance and the cross-border transaction of MBS on the international 
financial market. Therefore, it could be claimed that globalisation has facilitated the 
convergence towards overwhelming home ownership and residual social housing in 
the advanced economies, by deregulating the housing finance system and restraining 
public investment in social housing. And indeed, there are a few case studies that 
have adopted the term ‘convergence’ or ‘stages’ to portray what has taken place in 
housing policy since the 1980s. Ghékiere s (1992 cited in Kleinman, 1996) 
‘convergence model’ and Boelhouwer and van der Heijden’s (1992) ‘four stages’ are 
representative of the literature on the ‘new’ convergence, because the studies 
commonly pose the argument that neoliberal ideology and globalisation are major 
causal factors to fuel convergence when it comes to a wide range of changes in
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housing policy after the end of the Golden Age.
2.2.4 Counter-arguments against the new convergence thesis
Are housing policy and housing systems in Europe and America really converging 
into a specific model or phase? Are the housing regimes being dismantled facing a 
new era during which neoliberal values and globalisation will prevail? The first step 
towards answering these questions is to investigate what is happening in the housing 
system affected by changing housing policy in a comparative level.
< Table 2.2 > Levels of and change in home ownership as a percentage of 
__________ household tenure, iq6o-earIy iqqos ________
Country Early 1960s 1970s Early 1990s Change: i960 -early 1990s
Australia 63____ 67 70 7
Canada 66 60 64 -2
Ireland 60 71 81 21
New Zealand 69 68 71 2
UK 42 49 68 26
USA 64 65 64 O
Denmark 43 49 51 8
Finland 57 59 67 10
Norway 53 53 59 6
Sweden 36 35 42 6
Austria 38 _____ 41 55 17
Belgium 50 55 62 12
France 41 45 54 1.3
Germany 29 36 ______38 _______9_
Italy 45____ 50 ______67 22
Netherlands 29 35 _____ 44 15
Switzerland 34____ 28 _____ 30 ______ -J_ _
Japan 71____ _____ 59 61 -10
Sources: Castles (1998a: 251)
The most striking phenomenon is the steady growth of home ownership in most 
Western welfare states mentioned above. Home ownership has been growing for the 
last three decades and has become the major tenure across the developed countries, 
except in a few cases. <Table 2.2> illustrates the proportion of home-owning 
households to total households, which increased to beyond half of all households in 
most countries by the early t990s. Home ownership became the predominant tenure 
in Europe and America during the last decade of the 20» century. Home owners 
have benefited significantly from policy changes prioritising home ownership over 
renting and the typical cases of pro-home ownership policy are found in Anglo- 
Saxon countries. Government programmes in USA and Australia led to high rises in
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owner-occupation in the 1950s and the massive sales of social rented housing at 
discounted price encouraged dramatic increase in the rate of owner-occupation in 
the UK during the 1980s (Stephens, 2003: 1013).
On the other hand, it should be noted that some countries have bucked the trend, 
with home ownership either falling or remaining constant, and this fact necessitates 
careful investigations to interpret the counter-movement in comparative contexts. 
Firstly, the ratio of home ownership declined in three countries - Japan, Switzerland 
and Canada - during the same period. Secondly, the ratio of home ownership in 
some European welfare states - Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
- was still less than half in the early 1990s. Interestingly, all of these countries are 
categorised by Kemeny as ‘integrated rental markets’ in which various non-profit 
firms or associations play a leading role in the supply of rental housing and agents 
assisted by government can compete with private companies in the housing market. 
In addition, the rates of home ownership in continental Europe e.g. Denmark, 
France and Austria, were no more than 55% by the early 1990s - a figure not quite 
sufficient for us to say for certain that these countries have been moving towards 
home owning society or ‘dualist rental market,’ when other countries in the sample 
average around 70% in terms of home ownership rates.
Much more important than the figures are the causal factors that have made home 
ownership the dominant tenure, and the ways in which the housing system has been 
structured by these causal forces. Similar outcomes are not necessarily produced by 
identical forces and get through the specific causal process. The varying contexts of 
both causal factors and routes might create quite different social meanings from a 
local community to a nation-state, even though they have equivalent ratios of home 
ownership rate. In conclusion, it would not be particularly plausible to suggest that 
the housing systems in Europe are converging towards home ownership or that the 
European housing regimes are collapsing based on the evidence of a single indicator, 
i.e. the home ownership rate.
In order to critically evaluate the validity of the new convergence thesis, it is 
necessary to examine not only whether housing policy has been converging, but also 
the causes behind convergence as well as the direction in which policies are 
converging towards. For instance, it is widely accepted that there has been a 
conspicuous shift from “bricks-and-mortar subsidies to suppliers or supply-side 
regulations on rent levels to demand-side subsidies supplementing the income gap 
in renting or purchasing houses. This shift was partially affected by the belief that 
the new policy initiatives were more in line with the neo-liberal view than previous
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subsidies to suppliers and supply-side regulations, since they seemed to reflect 
consumer choices and to conform to market principles (Kemp, 2007: 267). However, 
the placing of demand-side subsidies at the centre of housing policy can be 
understood from a different viewpoint, which contrasts with the interpretation that 
the emphasis of consumer subsidies mirrors the reduced commitment of 
government to housing. The preference for demand-side subsidies is often regarded 
as a policy response to the changes arising from the transformation to post­
industrial society distinguished by aggravating income inequality and the 
individualisation of social risks (Kemp, 2007: 268). In other words, the movement 
to demand-side subsidies reflects a change in the way housing problems are 
perceived and the objective of housing policy in the changing view is to relieve the 
financial distress of an increasing number of low income households and the 
distributional problems of housing (Oxley, 2004: 196). Given that interpretations of 
contemporary changes in housing policy do not appear to fully confirm predictions 
and reasons that the new convergence thesis posits, it would seem reasonable to 
conclude that what has been occurring in housing policy cannot be designated a 
unilateral movement towards a single type of housing model in the developed 
welfare states.
More generally, there are several theoretical reasons why housing systems in 
advanced capitalist societies have not converged yet and will not do in the near 
future. Firstly, all social policies are basically the by-products of political struggles 
between social actors with conflicting interests in modern democracy. In the 
capitalist order, a major pillar of the welfare state, the distribution of goods and 
services in the market is determined by the price mechanism. However, the market 
mechanism inevitably produces losers with a lack of economic resources and 
reducing the perils caused by this structural problem requires political solutions. 
The task is the key role of mass democracy, the other pillar of the modern welfare 
state that is able to modify market-determined distribution by the political demands 
of the disadvantaged in the market through the parliamentary and administration 
system. In terms of the nature of political struggle, the power resources model - a 
prominent theory accounting for the development and change of the welfare state — 
describes political challenges to the market-determined distribution of economic 
resources as part of the “class struggle between labour and capital. The power 
balance between labour and capital in the welfare state is fluid, because the former 
has abundant political resources enabling it to push for social reform and income 
redistribution at the expense of capital, which controls the majority of economic 
resources and the means of production in a free market (Olsen and O'Connor, 1998:
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6). Collective forces superior in number can influence the condition of the market 
and the distributional outcomes through the political arena in mass democracy 
(Korpi, 1989: 312). Indeed, it was the political conflict between the two classes that 
gave birth to the welfare state in the 19th century, according to the power resource 
model. The alternative perspective of interest-group-politics theory is that interest 
groups with conflicting interests play a much more important role than the class 
does and thus are the central actors in the politics of social policy. The growth of 
various ascriptive demographic groups such as the elderly are disregarded by class 
theories, but can be seen as one of the key variables explaining the expansion of 
welfare spending in the welfare states (Pampel and Williamson, 1988: 1425). 
Whatever the essence of the political struggle is in the advanced welfare states, there 
can be no doubt that the organised political demands of social groups are capable of 
modifying the distribution of wealth determined by the market mechanism. Likewise, 
different kinds of demands and different priorities of the raised demands for 
housing vary across the nation states or even local communities in a country. 
Various struggles between political actors hinder the irreversible pursuit of policy 
convergence in housing across the Western advanced societies.
Secondly, all social policy reforms are mediated and constrained by established 
institutions that make many reforms incremental. Institutions are historical human 
inventions structuring social and economic interaction between people. They are not 
simply dependent variables, since they affect the structure of the interactions 
between the actors engaged and the strategic choices over political issues and 
economic transactions. The current institutions mediate political decision-making, 
consecutive implementation and termination of operations in the policy process. In 
general, established institutions are apt to make the degree of changes incremental 
rather than drastic, regardless of whether the incremental reaction is desirable or 
not. Two relevant concepts are useful for understanding the incremental nature of 
institutional change: “path dependency” and “increasing returns.” Path dependency 
can be defined as the “process in which choices made in the past systematically 
constrain the choices open in the future” (Myles and Pierson, 2001: 306). The 
meaning of this, however, is not to be interpreted as simply history matters in the 
development of policy change. More precisely, it designates the importance of the 
historical aspects, that a critical juncture especially at an earlier stage and/or the 
temporal ordering in a sequence can be extremely influential in determining the 
historical routes of certain institutions or policies, most of which are stable and 
incremental in nature (Pierson, 2000: 251-267, Pierson, 2004: Ch 2, Mahoney, 
2000: 507-548). Path dependency operates by narrowing down the policy choices
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possible in practice and is reinforced by the chain of “increasing returns . The 
concept of “increasing returns” helps explain why path-dependent processes can be 
quite persistent, highlighting how transaction costs can soar in specific social 
contexts as well as the importance of temporality, timing and sequence in the events 
that social scientists study (Pierson, 2000: 251).
The institutional approach can be applied to housing studies insofar as housing 
systems are socially constructed and housing studies need to comprehend 
institutional filtering effects and their promotion of path-dependent development. 
When applying it, it should be kept in mind that the impact of institutions on 
housing reforms varies from both the structures of housing policy and the structuies 
of other related institutions in an individual country. Recent comparative housing 
research has investigated the mediating effects of institutions (or policy) and 
connected the findings with the counter-arguments of the convergence thesis. 
Kemeny’s conceptualisation of housing regimes, covered in the previous section, 
illustrates how the formation of a specific housing system is encouraged or hindered 
by housing policy, as well as how the embedded housing system can resist pressure 
towards convergence created by neoliberal ideology and widespread globalisation. 
Schwartz and Seabrooke’s (2008) work on the ‘varieties 01 residential capitalism 
also demonstrates how a variety of housing finance systems are sustained aga" 
the forces of globalisation. When they deal with the housing finance s>stem 
comparative level, they rely on two concepts borrowed from thinking on the varieties 
of capitalism and Kemeny respectively: ‘institutional complementarities (Soskice, 
1999, Hall and Soskice, 2001, Hall and Thelen, 2009) and two kinds of rental 
housing market (dualist vs. unitary rental market). The first assumption derived 
from the former concept is that housing finance systems were formed by domestic 
voters’ preferences on the basis of economic interests and the financial systems have 
“institutional complementarities with the larger economy” (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 
2008: 238) (see <Table 2.3> for summary of political features m each group).6 The 
thesis demonstrates how different housing finance institutions including regulations 
on securitisation are related to the whole housing system in the identified groups. 
The four clusters are differentiated based on the values of the two major proxy 
variables - owner-occupation rate and mortgage as a % of GDP - and each individual 
market system has its own characteristics and varying implications.
" Institutional complementarities exist between two otherMHaU & Soskice
efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficit y of the economy
2001: 17). According to this logic, a specific type of coordination m one area ot y
could promote complementary activities in other areas.
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< Table 2 .3  > Varieties of residential capitalism: Four market systems
Owner-occupation Rate 
(reflects the size of the social rental sector and thus 
commodification; partially disconnected from global markets as a
consequence)
Low High
Mortgages as 
a % of GDP 
(reflects 
securitisation 
as a cause and 
stratification 
as a
consequence;
but also a
stronger
connection to
global
financial
markets)
H
i
g
h
C orporatist M arket
Housing (but not houses) as a 
social right, but strong 
stratification of the market: 
Owner-occupiers versus 
renters; plus defamilialisation; 
plus public organisation 
control of rented housing. Low 
property tax revenues. 
Problems of inter-generational 
equity as housing market 
outsiders are priced out of 
accommodation.
Liberal M arket
Highly commodified: houses as 
assets; strong stratification of the 
market: owner-occupiers versus 
renters. Market based self-help. 
High property tax revenues. 
Problems of inter-generational 
equity as housing market outsiders 
are priced out of accommodation. 
Many of these economies were also 
‘Frontier’ societies.
L
0
w
Statist-
d evelopm entalist
Housing (but not houses) as a 
social right, but financial 
repression reduces market 
segmentation/ stratification 
(?); plus private organisations 
control rented housing. Low 
property tax revenues.
Fam ilial
Non-commodified but not 
decommodified: houses as a 
familial social good, but not as a 
social right. Stratification from 
access to formal sector 
employment. Non-market self- 
help. Low property tax revenues.
Sources: Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008: 256)
The history of welfare political economy in the Western welfare states shows that 
we cannot presume the social system of capitalism without dem y 
historical coexistence of capitalism and democracy means that mdtena 
distributed by the free market has been modified by political legislation w ten t le 
majority of people, political parties, and their legal delegates seek the redistr. ution 
of market outcomes through democratic procedures. This is why policy changes are 
fundamentally subject to a variety of political demands from organised soe.a groups, 
whether these groups are labelled 'class’ or 'interest'. However, pohttcal demands do 
not directly generate the intended changes in the process of policy reform. Every 
demand for reform is filtered through many types of institutions including forma 
political arrangements - e.g. election system, the structure of govern 
bureaucracy and the judicial system - and the present policy in force. As well as 
playing a mediating role, the institutions are often needed to 
activities of economic actors in certain circumstances, in order to guarantee the
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optimum consequences from the market.? This necessity for intervention has led 
advanced capitalist democracies to shape ‘varieties of capitalism’ and to structure 
their own institutions concomitant to their strategy for economic development.
Given the diversity of capitalism and institutional structures over the world, each 
state’s response heavily depends on domestic political situations and the related 
institutions of the market and politics. Housing systems, constructed by various 
social forces past and present, are not immune to political and institutional variables 
when explicating the present and forecasting the future at the comparative level. 
Institutional variables, in particular, tend to steer the subsequent challenges towards 
path-dependent direction by narrowing down the possible options. In conclusion, 
judging from the theoretical and empirical rationales discussed above, it would 
appear to be an oversimplification to designate the recent changes in housing policy 
and housing system in the Western democracies as the convergence of housing. 
Furthermore, it can reasonably inferred that current housing systems won’t and 
can’t deviate considerably from the paths that they developed in the past, at least not 
in the near future.
2.3 The relationship between housing and the welfare state
As far as we acknowledge that housing is a matter of politics and the impacts of 
housing policy are mediated by other related institutions, housing policy is an organ 
of the body of the welfare state. Welfare systems, as Kemeny (i995: 172) puts it, 
should be addressed as “dynamic entities rather than as merely somewhat disjointed 
and essentially inert assemblages of welfare policies.” Hence scrutinising the 
relationship between housing (and housing policy) and other social policy is of vital 
significance for further understanding of the dynamics of housing in the Western 
welfare state. Unfortunately, as several commentators have pointed out, housing 
studies have a strong bias toward empirical analysis and are less concerned about 
theorising (e.g Allen, 2005, Bengtsson, 2009, Kemeny, 1992)- In sPhe ° f  this, it is 
notable that the recent theoretical debates on the topic have begun to contribute to a 
deepening knowledge of how housing policy (or housing systems) is systematically 
linked to other social policy in the welfare state. This section will explore the core 
arguments of the relationship between housing and the welfare state.
Several comparative political economists (Kitschelt et al., 1999> Hah and Soskice, 2001, 
Soskice, 1999) argue that even private companies, generally seen as enthusiastic supporters 
of the ‘free market,’ require alternative institutions to the free market when coordination 
between actors is absent.
31
2.3.1 Home ownership and the welfare state
When comparative researchers discuss the expansion of home ownership they 
occasionally refer to a complicated nexus of connections. The growth in home 
ownership has a wide range of social implications, because it can reshape 
contemporary welfare politics across the developed economies. With the continuous 
growth of owner-occupation, the increasing present and prospective owner- 
occupiers become influential cohorts affecting power relations in politics. Power 
elites, in addition, recognise home ownership as a functional vehicle of material 
resources in reforming the high cost structure of the welfare state.
Kemeny was probably the first scholar to raise the issue of the relationship 
between home ownership and other pillars of the welfare state. He was interested in 
the puzzling correlation between high rates of home ownership and low 
development of public welfare. He suggested that there might be an increasing 
correlation between high rates of home ownership and low commitment to public 
welfare as private home ownership grows due to the privatisation (Kemeny, 1980: 
372). Kemeny (1981 cited in Castles, 1998b: 17) argued that this trade-off between 
home ownership rate and welfare provision was generated by the strong resistance 
of taxpayers who would like to purchase their houses. Since no credible comparative 
data was collected at the time, it was not until the end of the last century that the 
idea was loosely tested by Castles (1998a, 1998b) with cross-sectional comparative 
data. The results of Castles (1998b: 10-11) basically supported the trade-off nexus 
posed by Kemeny that there was a negative relationship between high rates of home 
ownership and low development of welfare states in the Western developed 
countries for the three decades from i960 to 1980. He carried out correlation 
analysis on the level of home ownership and the development of public welfare. The 
results of the analysis demonstrated that the coefficients between the rate of home 
ownership and the total expenditure on social protection (pensions and other social 
protection expenditure) were negative and statistically significant at the three points 
-1960,1970 and 1980. Only the correlation between the rate of home ownership and 
the total expenditure of public health was exceptional, which illustrated the 
statistically insignificant coefficients at i960 and 1980. The trade-off between the 
variables became weak at 1990, so the inverse relationships are significant but 
moderate. Castles, however, cast some doubt over Kemeny’s explanation of the 
causal path of the inverse relationship, that the main reason for the trade-off might 
be the resistance of home owners (and prospective home owners) to rising tax for
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the expansion of public welfare. Castles questioned Kemeny’s explanation on three 
counts. Firstly, more importance needs to be accorded to the necessity for avoiding 
deficit financing when accounting for the declined trade-off between home 
ownership and welfare expenditure in the 1980s rather than the factor of tax 
resistance. Secondly, there are potentially other causal relationships between home 
ownership and welfare expenditure. For example, widespread home ownership 
might partially decrease the need for higher pensions in society. Finally, the reverse 
causal hypothesis to that proposed by Kemeny is equally plausible, as Castles 
(1998b: 17-18) argues in the excerpt below:
There is no a priori reason why the relationship may not be entirely the 
other way around, with a weak welfare state providing an incentive to 
home ownership as a means o f life cycle saving, or a well developed state 
tax crowding out the possibility of saving for private home ownership.8
In the wake of the debate between Kemeny and Castles, a small number of 
analyses relevant to this relationship have been undertaken in the 2000s with 
improved data and investigating additional issues. Doling and Horsewood (2003) 
tested the hypothesis that home ownership would affect early retirement in the 
labour market in the developed welfare states. The results of their multiple 
regression analysis were that home ownership encouraged early retirement by 
increasing the income available to retirees (Doling and Horsewood, 2005: 303)-9 
These results supported one of the possibilities posited by Castles, that home 
ownership could provide income compensation for the elderly and play a role as an 
alternative income source in the welfare states where public welfare safety nets were 
underdeveloped (Doling and Horsewood, 2005: 303-304). Meanwhile, Fahey 
(2003) investigated the inverse relationship between pensions and home ownership 
through a case study of the Irish housing system as a typical case of a country with a 
low pensions/high home ownership trade-off. According to Fahey (2003: 171-172), 
neither the cost of purchasing housing nor government investment in the promotion 
of home ownership were so unaffordable that the costs for home ownership did not
8 Later Kemeny admitted the possibility of the reverse causal path that the stronger 
preference of home ownership might be a strategic reaction to the meagre development of 
public welfare in “New World English-speaking countries” (USA, Canada, Australia) to some 
extent, although the hypothesis cannot be tested due to the difficulty of collecting historical 
data, either (Kemeny, 2005: 65).
9 However, the result is not reliable enough to be generalised without problems, since this 
multiple regression model has some serious methodological limitations. Firstly, the total 
number of countries is less than twenty in all five equations (from 13 to 18), and there are not 
enough countries to obtain stable credibility. Secondly, the data used are aggregate, not 
individual household. Individual household data seems to be the more appropriate source for 
the analysis considering the research question.
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seriously crowd out funding for the generous pensions benefits from the 1960s to the 
early 1990s. He also argued that the implicit income effect generated by home 
ownership did not weaken the incentives for the elderly to push for higher pensions, 
since the income effect of home ownership was not substantial, so the poverty rate 
amongst the elderly remained the highest level amongst all age cohorts. In Conley 
and Gifford’s (2006) multivariate regression analysis, the hypothesis that the weaker 
the public provisions of welfare hedging social risks are, the more inclined people 
are to possess home as a kind of “private social insurance” (Conley and Gifford, 
2006: 62). The findings of their analysis revealed a “substitution effect” of home 
ownership over inequality mediated by social expenditure, whereas the findings did 
not support the hypothesis of an “income effect” that increasing income by 
redistributive social policy was a drive to universal home ownership. The 
implications of the findings are well-summarised in relation to the debate between 
Kemeny and Castles at the below excerpt.
We found an inverse relationship between the degree of economic 
inequality and widespread home ownership in a country. This finding is 
consistent with earlier works by both Kemeny and Castles. It also lends 
support to perspectives stressing the promotion of owner-occupancy as an 
instrument for ameliorating the detrimental social effects of market forces 
in the absence of redistributive programs. In contrast, we find little 
evidence that economic parity on the housing demand side leads to more 
widespread ownership (Conley and Gifford, 2006: 75).
While each of these studies identified an inverse relationship between a high level 
of home ownership and low commitment to public welfare posited by Kemeny and 
Castles, the plausible causal paths were not rigorously tested in a reliable manner 
due to the practical problem of scarce data. Nevertheless, these studies were fruitful 
in the sense that have they inspired subsequent researchers to link home ownership 
with other aspects of social policy in the welfare state and to seek to ascertain how 
the structure of a welfare state affects this relationship.
2.3.2 ‘Asset-based’ welfare states or ‘collateral-indebted’ diswelfare 
states
The expansion of owner-occupation is particularly remarkable in the English- 
speaking countries, Kemeny’s dualist rental market. Even several countries in the 
integrated rental market deviate from the regime proceeded by the privatisation of
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the public (or non-profit) sector and deregulation of the housing finance system 
(e.g. the Dutch privatisation of non-profit housing associations). Encouraged by 
neoliberal fervour and the globalised finance system, rising owner-occupation has 
profound implications for the reshaping of the welfare states.
The wide ranging social implications of a home-owning society are well- 
documented by Malpass (2008: 9-11) who highlights three dimensions when 
discussing the new context of the British welfare state. Firstly, a large owner- 
occupied sector in the housing market becomes a prime determinant of individual 
well-being by uneven access to valued social resources like good neighbours, 
schools and hospitals. Secondly, in relation to government budget, both selling 
rental units in the public sector and home ownership in the housing market are 
profitable for any government that has difficulties in overcoming its fiscal deficits. 
The government obtains financial profits from the sales of public housing and 
thereby the sales reduce investment in the maintenance of social housing. The 
government basically collects the tax revenue from stamp duty and inheritance tax 
when owned houses are transacted or inherited. Finally, the accumulated wealth of 
home ownership, the largest asset in most households’ portfolios, is a major source 
of consumer spending. In the long-run agenda of the British Labour government in 
the early 2000s, the promotion of home ownership was seen as a way of providing 
‘asset-based welfare’ to low income households and incorporated into key agenda 
in social policy - e.g. the Saving Gateway and the Child Trust Fund as means 
(Groves et al., 2007a: 185). To achieve this objective, Labour encouraged home 
ownership through shared ownership and Homebuy schemes for low income 
tenants (Groves et al., 2007a: 190). With these ‘momentous’ changes in the way 
housing is viewed, they argued, housing would be transformed “from wobbly pillar 
to potential cornerstone of the new welfare state” (Groves et al., 2007a: 190).
However, it is doubtful whether the shift is fundamental enough to be designated 
as a ‘paradigm’ transformation towards the reconfiguration of the sustainable 
welfare state in future. Scepticism on the view of ‘housing asset-based’ welfare 
state is raised surrounding the two dimensions. The first aspect is whether home 
ownership can play the constant role of hedging economic risks over the life course 
or not. A scepticism on the stability of home ownership comes from the fluctuating 
cycle in housing prices around the world for the last four decades (see Ahearne et 
al., 2005 for the global trend in housing price). More than high volatility of housing 
price, the cycle of housing price shows substantial correlations between the 
advanced economies. According to the IMF (2004» ch 2 cited in Kim and Renaud,
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2009), the average cross-country correlation was 0.4 during the period from 1980 
to 2003. The combination of volatile housing price with the correlated movement 
generated a global housing bubble and the abrupt collapse of housing values was 
followed by deep recession in goods and service sectors of the economy. The latest 
episode is the global economic recession triggered by the credit crunch in the UK 
and USA mortgage markets in 2007. The fact that the epicentres of global 
economic crisis are the typical home owning societies in which the unregulated 
mortgage market developed well-illustrates how vulnerable owner-occupier 
dominated societies are to economic crises mainly originating from sub-prime 
mortgages delinquencies and high-risk mortgage-backed securities.
The second aspect concerns the new social cleavages emerging in home-owning 
societies. One of these cleavages is between owner occupiers and tenants in the 
public or private rental sector. The rising share of home ownership as a proportion 
of total wealth seriously can aggravate inequalities of wealth between owner 
occupiers and tenants. More serious social cleavage was created between owner- 
occupiers and tenants in the public rental sector as the public rental sector was 
filled with the poor and grew stigmatised (see Forrest and Murie, 199b Malpass, 
1990, Saunders 1990 for a review of the British case). In the case of Britain, this 
kind of tenure division enhanced social cleavage between different tenures as the 
haves’ continued to move into home ownership and ‘the have-nots became 
concentrated in the public rental sector (Saunders, 1990: 317). The other problem 
is the cleavage between debt-free owners and indebted owners. This cleavage 
frequently overlaps with intergenerational conflicts between the old who have fully 
redeemed their loans and the young still shouldering the heavy burden of an 
unpaid mortgage. This is because the housing costs of owner occupation are so 
high in young age to be “skewed towards the early years of the life cycle (Kemeny 
1995:169). The last cleavage might be generated within the home ownership sector, 
which is the conflict between owner occupiers in metropolitan areas and owner 
occupiers in local areas. This cleavage is not systematically addressed in the 
previous literature. Yet the conflict might occur when the price gap between 
metropolitan areas and local provinces is so large that owner occupiers enjoy 
asymmetric profits from home ownership in a state depending on the location of 
ownership.
Because of these limited functions and the problems caused by overwhelming 
home ownership, the contemporary housing system progressing towards a 
paradigm shift into ‘asset-based’ welfare states is not a plausible scenario. And
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even if there is paradigm shift of this kind, it will be highly undesirable given that 
the realisation of an ‘asset-based welfare state’ might distort the system into a 
series ‘collateral-indebted diswelfare states’ because of the varying social cleavages 
that over-reliance on home ownership produces.
2.4 Concluding remarks
Most comparative housing studies vary from the grand perspectives, clustered into 
the ‘convergence’ approach to the middle-range perspectives, often described as 
‘housing regimes’, depending on various levels of generalisations in their research 
findings. Although the old convergence perspectives- i.e. the ‘logic of industrialism’ 
and “structural Marxist political economy” lost their explanatory force, the 
arguments of the new convergence discourse have been persuasive. Key elements of 
this one are the increasing privatisation of social housing and the deregulation of 
housing finance markets. In particular, the deregulation of the housing finance 
system in combination with securitisation in the global capital market has enabled 
the continued growth in rates of home ownership in many advanced economies for 
the last two decades. The steady growth of home ownership and the global house 
price boom have been fuelled by the rocketing provision of credit created by the 
deregulation of intermediation systems for housing finance and the cross-border 
transaction of MBS on the international financial market.
Nevertheless, following the arguments of the middle-range perspectives, this study 
underscores that the analysis of housing systems should pay attention to analysing 
ideological stances towards housing and the variety of institutional structures 
supporting them. This is because the means of intervention in the housing market 
and their consequences will vary according to the prior objectives that a society 
wishes to pursue such as solidarity, social justice or social inclusion. Different kinds 
of demands and different priorities from the increasing demands for housing vary 
across the nation states or even local communities. Moreover, similar outcomes are 
not necessarily produced by identical forces and get through the specific causal 
process. The varying contexts of both causal factors and paths might create quite 
different social meanings from a local community to a nation-state.
Insofar as we admit that housing is a matter of politics and the impacts of housing 
policy are mediated by other related institutions, housing policy is an organ of the
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body of the welfare state. Scrutinising the relationship between housing policy and 
other social policies is of vital significance for comprehensive understanding of the 
dynamics of housing in Western welfare states. The growth in home ownership 
particularly has a wide range of social implications. It can reshape contemporary 
welfare politics, attitudes towards taxation and outputs of welfare systems across the 
Western developed economies. Therefore, the analysis of the relationship should be 
further investigated in the future to understand the impact of housing and related 
institutions when reforming welfare systems in Western developed economies. Of 
course, to stay at the Occidental world is not sufficient for us to understand the 
diverse dynamics of housing over the globe. At the regional level, housing 
researchers have to extend the range of research subjects to non-Western countries 
where different combinations of values, politics and institutions have structured 
varying housing systems and the relationship between housing and the other pillars 
of the welfare state. The following Chapter moves to the newly industrialised 
countries in Asian-Pacific region, the other side of Europe and America, for the 
investigation of how housing and housing policy have been perceived and developed, 
which leads on to investigation of the housing/welfare state connection.
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Chapter three
Non-Western approaches to welfare and housing: The 
experiences of the newly industrialised states in Asia
3*i Arguments about the Asian welfare system
The rising academic interest in the Asian welfare system is a fairly recent 
phenomenon. It was facilitated by two interlinked academic booms after the late 
1980s. One is the discourse on the ‘developmental states’ focusing on the leading 
role played by government in the process of industrialisation (e.g. Chang, 2003, 
2006, Deyo, 1987, Haggard, 2004, Henderson and Appelbaum, 1992, Johnson, 1982, 
Wade, 1990, 2000, Weiss, 1999, Woo-Cumings, 1999, 2007). The discourse has 
become an influential perspective accounting for the unique experiences of the Asian 
Tigers (or Dragons) in the economic strategy for industrialisation. The other boom is 
the upsurges in the discussions about the welfare regime in comparative contexts 
since Esping-Andersen argued that there were ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism in 
Europe and America. A number of comparative researchers have engaged with the 
pros and cons of Esping-Andersen’s influential typology. Although objections to the 
idea that there are three types of welfare capitalism have been raised, the argument 
that there are qualitatively different kinds of welfare system around the world is 
widely accepted by comparative researchers in social policy. Along with other 
regional welfare models outside Europe and America, the Asian welfare system 
became a subject for further discussion. Many arguments have been made about 
whether the system might form a unique welfare model differentiated from Esping- 
Andersen’s three types (see Esping-Andersen, 1997, Goodman and Peng, 1996, 
Holliday, 2000, 2005, Midgley, 1986, Jones, 1990, 1993, Kwon, 1997, 2005, White 
and Goodman, 1998). Influenced by the two interlinked strands, the challenges of 
distinguishing the Asian welfare system as a unique way to ensure social welfare 
have been frequently observed since the last decade of the 20th century. This section 
aims to review the key viewpoints of the two streams and to examine what 
implications for housing studies of Asian states can be drawn from the perspectives.
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In early interpretations of the Asian newly industrialised countries (hereafter 
NICs) the Asian NIC miracle was occasionally put down to the beneficial 
consequences of neoliberal prescriptions emphasising the efficiency of a laissezfaire 
economy (e.g. Ranis and Fei, 1975. Balassa, 1982 cited in Chang, 2003: 111). 
Neoliberal economists believed that the economic success of Asian NICs stemmed 
from short-run optimal resource allocation in the market, which can ensure 
economic growth in the long run (Wade, 1992: 270-271)- The advocates of neoliberal 
explanations claimed that, in terms of trade, realistic exchange rates and liberalised 
trade policy cranked up the engine of high performance in Korea and Taiwan during 
the early phase of industrialisation (Chang, 2003: 11). However, the neoliberal 
viewpoint began to be challenged in the 1980s, because of its reliance upon 
discredited assumptions and evidence. The most persuasive counter-argument came 
from a case study of the Japanese development model undertaken by Johnson 
(1982) which emphasised the role played by elite policy makers in the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) in setting up the goals and strategy of 
industrial policy. The plan-rational Japanese model was designated as a 
“developmental state,” a combination of private ownership with state guidance that 
is neither a plan-irrational socialist state nor a market-rational regulatory state such 
as the Western capitalist economies (Johnson, 1982: 18-26). Following Johnson s 
refutation of the neoliberal thesis, a number of works have been published on the 
key features of the developmental strategy of East Asian states over the last two 
decades (e.g. Amsden, 1989, Chang, 2003, Deyo, 1987, 2006, Evans, 1995, Haggard, 
*990 , Henderson and Appelbaum, 1992, Wade, 199°, Weiss, 1999, 2000, Woo- 
Cumings, 1999, 2007). This group of publications is frequently brought together 
under the unbrella of the ‘developmental states.’ This is probably because the word 
is a well-fitting term condensing “the seamless web of political, bureaucratic, and 
moneyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist Northeast Asia” (Woo- 
cumings, 1999:1).
The common features of the developmental states are well-summarised by Weiss 
(2000: 23) who identifies three elements - “transformative goals, a pilot agency and 
institutionalized government-business cooperation” as the common constitutes of 
the developmental states in the region. Firstly, the developmental states aimed to 
expand productive capacity and to run after the industrial technology of the 
advanced economies. Secondly, relatively autonomous pilot agencies and elite 
bureaucrats loyal to the state’s goals took the leading roles in the industrialisation
3.1.1 The burgeoning school of the ‘developmental states’
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project. Thirdly, the states maintained close coordinating ties with organised 
business players and utilised these to push forward with industrial projects.
When the Asian Tigers embarked upon industrialisation in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, the serious problem they faced was how to survive the destitute 
conditions that plagued their countries, either newly independent from imperial 
powers or devastated by the War or consecutive civil wars (see Henderson and 
Appelbaum 1992: 5-11 for historical legacies in East Asian societies). Given the need 
for survival in the world system, the East Asian ‘developmental state emerged and 
evolved as a nation-building project (Castells, 1992: 58). More specifically, in order 
to improve their economic performance, pilot agencies such as the Economic 
Planning Board (Korea), the Council for Economic Planning and Development 
(Taiwan) and the Economic Development Board (Singapore) took over responsibility 
for anchoring and guiding the direction of the region’s economies, coming up with 
long-run blueprints for economic development (see Cheng, Haggard and Kang, 1998, 
Dent, 2003, Stiglitz, 1996 for the roles of pilot agencies in Asian Tigers). These long­
term plans were backed up by further medium- or short-term plans such as five-year 
economic development plans. Led by the pilot agencies, the principal strategy in 
many states, e.g. Korea and Taiwan, was to give selective assistance to target 
industries. The focused cultivation of leading industries was intended to nurture 
competitive firms in a global market. The governments in Asian NICs selected a 
couple of existing industries, which then enjoyed privileges through the affluent 
supply of credit and favourable tax benefits but had to be obedient to government 
controls on entry or pricing in return (Chang, 2003: 116). Not content with the role 
of guide or coordinator, central governments organised new activities, even though 
the activities were outside their standard tasks. For instance, pilot agencies often 
took a more active role in implementing the planned strategy, as well as making 
plans. The Economic Development Board in Singapore was concerned with 
collecting information on appropriate products for export and invited business 
executives to travel abroad to officially advertise their pioneering challenges to 
foreign markets (Stiglitz, 1996: 171). Moreover, the governments often formed new 
industrial sectors out of state firms, or credit rationing and the guarantee of loans on 
behalf of private firms (Henderson and Appelbaum, 1992: 22).
The administrative achievements of the developmental states were partially down 
to the efficient organisation of the bureaucratic system. Perspectives on modern 
bureaucracy have always been conflicting, as can be seen in the continuous tension 
between the Weberian view, which regards bureaucracy as a necessary complement
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to market-oriented institutions in capitalist growth, and the Smithian view that 
bureaucracy should be limited to ensuring property rights (Evans and Rauch, 1999: 
748-749). As far as East Asia is concerned, several individual cases studies (Johnson, 
1982, Amsden, 1989, Wade, 1990; respectively Japan, Korea and Taiwan) have 
reached a conclusion supporting the former view that bureaucracy is essential for 
economic growth. In particular, the case studies of developmental states illustrate 
that state bureaucracy can be a very effective way of encouraging long-term 
investment by private firms and that bureaucracy can remain credible and coherent 
even in the long run (Evans and Rauch, 1999: 752-753)- 1°  the Asian NICs, 
professional elite bureaucrats were recruited and trained at the central departments 
and they served political regime and the goals the regime set. Elite bureaucrats could 
develop job skills and be promoted without the threat of their professional career 
being terminated, in so far as they were loyal to the regime. Weberian bureaucracy 
was adjusted to the needs of the Asian NICs to deliver administrative services in a 
well-organised and coherent manner, and acted as the primary vehicle driving 
unprecedented industrialisation.
The last element of the Asian NICs’ success lies in their institutional structures. 
Successive governments have institutionalised formal and informal arrangements to 
coordinate with private actors or enforce the activities necessary for development. 
Not only the general issues in economy e.g. export promotion, wage-setting, but also 
the firm-specific or industry-level agenda have been negotiated through the 
involvement of representatives of industry associations or big companies (Haggard, 
2004: 61). The Asian representative institutions are, as Haggard (2004: 61) 
highlights, different from corporatist institutions in Europe, since labour and other 
groups have been repressed or represented by token associations. When 
coordinating with the economic actors in the private sector, it should be 
remembered that governments had considerable discretion in relation to private 
actors. Their relative independence prevented states from being controlled by the 
private sector. The autonomy of states enabled them to set national goals without 
pressure from private interests and to utilise the connections with the private sector 
to achieve their goals (Evans, 1995: 32). The networks between states and private 
sectors often worked as enforcing instruments due to the dominant status in the 
relationship with private firms. For example, administrative guidance, which was 
loosely used in Japanese industrialisation and became a much more coercive means 
" ’hen it was transferred to Korea, virtually delivered mandatory commands of 
government to private firms beyond public advice (Woo-Cumings, 2007:117)-
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Developmental state theory has certain virtues when it comes to shedding light on 
the unique historical routes out of the Anglo-Saxon experience unfolded by the 
normative view of laissezfaire economics as the way of economic development. It is 
unlikely, as Chang (2007: 19) asserts, that there is a single universal path leading to 
economic development and institutional evolution regardless of the contextual 
differences. The debates about the Asian modes of development make us aware of 
how different societies have invented or modified optimal coordinating strategies 
under the given conditions. Notwithstanding the virtues of the theory, there are 
several problems with applying the model and developmental state theory per se. 
Firstly, in the matter of regional coverage, the model can be applied to the 
experiences of North-East Asian states - Japan, Korea and Taiwan - at most plus 
Singapore in some respects. The essential characteristics of the developmental states 
do not neatly correspond with the characteristics of developmental governance in 
South-East Asia (Weiss, 2000: 24). In the different governances between East Asia 
and South Asia, Hendersen and Appelbaum (1992: 15) argue that Hong Kong and 
Singapore seem to have implemented policies which conform more to free-market 
norms than the values of the newly industrialised states in North-East Asia. 
Meanwhile, there are substantial variations in policy within North-East Asia. In 
particular, dissimilarities between Taiwan and Korea have been pointed out in some 
key dimensions such as: industrial structure (Castells, 1992: 50); government- 
business relationships (Haggard, 2004: 71-72); and the regulation of financial sector 
during the process of opening up the financial market (Weiss, 2000: 3° ‘ 3 t)'
More than anything, there is little systematic explanation of how key actors such as 
the working class or other social groups have responded to the alliance of states and 
capital over time as the other statist theories have in common. Even if the social 
forces were efficiently repressed or controlled in the early phase of industrialisation, 
it is unrealistic to maintain the assumption that the influence of non-statist actors 
has been subordinated to authoritarian governments and remain insignificant to 
lead changes in society. As Castells (1992: 66) notes, the developmental process 
transforms societies as well as economies, so much so that previous developmental 
pathways become unsustainable as the new capital class and working class grow. 
Although it might be too early to declare that the developmental model of the past 
perished, it cannot be denied that the evolving social cleavage is a critical factor 
making the past model no longer workable.
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Arguments about the welfare systems in the Asian NICs overlap with discussions 
of the developmental states. Many studies of the welfare system have in common 
with the crucial attributes that the perspective of the developmental states posed in 
policy structures for the pursuit of development. Influenced by the developmental 
states thesis in some respects, the mounting interest in Asian welfare model has also 
been facilitated by the upsurge in the welfare regime approach since the 1990s. 
Following the publication of Esping-Andersen’s influential tripartite typology of 
welfare states, there have been many heated debates about the pros and cons of his 
schemata, often centred around the discovery of a fourth type. “Radical” welfare 
regimes in Australia and New Zealand (Castles and Mitchell, 1992), “Rudimentary” 
welfare states in Southern Europe (Leibfried, 1992, Ferrera, 1996), “Post-communist 
conservative corporatism” in former communist Europe (Deacon, 1993) are 
suggested as the prominent fourth type of welfare states. Along with other regional 
welfare models outside West Europe and America, the Asian welfare system was 
referred to as the potential fourth regime and it was argued whether the system 
might form a unique welfare model differentiated from Esping-Andersen’s three 
types.
Early debates on the Asian welfare system were not directly related to the 
perspective on the developmental states. For example, the case studies of Midgley 
(1986) intended to test the existing theories concerning the development of the 
welfare states and industrialisation. He tested whether key components of the 
orthodox theories could be applied to the historical experience of the four Little 
Tigers rather than trying to identify a new Asian welfare model. By sketching the 
characteristics salient in the development of economy and social policy in the Asian 
countries, Midgley (1986: 235) concluded that prominent contemporary theories of 
social welfare and industrialisation failed to explain the complex reality of social 
welfare in the four Asian Tigers, even though the theories were intellectually well- 
organised.
It was not until the 1990s that a more refined perspective on the Asian welfare 
system was suggested as a coherent model in connection with the concept of the 
developmental states. Deyo’s (1992) analysis of social policy, for example, can be 
linked to the developmental theory. For him, the developments of social policy are 
coupled with the transformation of economic strategy for growth guided by 
politically insulated government. Deyo (1992: 304*305) argued that social policy had 
been designed by autonomous states in a direction towards reinforcing labour
3*1.2 Developmental states and the Asian welfare regime
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productivity and subsidised wages; in turn, proactive actions in social policy had 
fostered economic performance in a global market. The more directly governments 
intervene in the developmental process, the more explicitly social policy is connected 
with economic growth as seen in the cases of Korea and Singapore (Deyo, 1992: 305).
The case studies of Japan and Korea by Kwon (1997) offered a similar view on the 
development of the East Asian welfare system to that of Deyo. Kwon’s analysis is 
also inclined to place more emphasis on the developmental strategy of governments 
to build up the welfare system. Kwon (1997: 481-482) summarised the three 
characteristics of the ‘East Asian Welfare Model’ deduced from the Japanese and 
Korean cases. Firstly, the official figures for welfare expenditure were not 
representative of public expenditure as a whole, since the governments’ intervention 
in these countries played the role of regulator rather than provider typical in 
European countries. Secondly, the richest as well as the poorest households 
relatively benefited from public transfers compared with other households at 
different income levels. Finally, the argument that the Asian states could be located 
in Esping-Andersen’s conservative welfare regime category was refuted by the 
distinctive features of the East Asian welfare system.
White and Goodman’s (1998) view of the welfare system in East Asian states - 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan - is fundamentally line in with those expressed by Deyo 
and Kwon. White and Goodman (1998: 15) label the welfare systems of these three 
countries ‘developmental welfare systems’ because of the minimum social assistance 
programmes and heavily reliance on funded social insurance. They argued that, 
social insurance funds were attractive to political leaders in the region, because the 
funds could be mobilised for investment in the industry or infrastructure introduced 
by authoritarian political powers for development goals. However, they acknowledge 
that the East Asian welfare systems have been severely challenged by internal and 
external pressures e.g. the impossibility of sustainable full-employment, a 
dramatically ageing society, advanced démocratisation and globalisation. These 
challenges mean it is doubtful whether the East Asian model can be sustained in 
future (White and Goodman, 1998:18-19).
Holliday’s (2000) examination of the Asian welfare system might be connected 
with the developmental states theory, even though it adopted a very similar 
framework to Esping-Andersen’s. Holliday explored Asian welfare capitalism where 
the nexus of market, states, and family serves as the main provider at the centre for 
analysis. He labels the Asian welfare system the “Productivist World of Welfare 
Capitalism” compared with the three worlds of capitalism in Europe and America.
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Productivist welfare capitalism is characterised by ‘a growth-oriented state’ and 
‘subordination of all aspects of state policy, including social policy, to 
economic/industrial objectives’ (Holliday, 2000: 709). More specifically, he 
classifies three sub-types of productivist welfare capitalism in Asia: facilitative 
(Hong Kong), developmental-universalist (Japan, Korea and Taiwan) and 
developmental-particularist (Singapore). <Table 3.i> shows the variation in the 
central dimensions of welfare capitalism in the Asian productivist world.
< Table 3.1 > The productivist world of welfare capitalism
Social policy Social rights Stratificationeffects
State-market
family
relationship
Facilitative
Subordinate 
to economic 
policy
Minimal Limited
Market
prioritised
Developmental-
universalist
Subordinate 
to economic 
policy
Limited: 
extensions 
linked to 
productive 
activity
Reinforcement 
of the position 
of productive 
elements
State underpins 
market and 
families with 
some universal 
programmes
Developmental-
particularist
Subordinate 
to economic 
policy
Minimal; forced 
individual 
provision linked 
to productive 
activity
Reinforcement 
of the position 
of productive 
elements
State directs 
social welfare 
activities of 
families
Source: Holliday (2000:710)
Goodman and Peng’s (1996) case study is also partly about the relationship 
between the development states and Asian welfare model. Goodman and Peng 
(1996: 210) designated the development of welfare models in Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan ‘peripatetic adaptive learning and development strategies with the prime 
goal of nation-building.’ They claimed that the ultimate goal of the North-East Asian 
states, when they had first sorted out the problem of abject poverty, was to pursue 
nation-building once this had been achieved. Supported by elite bureaucrats, the 
states pioneered a strategy for nation-building in which economic policy took higher 
priority than other policies. In terms of public welfare provision, they argued that 
the states’ strategies were far from coherent. In the case of Japan, the approach was 
so haphazard and pragmatic that Japan imported key institutional arrangements 
from the Western welfare states and reconstructed them for the national objective of 
nation-building (Goodman and Peng, 1996: 211-212). Judging from the historical 
evidence, they predicted that “all three societies will continue to draw on Western, 
indigenous and, in the case of Korea and Taiwan, Japanese models as the economic
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and political situations dictate” (Goodman and Peng, 1996: 216). Their view can be 
loosely connected with the developmental states perspective, because it underscored 
the priority of economic growth and the institutional structures that the 
developmental states focused on in the formation of welfare models. Yet it can be 
differentiated from the developmental states thesis in the sense that the current 
welfare model is not the product of systematically planned schemes, but merely the 
accumulation of piecemeal responses due to the fragmented nature of policy transfer.
Compared with the others, Jones’s (1993) study placed more emphasis on culture 
and values when referring to Asian welfare systems. She treated Confucianism, the 
common cultural background of the Asian NICs, as a pivotal element of the welfare 
model. Jones (1993: 208) argued that Asian governments sought to restore the 
collapsed community in the developmental stage, acting as the functional equivalent 
of a traditional village, which is the core social unit along with the family in 
traditional Confucian society. The consequence of this was that consistent reliance 
on non-statutory social welfare provided by families and communities, not by 
government, as the last resort for social security became the distinguishing 
characteristic of the Confucian welfare state (Jones, 1993: 213). More extensively, 
the Confucian welfare state is an alternative welfare capitalism in the non-Western 
world operated by a set of principles based on “conservative corporatism without 
(Western-style) worker participation; subsidiarity without the Church; solidarity 
without equality; laissez-faire without libertarianism” (Jones, 1993: 214).
3 .1.3 The conceptual adjustment of the developmental states in Asian 
welfare regimes
Recent literature on the Asian welfare regimes has several valuable implications 
for the study of the region’s welfare systems. First of all, the negative evaluation of 
Asian values and systems based on these values is contended by the literature. 
Confucian values, for instance, were once seen as part of the ‘feudal legacy’ 
preventing Asian countries from making the economic leap in the post-war period 
(White and Goodman, 1998: 6). However, Confucian values have since been re­
evaluated as positive influences on the revolutionary upturn in the economy. 
Confucianism is now recognised as contributing to the economic miracle in Asia and 
is underpinned by the following positive attributes: “emphasis on education, strong 
family relations, benevolent paternalism, social harmony and discipline, respect for 
tradition and a strong work ethic” (White and Goodman, 1998: 8). In a similar vein,
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by connecting the welfare regimes with the developmental states thesis these studies 
provide an alternative perspective on Asian experiences and thus function as a 
useful framework for analysing the ways in which the developmental plan at the 
initial phase becomes an integral component of subsequent social policy. They help 
students to identify the principal actors (political leaders, professional civil servants 
and capital representatives) and institutional structures (the legacies of the past in 
state bureaucracy, institutional arrangements between states and business or 
working associations) in the Asian policy process.
On the other hand, there are critical flaws in these studies’ analysis of the 
development of social policy in East Asia. Most simply reiterate the proposition that 
all other goals in social policy were subordinated to the primary objective of 
economic development. Once the national objective is holistically defined in a simple 
way without concrete investigations case-by-case, the rationales for the Asian 
welfare regime will always be challenged. Since all welfare regimes are 
fundamentally concerned with how to maintain economic growth, what is necessary 
for the rationales for the regime is to identify how the individual countries variously 
have framed the entity of policy regimes and fine-tuned the relationship between 
policy constituents. Meanwhile, it is unlikely that researchers will be able to stick 
with the traditional version of the role played by states in previous developmental 
stages. The original version of the developmental states thesis might no longer be 
viable in some cases, e.g. Korea, which went through paradigmatic shifts in the 
aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). Hence, the original version needs to 
be adjusted by redefining the roles played by states after the countries had reached a 
certain level of industrialisation in the 1980s or in response to the regional financial 
crisis in the 1990s. It should be adjusted in such a way that we are able to perceive 
the evolving nature of developmental states, which have adapted their governance 
strategy to changing milieus in order to first secure then maintain continuous 
economic prosperity. Otherwise, the theoretical approach will have to give way to a 
rival perspective sooner or later.
The concept o f ‘evolving states’ is useful here for capturing the dynamic aspects of 
bureaucracy and the nexus between government and private sector. The dynamic 
approach is effective at dealing with how the role of state has been embedded in a 
wide range of internal social changes - rapid urbanisation, a matured economy with 
structural unemployment, the dismantling of the extended family and a rapidly 
ageing society - all in under less than half a century. The evolving states concept 
encompasses not only the endogenous changes that take place in domestic society,
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but also the exogenous forces of the global economy. The AFC in the late 1990s 
illustrates what disasters globalisation can bring about when states fail to cope with 
external forces. Weiss (2000) and Kwon (2005) give practical hints on how to 
transform the developmental states into contemporary Asian states. Weiss (2000) 
argues that it was necessary to reconfigure the developmental states, because Asian 
NICs considerably achieved their objective of catching-up with the Western 
economies of the global market. However, this does not mean we should throw away 
the concept of developmental states; instead we should redefine states which have 
successfully readjusted their economies with different sets of policy means as 
‘transformative’ (Weiss, 2000: 29). Good examples of transformative policies are the 
upgrading projects of industrial restructuring and technologies improvements in 
Japan and Taiwan during the 1990s. Kwon (2005) meanwhile scrutinises the 
emerging new characteristics of Korean and Taiwanese social policy, arguing that 
the developmental welfare states in Korea and Taiwan were structured to provide 
selective occupational benefits for the working cohorts employed by large-scale 
firms, leaving the vast majority of the vulnerable without the protection of public 
programmes (Kwon, 2005: 484-485). The evolutionary feature lies in the 
restructuring of the welfare system in accordance with the change in national goals. 
As the objective of economic policy has shifted away from far-reaching economic 
growth to the maintenance of competitiveness, developmental states have been 
transformed into more inclusive systems through newly introduced social protection 
programmes and employment schemes (Kwon, 2005: 493*494)-
Nevertheless, some weaknesses should be improved if the theory can survive as a 
conceivable linkage between social policy and the other policies in the Asian NICs. 
Firstly, more analyses need to be accumulated so that the theory can be extended to 
social policy beyond industry and finance. It is necessary to evaluate whether social 
policy was fully integrated into the governance of the economic development or 
whether it was no more than a patchwork of piecemeal welfare schemes introduced 
by repressive governments reluctant to invest in non-economic fields. Secondly, it is 
° f  vital importance to consider regional variations in Asia, particularly in the 
analysis of why and how regional variations in social policy have been structured 
between countries in North-East Asia and South-East Asia. The current empirical 
research relies heavily on case studies of cash transfer programmes. Yet the bias 
towards cash transfer programmes is not sufficient to test the central hypotheses 
that the developmental welfare states thesis posits. First of all, it is widely accepted 
that Asian governments provided good quality education to improve human capital 
and public housing to foster a sense of national identity. These initiatives were not
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simply public cash transfer programmes in the Western sense. Ironically systematic 
analyses of education policy and housing policy are relatively absent from the 
comparative research insisting the uniqueness of the Asian welfare model. It is 
unlikely that the institutional structures of income transfer programmes will show a 
fundamental difference between the Occidental models and the Oriental models, 
since most were transferred from the Western welfare states. The narrow interest in 
cash transfer programmes might make the counter-argument that the Asian welfare 
regime is a hybrid of the Western welfare regimes more persuasive. Therefore, by 
paying special attention to housing policy we will be more likely to find the solutions 
to the puzzle of the regional variations between the East Asian states and the city- 
states in South Asia. It is likely that housing policy could turn out to be one of the 
hallmarks of the Asian welfare regime, helping to explain how different arrays of 
social policies can create distinctive welfare models within Asia.
3-2 The lessons from Asian housing regimes
3 *2.1 Application of the regime approach to housing in Asia
It is odd that the central arguments about Asian housing policy occurred quite late, 
approximately at the end of the last century, despite the importance of housing 
policy as a source of welfare in Asia. Leaving aside the tardiness of academic 
researchers in this respect, it is also odd that there are far fewer volumes of 
comparative literature on the Asian housing regimes than individual case studies of 
a single country. Notwithstanding the late and low interest in Asian housing regimes, 
reviewing the literature is a necessary first step towards refining the regime 
frameworks. The studies fall into one of two groups: positing a single homogeneous 
model in the Asian NICs (Doling, 1999b, Ronald, 2007) or identifying sub-variations 
between Asian states and classifying a couple of regional models (Ramesh, 2003, 
Groves et al., 2007c).
In the first group, Doling (1999b) widens the regional coverage of the housing 
regime by proposing that the Asian housing regime did not fit with the ideal types of 
the Western ones. He embraced the criterion of state-market mixes at the 
development, construction and consumption stage to identify ideal types of housing 
regime. In his typology, there are three housing regimes in the Western countries: 
liberal, communist and corporatist (Doling, 1999b: 232-234). The liberal housing
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regime is discernible as an ideal type under pure capitalism. In the liberal regime, 
the market dominates all three stages of the supply and consumption of housing. 
Government in the liberal regime intervenes in the process in a residual way. The 
communist housing regime, on the other hand, is characterised by the dominance of 
the state in all three phases. Land is owned by states and houses are built by state- 
owned construction firms. At the consumption phase, the constructed houses are 
assigned by administrative procedures, not by the market mechanism. Finally, in the 
corporatist housing regime, the state plays a major role in setting the goals of the 
provision of housing but private construction firms are the main suppliers of 
housing. According to Doling, it is not possible to cluster the Asian housing regime 
into any one of these three ideal types. His point of view about Asian development 
has much in common with the developmental states perspective. He argues that 
housing was subordinated to economic growth in Asian NICs and the foremost 
beneficiaries of housing policy were the well-disciplined working population able to 
participate in productive activity (Doling, 1999b: 248). In terms of policy 
instruments, the governments took the initiative in the developmental stage by 
controlling land whereas housing is consumed dependent upon the ability to pay, 
which makes home ownership affordable only for middle and high-income 
households (Doling, 1999b: 247-248). Following on from his conclusions in this 
study, he claims in a later publication with other Asian colleagues that home owning 
societies do not disturb the income status determined in the labour market in the 
Asian Tigers (Agus et ah, 2002:15).
Ronald (2007) identifies a homogeneous housing model in Asia and called it the 
“Eastern home ownership model" in contrast with the “Western home ownership 
model.” The Eastern home ownership model has been formed under a set of social 
and political forces in Asia: limited awareness of collective rights to housing, the 
absence of class solidarity, tolerance of authoritarian leadership during the period of 
the high levels of economic growth and a depoliticised middle class (Ronald, 2007: 
488). In particular, Ronald (2007: 488-489) focuses on the two-fold common 
Patterns in the role of home ownership in Asia, which differentiate the Asian from 
the Western home ownership model. The first common pattern is that the Asian 
housing model was founded on a dualistic perception of housing as a welfare good 
and exchange commodity for distributing welfare responsibility between family and 
states. Home ownership in the East took on a much greater responsibility for 
ensuring financial security than in the West. This was because home owners in Asia 
Were less protected by public welfare programmes than in the West when the 
Property values of housing plummeted in the volatile market. The second similarity
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was the tendency for governments in Asian NICs to perceive the expansion of owner- 
occupied housing as serving economic development by stabilising the established 
social order. As a result, governments played a major role in the planning and 
provision phase and middle-class households benefited from the strategic 
involvement of states in housing by and large. On the basis of these two features, he 
concludes that the Eastern home ownership model differs considerably from the 
Western home ownership model although increasing convergence of two models can 
be observed.
< Table 3.2 > Public expenditure on housing in Asian NICs
% of GDP 96 of TGE
1975 1985 1995 1999 1975 1985 1995 1999
Hong Kong 2.4 3-4 3-2 5-4 16.0 21.0 18.2 24.6
Singapore 1.3 l.l 1-3 2.5 7.1 4-2 8.1 13.5
Korea 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.4(’97) 1.1 1.0 2.4
1.9
(’97)
Taiwan - 0.6 0.9 1.0 - 2-5 3-1 4.1
Source: Ramesh (2003:142)
Ramesh (2003), on the other hand, suggests that there are two sub-types of 
housing policy regime amongst the first-tier generation of Asian NICs - Hong Kong, 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. All four Little Tigers are basically similar in that their 
governments have promoted home ownership, while the rental sector has been 
residualised for the poor only through the stigmatisation of provision (Ramesh, 
2003:151). Despite the similarity, he draws a border line between the two city-states 
(Singapore and Hong Kong) and the other two Tigers (Korea and Taiwan). More 
concretely, from the extent of government intervention, it is clear that Singapore is 
committed to the public provision of housing, as is Hong Kong to a lesser degree. 
The dominance of the public housing sector in Singapore and Hong Kong has been 
achieved by large-scale land expropriation at cheap prices and affordable provision 
of public housing. On the other hand, the Korean and Taiwan governments were 
more reluctant to spend their budgets on housing (see the <Table 3 -2>) and 
depended on private firms to provide housing. Yet there are in-group variations 
between Korea and Taiwan in terms of their enhancements of the market-dominant 
system. Taiwanese government has intervened in the market to the extent that its 
allocation mechanism was hardly distorted. The Korean government, unlike Taiwan, 
imposed excessive regulations on the market and distorted the market mechanism
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to a significant degree until the 1980s.
In Groves, Murie and Watson’s (2007c) study focusing on the historical 
trajectories of housing policy in Japan and China as well as the Four Tigers, the 
Asian housing systems are classified into three groups (Groves et al., 2007c: 204- 
205). The first group is composed of the two city-states (Hong Kong and Singapore) 
that adopted a state managed or controlled housing policy. Although most policy 
measures were introduced to enhance the market, a state-controlled model was 
firmly established in Singapore. Hong Kong seemed to restore the public sector 
model by the withdrawal of the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) to some extent. 
The second group consists of three East Asian cases (Japan, Taiwan and mainland 
China) which have embraced the relatively ‘unmoderated private sector model’ 
characterised by a rising private landlord class. Reliance on the housing market 
through the commercialisation of housing is the dominant strategy serving the prior 
goal of economic growth. The approach was pronounced in China, Japan and 
Taiwan, especially during the early stages of industrialisation in China and the later 
stages of industrialisation in Japan and Taiwan. The last group is a single case 
(Korea) and is labelled the ‘innovative dual approach.’ The model has maintained 
favourable finance to home ownership, but simultaneously increased the public 
rental sector. Korea, which suffered severely from the economic recession in the late 
1990s influenced by Asian financial crisis, has made an exceptional choice in 
housing policy. This choice reinforced the government interventions following the 
newly designed long-run plans.
3-2.2 Lessons of the housing regimes approach for Asian housing 
studies
What lessons can be drawn from the regime approach for further analysis of the 
Asian housing system in a comparative context? Firstly, all of the research above 
connects the housing system to the bigger picture of national systems and compares 
them in broad circumstances. These studies, at least implicitly, assume that the 
housing system has been constructed by varying social forces at multiple levels. They 
are interested in how the housing system has been structured in and by a state and 
what kind of common social forces made Asian housing systems distinctive from 
those in the Western welfare states. Hence, the research indicates that housing 
Policy analysis needs to take into consideration multiple interconnected factors at 
the macro, micro and meso levels. The important regional factors at the different
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three levels and the analytical points that need to be elaborated upon for a more 
refined analysis are explored below.
At the macro level, it should be noted that a nation state is not the largest context 
in which policy is located. The impact of the global environment on the domestic 
policy process is growing economically and politically. The Asian NICs have become 
role models for all developing countries with respect to how they have seized the 
opportunities for economic prosperity in an era of globalisation. Exports to 
developed countries, taking advantage of a cheap labour force, were the main driving 
force behind Asian economic expansion in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
At the same time, globalisation was an apparently Janus-faced phenomenon in the 
Asian NICS, too. Once the economies caught up with the First World, their position 
in the world economy was threatened by other developing countries with cheaper 
labour costs. Meanwhile, free and fast movement of capital enabled transnational 
capital in the region to fly away to countries in which governments ensured low 
taxation and less regulation. Faced by changes in the international division of labour 
and in the national profiles of financial havens, the Asian Tigers could not help but 
modify their overall strategy for sustainable growth in the world economy. The 
developmental states thesis well demonstrates how they adjusted developmental 
strategies to changing environments in the 1970s or 1980s (see Amsden, 1989. Wade, 
1990, Henderson and Appelbaum, 1992, Weiss, 2001). Some housing studies 
reviewed above (Doling, 1999b, Ronald, 2007) directly relate the key arguments of 
the developmental theory (e.g. strong government for economic growth or nation 
building) to the formation of Asian housing regimes. Besides these studies, the 
emphasis on the developmental states is not unfamiliar in other comparative 
literature on housing policy in Asia, although this does not deal with the modelling 
or clustering of Asian housing systems (e.g. Ronald, 2008, Park, 1998). The wide 
acceptance of the developmental thesis offers a strong rationale for tying the analysis 
of housing policy to other economic and social policies at the national level. Such 
analysis should simultaneously mirror states’ adjustments to ever-changing global 
conditions. In terms of housing finance, ‘securitisation’ - the latest development in 
the history of financial techniques - has had a profound influence on the housing 
system, since it enables domestic mortgagers to mobilise international liquidity to 
finance home ownership in a global capital market. Hence, it should be noted that 
states’ responses to globalisation of the mortgage market could be so fundamental as 
to dramatically alter the existing housing system.
Another significant macro factor is the political tensions in the region during the
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post-war period. The tremendous damage caused by the Second World War was 
definitely a momentous turning point in the history of Asian housing policy. It is 
argued that the common tendency in post-war European housing was the mass 
production of housing led by government (Boelhouer and van der Heijden, 1992: 89, 
Doling, 1997: 12). A similar response was observed when Asian governments sought 
to cope with acute housing shortages by increasing supply in the 1950s and 1960s. 
This thesis argues that the motivation behind the restoration projects significantly 
came from the regional political tension at the time. North-East Asia was the 
frontline of the ‘Cold War’ between the Soviet communist bloc and the Euro- 
American capitalist bloc. Authoritarian governments in North-East Asia (Korea and 
Taiwan) were faced with the potential threat from adjacent communist regimes. The 
potential for armed conflicts also affected South Asian countries (Hong Kong and 
Singapore) although the impact was less severe than in North-East Asian states. The 
colonial government of Hong Kong, a Chinese territory under the rule of Britain, was 
cautious not to prompt neighbouring communist China during the Cold War. Led by 
Chinese elite politicians in a multi-racial society, the government of Singapore - a 
British colony which gained independence early in the post-war period - was under 
great strain from the Muslim Malaysian block which occupied the Malay Peninsula 
except the tip. Hence the geopolitical conditions in Asian Tigers were one of main 
‘historical legacies’ to account for Asian Tigers’ economic transformation in the post­
war period (Henderson and Appelbaum, 1992: 9-10). The geopolitics of the region is 
an essential contextual factor not to be ignored in housing policy analysis, especially 
the analysis of the initial development during the post-war or post-independence 
period. In the following chapters, the thesis argues that the development of housing 
including the public sector was ignored or repressed, because of lower priority 
amongst policy agenda in order not to crowd out primary manufacturing industry 
needed for export-led economic growth, as can be seen in the case of Korea. 
Conversely, in the Singapore public housing sector, the promotion of affordable 
home ownership was an attractive carrot to foster loyalty to an authoritarian regime 
when the states faced challenges from external and internal competing forces in the 
Post-independence era.
Secondly, at the micro level, a number of actors conflict or sometimes cooperate in 
the market and political elections. Politicians, bureaucrats and occupational 
representatives like business associations, labour unions are typical actors in 
capitalist democracies. The Western welfare states have grown into mass 
democracies since the franchise encompassed females and became universal at the 
end of Second World War. However, this kind of democratic policy process was
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absent from most Asian countries where authoritarian regimes maintained supreme 
power over society during the earlier period of industrialisation. Authoritarian 
regimes maintained coercive political control with many brutal instruments and 
thereby the realisation of grassroots democracy was retarded. Apart from in Japan, 
which democratised earlier, it was not until the 1980s that the social movements for 
démocratisation began to burgeon. The result of these long-running authoritarian 
regimes was that the most influential actors in the policy process were political 
leaders in power and professional bureaucrats supporting their rule. They seized the 
initiative against non-static actors and pushed their agenda in the policy making and 
implementing process in order to achieve the goals that states set up. In Asian Tigers, 
‘strong’ states had the political ability to enjoy a high degree of autonomy from rent- 
seeking lobbies in policy-making process (Cheng, Haggard and Kang, 1998: 88). 
Developmental states were insulated from private interests and enjoyed great 
autonomy to set and implement their own goals (Evans, 1995= 32). Based on the 
strong states and its autonomy in policy process, this thesis stresses that working 
class or other interests groups in Asian NICs were weakly organised and the states 
had strong initiatives to steer the directions of housing policy in Asian NICs. 
Particularly, this study will argue that the interests of non-static actors have been 
depoliticised by various institutional arrangements designed by strong states in 
Asian NICs.
The final essential factors are a wide range of institutional arrangements that 
intermediate the feedbacks between macro factors and micro agents. It is necessary 
for Asian studies to pay special attention to the remaining institutions bequeathed 
by ‘policy transfer’ in the past. Policy transfer was a major constitute of formal 
institutions imported from foreign countries and many Asian NICs relied upon the 
transferred policies when they commenced their industrialisation projects. Policy 
transfer can be defined as “a process in which knowledge about policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the 
development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another 
time and/or place” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 344). Policy makers can learn 
practical lessons from the policies other policy makers implemented to cope with 
particular as well as universal problems (Rose, 1991: 4) Hence policy transfer 
normally occurs when policy makers search for lessons from past policy in a unit or 
contemporary policy put into practice in other countries/provinces. Goals, structure, 
concrete means or administrative skills, institutions, ideology can be moved from 
timc/place to time/place through policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 349- 
350).
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Many policies in Asian NICs were imported coercively by the Western imperial 
powers during colonial rule or voluntarily by the indigenous regimes in the post-war 
period. Even Meiji Japan, the first industrialised country in Asia, introduced and 
amended foreign arrangements. Many kinds of foreign institutions were transferred 
and adjusted to reflect the Japanese preconditions for efficient industrialisation - the 
British navy and post office, the Prussian army and criminal law, the French civil law 
and the Belgium central bank - after the country was forced to open its ports in 1853 
(Chang, 2007: 30). The impacts of newly transplanted institutions depend on 
varying elements, even when the cases are located in similar environments. The 
developmental path of policy is contingent on factors such as the forms of policy 
transfer, the timing of introduction of policy and the origin of imported 
arrangements. In the Asian context, colonialism often generated enduring impacts 
on the following sequential processes in policy development. This is mainly because 
there were substantial variations in the goals of occupying colonial powers and 
administration systems in different countries. For instance, British colonial 
governments in Hong Kong and Singapore were much more “disinterested” than 
Japanese colonial governments in Korea and Taiwan (Henderson and Appelbaum, 
1992: 8). Different types of rule are probably associated with the different objectives 
for obtaining colonies. While Hong Kong and Singapore, major British colonies in 
Asia, functioned as naval stations and transit ports, Korea and Taiwan were strategic 
points for Japan to extend its boundary to Mainland China and Russia in the 
continent. Even after the colonies became independent, most Asian countries 
vigorously brought in a broad scope of policies implemented in the Western 
countries and Japan for the purpose of prompt nation-building. Needless to say, our 
understanding of policy development can be furthered by analysing how policy 
transfers from the colonial powers have been embedded in the different national 
housing systems over the long-term.
in conclusion, this study aims to configure the multi-level factors in the housing 
P°iicy process and to examine what different combinations of these factors result in 
contrasting approaches to housing when comparing the development of housing 
Policy in Korea and Singapore. Of particular concern is what filtering role 
established housing policy and relevant institutions played in the development or 
overdevelopment of public housing.
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3-3 Concluding remarks
The intention to establish a home owning society can be seen in the ambitious 
programmes for the promotion of owner-occupied housing, particularly in the state- 
controlled city' states in Asia- Singapore’s ‘Home Ownership Scheme’ in 1964 with 
the slogan of “home owning democracy” and Hong Kong’s ‘Home Ownership 
Scheme’ launched in 1976. The skyrocketing rise in the home ownership rate of these 
countries was even more dramatic in Singapore than in Hong Kong. Home 
ownership rates in Singapore have been increasing for three decades, from 2996 in 
1970 to 92% in 2000 (Phang, 2007:17). The nation states in North-East Asia, on the 
other hand, have promoted owner-occupation but by more indirect and market- 
centred means than those of their counterparts in South Asia. As a result, there are 
the relatively low rates of home ownership and considerable variations between 
countries. More interestingly, the home ownership rates of Korea have decreased 
from 7296 in 1970 to 5496 in 2000 (Park, 2007b: 77). The decline on this indicator is 
pronounced enough to call into question whether the home owning society was 
sought in Korea. Nevertheless, the previous studies develop a general consensus on 
the argument that Asian societies are basically home owning societies in which the 
property value of housing accounts for the largest share of the financial portfolio of 
many households. Although we admit that the Asian Tigers achieve or are moving 
towards home-owning societies, the work of comparing policy changes and the 
subsequent impacts is so essential to account for variations in housing across the 
countries and ascertain the critical factors that brought about the differences at 
multiple levels.
Furthermore, the general perception of the Asian NICs as home owning societies is 
a signal for us to revisit the concept of ‘asset-based’ welfare explored in the former 
chapter. The concept of ‘asset-based’ welfare has been posed to explore whether it 
can become the alternative ways for the provision of welfare in the reconfiguration 
of the modem welfare states (Groves et al., 2007c, Regan and Paxton, 2001). 
Growing wealth inequalities provide a strong rationale for government assistance in 
order to build up assets for low-income households, because deficiency in the 
property of a household severely restricts life chances (Regan, 2001: 1). Home 
ownership, no doubt, takes the lion share of the total wealth of the average 
household keep and thus the owner-occupied house is an essential component of 
asset-based welfare. The status of home ownership occupies the central position in
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industrialised home owning societies like the Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. USA or 
UK) and the Asian NICs where the balance sheets of the majority of households will 
be improved or aggravated depending on the value or costs of home ownership. 
When viewing the asset-based welfare states, the point should be kept in mind that 
the impacts of home ownership on the welfare of citizens vary contingent on how 
home ownership has been institutionally encouraged by housing policy and the 
complementary role of the other social safety nets. As mentioned before, the cash- 
transfer schemes - pensions, health and unemployment benefits - in Asia were 
introduced to cover a limited range of the working population for developmental 
purposes. Public assistance programmes were kept to a minimum in order not to 
deteriorate the work ethic. Most of the resources made available for public welfare 
were funded by social insurance schemes, not by general taxes, in order to avoid 
placing a heavy burden on the state. The common characteristics of the Asian 
welfare states might be related to the promotion of home ownership and the social 
outcomes it generated in spite of the regional differences between the states.
Given the importance of home ownership in the Asian welfare states, the nexus 
linking home ownership and the national pension scheme amongst the general 
relationship between housing and other pillars of the welfare state, is of vital interest, 
and not just for the Asian context, but have hardly been investigated. The link 
between home ownership and national pensions systems in Asia is more interesting 
and it is probably more important than in the West considering the differences in 
funding national pension schemes. For example, both Korea and Singapore, the 
main cases for the historical analysis in this study, have run a funded national 
pension scheme contrasting with the pay-as-you-go pension schemes adopted in the 
Western welfare states. The funds are an attractive public source for financing 
housing as well, because the provision of public housing requires huge lump-sums to 
pay for the consumption of housing as well as the supply of dwelling stock. 
Clarifying the nature of this relationship in Korea and Singapore, a relationship 
which has been so far overlooked by researchers studying the Asian welfare system, 
might be just the intellectual catalyst needed to trigger a second round of debate, ‘for 
or against’ the Asian welfare model based on home ownership.
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Chapter four
Applying comparative historical methodology to housing 
policy analysis
4.1 Conceptualising ‘case’ and case study in the social sciences
4.1.1 Defining the concept o f‘case’ in the social sciences
In order to determine what objects are addressed and how they are analysed and 
compared in this study, it is first necessary to examine the meaning of ‘case’ in the 
social sciences. The uses of ‘case’, originating from the Latin word casus, are too 
various to be unanimously defined in ordinary' life. Notwithstanding this difficulty, 
all social scientists have to be concerned with what the term ‘case’ means in social 
science analyses, because it boils downs to issues of ontology and epistemology 
which determine the direction and focal points of their research. It is expected that 
the proper recognition of the multiple dimensions that the concept o f ‘case’ provokes 
enables social scientists to design the appropriate research model under the given 
circumstances and research questions. The challenges of defining ‘case’ have been 
explored in numerous works on social scientific methodology, in both the 
quantitative and qualitative traditions (see King et al., 1994, Ragin, 1992, Yin, 2009, 
George and Bennett, 2005, Gerring, 2007). Here we will confine ourselves to the 
brief but apposite definitions offered by George and Bennett (2005) in order to ease 
our way into the discussion about conceptualising ‘cases.’
We define a case as an instance o f a class o f events. The term "class of 
events" refers here to a phenomenon o f scientific interest, such as 
revolutions, types o f governmental regimes, kinds o f economic systems, or 
personality types that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of 
developing theory (or “generic knowledge”) regarding the causes of 
similarities or differences among instances (cases) o f that class o f events 
(George and Bennett, 2005:17-8).
The definition encapsulates the kind of phenomena that social science research is 
interested in, as well as the goals that are established when a case is chosen.
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Unfortunately, it does not provide us with a complete answer to the question of what 
a case means in the context of social science analysis. Since a case has multiple 
dimensions, it is almost impossible to define it in a way that most researchers will be 
prepared to accept. But despite the difficulties of defining a case, the conceptual 
mapping of “case” that Ragin (1992) does in <Table 4.i> is a useful guide when it 
comes to configuring the attributes of a case. <Table 4.i> displays the four ways of 
conceptualising a case in social science analyses. Given the multi-dimensional 
complexities of cases, it is up to the individual researcher to make decisions about 
the ontological issue, i.e. what to study and the epistemological issue regarding what 
forms of knowledge are pursued, decisions which will determine where to locate 
their cases at a specific point amongst the matrix of cases below.
< Table 4.1 > Conceptual map for answers to “what is a case?”
Understanding of 
cases
Case conceptions
Specific General
As empirical units 1. Cases are found 2. Cases are objects
As theoretical 
constructs 3. Cases are made 4. Cases are conventions
Source: Ragin (1992: 9)
1 . Cases are seen as empirically real, but specific in the sense that they must be 
identified and established as cases in the process of the research.
2. Cases are seen as empirically real and general, and there is no need to verify 
their existence.
3- Cases are seen as specific theoretical constructs united in the process of 
research.
4- Cases are seen as general theoretical constructs, but these constructions are 
regarded as the conventionalised outcome of collective academic work.
4 -1.2 Identifying case studies: Goals, objects and methods
The complex natures of cases almost inevitably lead us into a discussion about the 
methods of how to accumulate knowledge in the social sciences. There are a wide 
range of methodological approaches, from the positivist, which aims to illuminate 
cause-effect relationships through deductive-empirical methods i.e. statistical 
inferences, to the interpretivist, which explores the meanings of social phenomena in 
more holistic and contextual ways (Porta and Keating, 2008: 26-27). The term case 
study" has come to be associated with the methods utilised by
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interpretivists/qualitative researchers. It is used to describe research work based on 
a qualitative approach with a small number of cases and using a particular type of 
evidence (e.g. clinical, participant-observation, process-tracing or historical 
research) in a holistic manner (Gerring, 2007: 17). However, there is no reason for 
case studies to be exclusively confined to non-statistical and in-depth methods 
covering small-N cases. It is not merely a type of qualitative approach which relies 
on nuanced interpretations and can equally on occasions employ quantitative 
evidence, particularly in historical analysis (Yin, 2009:19).
<Table 4.2> Research designs: A covariational typology
Spatial
Variation Temporal variation
No Yes
One
None 1. (Logically impossible) 2. Single-case study (diachronic)
Within-case 3. Single-case study (synchronic)
4. Single-case study 
(synchronic + diachronic)
Several Cross-case & within-case 5. Comparative method
6. Comparative-historical
Many
Cross-case 7. Cross-sectional
8. Time-series cross- 
sectional
Cross-case & 
within-case 9. Hierarchical
10. Hierarchical time-series
Note: Shaded cells are case study research designs. 
Source: Gerring (2007: 28)
Case studies, first of all, are able to sort out a set of groups on the basis of which 
main objective they arc searching for. Four types of case studies are identified by 
Vennesson (2008: 227-228) according to their diverse research purposes: the 
descriptive, the interpretive, the hypothesis-generating and hypotheses-refining, and 
the theory-evaluating study. The single yardstick of the general purpose is by no 
means sufficient for the proper comprehension of the variations of a case study and 
its methodological virtues. Other standards here are introduced to be more precise 
by drawing a mapping table as to the critical dimensions of a case study, just as we 
did for the conceptualisation of cases in the preceding section. cTable 4.2> drawn by 
Gerring (2007: 28) lends practical assistance to the configuration of different kinds 
° f case study in social science research.10 What should be pointed out here is that the
The cell j type of case study - a case observed at a certain point without the within-case 
observations - is logically impossible since it produces no evidence of causal proposition
(Gerring, 2007:31).
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boundaries between cells are blurred and fluid just as they are in the former cTable 
4 .i>.
When we describe the case study method to distinguish it from other methods, 
three vital dimensions can be identified and are clearly shown in <Table 4.2>: the 
number of cases, the kind of variation (spatial or temporal) and the location of 
variation (cross-case or within-case). By looking at these three dimensions, the 
characteristics of the case study method become apparent. Firstly, researchers 
conducting case study research usually work with a small number of cases. Lijphart 
(1971: 691) made a distinction between the case study method and the comparative 
method, since the former works with a single case whereas the latter looks at more 
than two cases in detail and compares them. However, we do not need to confine the 
case study method to an in-depth study of a single case. Whether the number of 
cases is one or more than one is not the absolute criterion separating the case study 
method from other methods dealing with a small number of cases insofar as they 
share the methodological features to analyse the cases. Secondly, case study research 
produces the multiple criteria and different combinations between the kind of 
variation and the location of variation, by which the case studies can be located in 
different categories. This is because the spatial/temporal and cross-case/within-case 
variations act as principal sources affecting the illumination of causal paths and the 
degrees of extending the outcomes from case analysis. According to these criteria, 
the five grey-coloured columns in cTable 4.2> are placed into the case study designs 
for the examination of a single case or several cases with temporal/spatial variations.
We should also be aware of the methodological strengths of the case study method 
if we want to use it appropriately. George and Bennett (2005: 19’ 22) sum UP the 
four advantages of the case study method for testing hypotheses and developing 
theories as follows. Firstly, case studies allow researchers to identify and measure 
the most suitable indicators for the theoretical concepts they are interested in. The 
case study has a higher degree of conceptual and measurement validity than the 
statistical study, which brings together all the cases in a sample but does not 
investigate individual cases in detail. Secondly, the case study can generate new 
hypotheses by studying outliers amongst many cases in more depth. The statistical 
sludy, on the other hand, hardly has any means for yielding new hypotheses. Thirdly, 
the case study is better than the statistical study when it comes to chasing down the 
eausal mechanisms in individual cases through detailed investigation. Finally, the 
case study is an effective method for examining multiple and conjunctural causal 
Nations such as cquifinality and interactions effects (Ragin, 1987: 42-9)- Yet the
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advantage in this respect is not absolute over the statistical method, because the 
generalisations of outcomes drawn from the intricate causal configuration are 
significantly limited to other cases.
Meanwhile, the case study method has analytical disadvantages too. The major 
weakness of the case study is that it can only address a small number of cases in an 
individual study. Moreover, the virtues of the case study are negated by increasing 
the number of cases included in a study. As the number of cases in a single study 
increases, it becomes less likely that a causally associated feature will be common 
across all cases (Ragin, 1987: 50). The nature of the case study makes it difficult to 
cover many cases in a study, which renders the case study researcher less capable of 
generalising the results of their analysis to a larger class of cases. Another 
disadvantage of the case study is its limited ability to estimate the generalised causal 
effects or causal weight of variables across cases (George and Bennett, 2005: 25). 
With this method, it is almost impossible to estimate the level of the average impact 
of a specific causal factor on social phenomena. The statistical method, on the other 
hand, is a useful means for estimating the degrees of causal effects on outcome 
indicated by the coefficient in a multiple regression model.
Statistical analysis has come to be perceived as the orthodoxy in the social sciences 
and it is often mistakenly thought that the case study method is inferior to the 
statistical method when developing theory and testing hypotheses. But statistical 
analysis definitely has inherent weaknesses when it comes to unveiling the sources 
of complex social events whereas the case study method is good at handling the 
complexity of cases in the social sciences. For example, while the “homogenizing 
assumptions" rooted in the statistical analysis disturb the productive 
communication between ideas and evidence, the strategy in a case study enables 
researchers to shed light on “diversity'" of social phenomena (Ragin, 2000: 5).
In conclusion, weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of research methods 
is not about creating a hierarchical order between them and rather it must be 
Inclusive and pluralistic (Yin, 2009: 7). The relationship between statistical analysis 
(quantitative research) and the case study should not be understood as exclusive and 
hierarchical. The statistical method might be more advantageous than the case study 
"hen analysing a particular social phenomenon under specific circumstances, but it 
mi8ht be the other way around once the surrounding conditions change. The case 
study. in addition, allows researchers to utilise both quantitative and qualitative 
^ d en cc to achieve their research purposes. The eclectic nature of the case study 
Method makes it a powerful tool in the scientific dialogue between theory and
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evidence.
4.2 Comparative historical analysis in the social sciences
4.2.1 Background
Comparative historical analysis (or comparative historical methodology) can be 
seen as a kind of case study method, used in the social sciences when the eclectic 
nature of the case study method is justifiable. It has been frequently adopted since 
the pioneers published their classic works in the modern social sciences. 
Contemporary comparative historical analysts are regarded as the intellectual 
successors to a tradition initiated by Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Max Weber 
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 3). Yet comparative historical analysis has 
become a confusing term, particularly in relation to methodology, as the term refers 
to as a broad range of studies the essential attributes of which in terms of analysis 
are often poorly defined. Without systematic understanding of comparative 
historical methodology, the status of the scientific method in the social sciences may 
be jeopardised and comparative historical research marginalised unless there are 
vigorous efforts towards greater “systematization” in comparative study (Immergut, 
1998: 27). In the section below, several key points of comparative historical analysis 
are discussed concerning how it deals with cases as methodology in comparative 
research.
4.2.2 What is comparative historical analysis?
Comparative historical analysis is basically a case study of social phenomena for 
the comparison of different cases. Comparative historical analysis (CHA) shares the 
general features of the other case study methods but here we must be more specific 
if we want to take full advantage of CHA and use it in an appropriate way. Narrowing 
the focus of CHA can be problematic, given its broad usage and analytical diversity 
and it is probably more effective to sketch the main characteristics of the approach 
instead of struggling to arrive at a unanimous definition. Indeed, many issues 
related to definition are raised in an edited collection written by prominent 
colleagues committed to the approach, Comparative Historical Analysis in the 
Social Sciences (2003) and the discussions in this publication arc worth critically
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reviewing here, as a first step towards understanding the traits underpinning CHA.
Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003: 6) define comparative historical analysis as “a 
concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use of 
systematic and contextualized comparison.” Developing the definition, they go on to 
identify three key characteristics of comparative historical analysis (Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer, 2003: 11-4). Firstly, the main concern of CHA is identifying and 
explaining the causal configurations generating social phenomena. Since causation 
is of vital importance in CHA, they argue that perspectives not concerned with 
causal explanations are more or less absent from this tradition. Secondly, students 
engaged in CHA put emphasis on the sequential unfolding of processes when they 
analyse historical events or the developments of policy. Therefore, differences in the 
temporal structure of events and the timing of events are critical elements in 
producing diverse results. Finally, comparative historical researchers carry out 
systemic and contextualised comparisons of similar and contrasting cases. Through 
the comparison of small-N cases, researchers are able not only to find new concepts 
and explanations, but also to achieve a higher degree of conceptual and 
measurement validity than quantitative researchers who rely on statistical inference 
from large-n cases. This in turn enables researchers to demonstrate how different 
configurations of variables yield a wide scope of outcomes under heterogeneous 
surroundings.
More concretely, in terms of the first essential element of CHA, demonstrating 
causal mechanisms is one of the principal purposes of all scientific research in the 
social sciences. Why particular phenomena happen in some societies but not in 
others is the central concern of the vast majority of social scientists. The causes of 
social phenomena, however, differ from the causes of natural phenomena in several 
respects, the most important of which is that it is unlikely that social scientists will 
find strong causal relationships akin to the laws of nature, which can be generalised 
across similar cases. Despite the difficulties in ascertaining the causal chain, to 
demonstrate causation is an obvious goal in the social sciences and is also the main 
concern of most comparative historical studies. Historical explanations aim to make 
inferences about the causes of social phenomena from particular occurrences 
(Mahoney et a!., 2009: u6). Comparative historical studies challenge reasoned 
historical accounts about why events took place by comparing the temporal changes 
*0 different cases or two temporal points in a particular case history. Through this 
interest in causation, researchers can not only set up hypotheses as to the effects of 
developments in particular cases, but also help policy-makers to implement better
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policies by demonstrating the causal links in pertinent cases (Mahoney and Terrie, 
2008: 748-749).
When it comes to ways of illuminating the causal mechanisms of outcomes, many 
comparative methods address the temporal change over time, rather than simply 
working with a static scene at a certain point in time. The temporal structure of 
events, including temporal order and timing, is the focal point of comparative 
historical analysis. This is because the influence of identical causal events varies 
according to their temporal order or timing, which cannot be tested by static cross- 
sectional analysis alone. Therefore, students committed to comparative historical 
methodology, regardless of their theoretical backgrounds, tend to start from the 
premise that, as Tilly (1984: 14) puts it, “when things happen within a sequence 
affects how they happen.”
The final observation commonly made in comparative historical literature and 
worth noting here is about the importance of systematic and contextualised 
comparison. Due to its characteristics, comparative historical analysis is a powerful 
way to demonstrate the varied combinatorial effects of causal factors. Conjunctural 
causation makes the work of verifying causal mechanisms more complex than a 
large number of causal variables do in the social sciences (Ragin, 1987: 26). 
Comparative historical analysts normally wrestle with a small number of cases and 
conduct intensive investigations into cases in order to deal with the complexity of 
conjunctural causation. During the process of small-N case studies, they can easily 
“move back and forth" between theory and history and measure variables in a 
contextualised way (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 13). This brings out 
conjunctural effects as well as temporal differences between case studies, thereby 
enabling comparative researchers to pay attention to different combinations of 
social forces and filtering impacts by institutions in similar or dissimilar 
environments.
4*3 The close affinity between the new institutionalism and 
comparative historical analysis
4 .3.1 The growth of the new institutionalism
Comparative historical methods have become the preferred empirical strategy for
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testing hypotheses amongst researchers belonging to the academic camp known as 
the ‘new institutionalism’. Working within the broad neo-positivist tradition, this 
group of scholars has highlighted the variable of institutions to explain various social 
phenomena through a series of small-N case studies (Porta and Keating, 2008: 30). 
They have refined comparative historical methods by providing concepts (e.g. path 
dependency, critical junctures) based on the theory. Hence to grasp what the new 
institutionalism is and what core notions are innovated in this perspective is an 
essential step towards capturing the mutual reciprocity between theory and methods 
in this branch of the social sciences.
Institutions are historical human inventions that structure social and economic 
activities between people. Therefore, institutions basically emerge, evolve, and 
perish dependent on the willingness of human beings. Established institutions, 
however, are not simple dependent variables, in that they bring about changes in the 
structure of interests of the involved in every game and consequently affect the final 
strategic choices over political issues or economic transaction. Hence institutions 
turn into the subject in political-economic life, not just an object that is entirely 
innovated or reformed by humans. Institutionalism places the active role played by 
institutions framing the patterned interactions between institutions and social 
actors at the centre of analysis.
The works of early institutionalism were usually normative and lacking in 
“analysis", which means the literature is full of simple descriptions and comparison 
of institutional arrangements across countries (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 3). 
Following on from where the ’old’ institutionalism left off in the 1950s, the ‘new’ 
institutionalism was conceived in the 1980s as a response to behaviourism and 
rational choice theory, which dismiss institutions as “no more than the simple 
a8gregation of individual preferences" (Lowndes, 2002: 90-91). Several pioneering 
works on the new institutionalism were published in politics and sociology from the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s (e.g. March and Olsen, 1984, 1989, North, 1990, 
Williamson, 1985, DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). The new perspective has emphasised 
lhe importance of institutions in influencing the goals of actors and power relations. 
Since, as North (1990: Ch 2) puts it, institutions are devised to advocate the interests 
those who have political bargaining power, an updated version of the old 
institutionalism enables us to advance our understanding of the politics around
institutions.
discerning the new institutional approach is not so difficult, but demarcating the 
intellectual boundaries between the many sub-categories of the new institutionalism
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is less easy. This difficulty in sub-categorisation is a result of both the theoretical 
features of new institutionalism and the developmental process through which the 
theory has gone. New institutionalists share a belief in the importance of institutions 
as a variable with which to analyse social events, although the perspective does not 
provide a consistent conceptual tool kit (Hudson and Lowe, 2004: 149). Despite its 
relative conceptual inconsistency, it is possible to categorise studies stressing the key 
role of institutions into three academic schools: rational choice, historical, and 
sociological (or organisational) institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 936-950, 
Immergut, 1998: 11-20). Rational choice and historical institutionalism have both 
paid a great deal of attention to the welfare states in Europe and America.
However, the crucial differences between these two branches of the new 
institutionalism lie in their views on human nature and preference formation. 
According to Hall and Taylor (1996: 938-940), rational choice institutionalism starts 
from the premise that actors in social relations seek to maximise the value of their 
individual utility function based on rational calculations. Historical institutionalists, 
on the other hand, assume that individuals in the policy arena act within the 
constraints of bounded rationality, a term originated by March and Olsen (1984) 
rather than pure or perfect instrumentality. The second controversial issue between 
the two schools is over the formation of individual and group preferences i.e. the 
question of how aggregated individual preferences become collective decisions. New 
institutionalists reject the behaviourist maxim that interest aggregation is the mere 
summation of individual preferences (Immergut, 1998: 11). However, the two 
schools differ in their views of preference itself. Rational choice institutionalism 
regards the preferences of actors as an exogenous factor and a given assumption in 
analysis, whereas historical institutionalism treats preferences as an endogenous 
factor in the sense that institutional context shapes the interests of individuals or of 
groups (Thclcn and Steinmo, 1992: 8-9). In other words, rational choice 
institutionalists presume that individuals have pre-dctermined preferences and seek 
to maximise their utility with respect to a clearly defined utility' function consisting 
° f key independent variables related to preferences. New historical institutionalists, 
meanwhile, tend to see the interests of agents as interactive and dynamic, defining 
them in relation to the institutional context.
Each academic camp has a relative advantage over the other one concerning the 
core questions of why institutions are devised and what drives institutional changes 
0yer time. On the first question, rational choice institutionalism provides the more 
intuitive explanation. To rational choice institutionalists, institutions are created by
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the explicit intentions of social agents, a position which recognises the positive 
outcomes of introducing institutions and that voluntarily enacted institutions can 
achieve what they were set up for, as long as they perform their original functions 
without many harmful side effects (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 952-953)- On the second 
question, historical institutionalists are more interesting, concerned as they are with 
gradual institutional change backed up by the notion of ‘path dependency.’ While 
path dependency can be useful for explaining incremental changes in stable periods, 
it is less convincing when it comes to interpreting periods of radical institutional 
reform. Hence it might be assumed that historical institutionalism is an 
inappropriate perspective from which to view institutional changes, because it relies 
on the long-lasting impacts of institutional choices made at the initial phase (Peters, 
2005: 76-77). To solve this problem, historical institutionalists have introduced 
other notions for explaining radical transformations without modifying the basic 
idea of path dependency. ‘Critical junctures’ is one such novel construct used to 
describe the moments or short periods triggering the commencement of a 
differentiated path-dependent period. As these interconnected ideas are of crucial 
significance in historical institutionalism, they will be further examined in a separate 
section below.
4*3*2 Interconnected key concepts in the historical institutionalism
‘ Pith dependency' and "critical junctures' have a propcr
historical institutional camp, but the\ art essential if we
understanding of what they mean. More conceptual discuMrans .  tual 
prevent these terms from falling prey to what Sartor, ( .97». ,053)
stretching."
. made In the Past s),8,emaliCal’yPath dependency is the -process in "  picrs„n. aoot: 306, «  * a
constrain the choices open In «he W - carljcr point in «me
concept which suggests 'tha, what has happened^ ^  ^  w  point m
affect the possible outcomes of a sequence re,urns' is a major source
time- (Sewell, ,99b: aba-g) The nature o me ,ncrcasing returns nulucis a
institutional inertia, the essence of path ^ * * * 4  option «0 another
aituation where actors rarely choose to sh, t to ^  incren,cntal, »>
one, even though the current option is not ' u usistencc of path-th l«" 1
reinforced by increasing returns demonstrate  ^ ^  rem„gably in sPtc,fic M>‘  
Processes by identifying how transaction
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contexts and highlighting the importance of temporality - timing and sequence 
(Pierson, 2000: 251). The traits of increasing returns manifest in a variety of 
institutions, not just a single institution and they are interconnected in a mutually 
complemented manner. Therefore, “the increasing returns nature of the institutional 
matrix” constituting the formal rules and informal constraints in a society hinders 
particular changes of institutions from reversing the ongoing direction (North, 1990: 
104).
Critical junctures, on the other hand, are important turning points or crucial 
periods which alter the historical stream of events in a dramatically different way. 
Several different phrases with a similar meaning to ‘critical junctures’ have been 
found in the various literature focusing on path dependency (e.g. Wilsford, 1985, 
Abbott, 1997 cited in Howlett, 2009: 248). However, the underlying meaning of 
these terms is the same. A critical juncture is “a period of significant change, which 
typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) 
and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (Collier and Collier, 1991: 
29). Specific junctures might turn out to be “critical" because positive feedback is 
produced by the initial form of mobilisation (Pierson, 2004: 66). The following 
definitions might help to consolidate the methodological foundation for the 
historical analysis of critical junctures.
• A critica l ju n c tu r e  m ay be defin ed  as a p erio d  o f  significant change, 
w hich typically  occu rs in d istin ct w ays in d ifferen t countries (or in 
oth er  un its o f  an a lysis) a n d  w hich is hyp othesized  to p roduce distinct 
legacies (C ollier  a n d  Collier, 19 9 1:2 9 ).
* IVe defin e cr itica l ju n ctu res  as relatively  short p eriod s o f  tim e during  
w hich there is a substa n tia lly  h eig hten ed  proba bility  that a g en ts  
choices w ill a ffect the outcom e o f  in terests (C apoccia a n d  K elem en, 
2 0 0 7 :3 4 8 ).
*n relation to the first definition, three conditions have to be satisfied when 
insisting specific events (or periods) are critical junctures: a significant change has 
to have happened, and the change must have occurred in distinct ways in different 
Units ° f  analysis and there is an explanatory hypothesis as to the outcomes -  if the 
hypothesised critical junctures proves not to produce the legacy’, the hypothesis that 
h was a critical juncture should be rejected (Collier and Collier, 1991; 3°)* 1° the 
second definition, the two italicised words - relatively  and substa n tia lly  - warrant 
forther consideration. The word ‘ rela tii'e ly " underlines the necessity of comparing
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the temporal span between the critical junctures and the process after the junctures. 
Associated with the relativity of period, Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: 348) indicate 
that “the duration of the juncture must be brief relative to the duration of the path- 
dependent process it instigates.” The second word, “substa n tia lly ," highlights the 
importance of establishing the degree to which the junctures increase during the 
period i.e. "the probability that agent’s choices will affect the outcome of interest 
must be high relative to that probability before and after the juncture” (Capoccia and 
Kelemen, 2007: 348). The concept of “substan tially  heightened probability” can be 
better understood by linking it to the notion of “contingency.” Critical junctures are 
identified by significant increases in uncertainty or unpredictability, expressed by 
“contingency," which indicates a high probability of deviating from the previous 
sticky process and of commencing a new self-enforcing process during the junctures. 
In conclusion, critical junctures are relatively short periods in which alternative 
options become available and thus they are of vital importance in temporal analysis, 
as it is highly likely that they generate new path-dependent development which 
would otherwise have been blocked.
4 »3>3 Positive feedbacks between the theory and the methodology
It is by no means difficult to recognise the affinity between the new 
institutionalism and comparative historical analysis. There clearly is an affinity 
between the two and this is apparent in the following excerpt from Pierson and 
Skocpol (2002) the two most prominent scholars in the school:
Three  important fe a tu r e s  characterize h istorical-in stitution al scholarship  in 
con tem p ora ry  p o litica l scien ce. H istorical in stitutionalists address big, 
su bsta n tive  q u estion s that are in herently  o f  in terest to broad p ublics as w ell 
os fe llo w  schola rs. (...) h istorical in stitution alists take tim e seriously, 
sp ecify in g  seq u en ces a n d  tracing  tran sform a tion s a n d  processes o f  varying  
scale a n d  tem porality . H istorical in stitution alists likew ise analyze m acro  
con texts a n d  hyp othesize  about the com b in ed  effects o f  institutions and  
P rocesses (...)  (P ierson a n d  Skocp ol, 2002: 695-696).
Because of the features they share in common, it can be argued that both historical 
ittstitutionalism and comparative historical methods would benefit from the 
affirmative spiral feedbacks obtained by refining conceptual frameworks in theory 
and tnethodology. The fact that two key concepts related to temporal structure - path 
dcI*ndency and critical junctures - have been developed by historical
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institutionalists illustrates how theory can make the most of methodology in order to 
elaborate its own logic and vice versa. Here are two precise cases illustrating the 
constructive dialogue between them. The strategy of périodisation is an interesting 
instance of how theoretical concepts promote technical fine-tunings in CHA. 
Périodisation concerns the methodological strategy of partitioning history into a 
number of separable periods in a chronological order (Lieberman, 2001: 1017). 
According to Lieberman (2001: 1017-1019) periods are generally divided by crucial 
dates or events, with other events or processes simply slotted into place between 
turning points. He classifies the périodisation strategies employed in CHA into four 
groups: the institutional origins strategy, the institutional change strategy, the 
exogenous shock strategy and the rival causes strategy. With all of these approaches, 
it is necessary to find and specify the moments that demarcate the periods. Path 
dependency and critical junctures are therefore of benefit to every scholar who 
struggles with how to divide periods in CHA. Conversely, an example of how 
comparative historical methods can serve to refine the theory is that of 
counterfactual analysis, which might be an appropriate method for testing the 
validity of theoretical concepts in the new historical institutionalism. Counterfactual 
analysis - the analysis of hypothesised events that did not occur in history - begins 
with the assumption that “If it had been the case that C (or not C), it would have 
been the case that E (or not E)” (Fearon, 1991: 169). Conceivable counterfactual 
scenarios supposed by theoretical predictions or reorganisation of policy-making 
process can be a means for discerning whether contingency - the core attribute of 
critical junctures - was heightened at a particular moment (Capoccia and Kelemen, 
2007: 368). Along with this method, other comparative historical methods such as 
‘process tracing’ or ‘systematic process analysis’ fall into the same category of 
methods that have the potential to encourage theoretical improvement.
4*4 Application of comparative historical analysis to policy 
analysis
4*4.1 The popularity of comparative historical analysis in social policy 
analysis
Comparative historical methods have played a major role in developing social 
Policy' analysis at the comparative level, just as they have done in other fields and
disciplines. The importance of CHA is clearly discernible in the argument of the 
‘welfare (states) regime.’ Esping-Andersen’s The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism (1990) is a comparative historical study of how three different types of 
welfare capitalism have emerged in Europe and America and the idea of path 
dependency is consistently maintained in subsequent literature on the three welfare 
regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1996, 1999) and other case studies from a comparative 
perspective (e.g. Korpi, 2001, Rothstein, 1992). Besides the development of the 
welfare states, the retrenchment of the public role in America and Britain during the 
1980s is examined by comparative historical methods in Pierson’s (1994) work. A 
broader version of the welfare politics in a period of permanent austerity was edited 
by Pierson (2001). Comparative historical studies combined with the quantitative 
method e.g. Huber and Stephens (2001) or Swank (2002) show how the different 
methods can be complementary when it comes to exploring the development and 
change of the welfare states. In addition, comparative historical methods offer keen 
insights into the development of individual programmes for securing social risks 
across countries or in a single country (e.g. Immergut, 1992, Orloff, 1993» Skocpol, 
1992, Amenta, 1998).
Why have comparative historical methods been so popular with analysts of social 
policy? Firstly, the popularity of comparative historical methods is relevant to the 
historical nature of social policy. Social policy is not formulated at a single point in 
time. It is the accumulated result of historical processes over a long-term period. 
Once a policy is legislated, it never remains in its original form. All social policies 
have steadily expanded coverage of the population and provided higher levels of 
benefits. Social policies in history were sometimes retrenched in that a benefit was 
cut and the proportion of population covered was reduced. A wide range of social 
policies contribute to the historical entity of the welfare state, which differs from 
other social phenomena with only two opposite consequences - presence or non­
presence. The primary units for the comparison of the welfare states are relatively 
b'g. since major social policies as a constituent of the welfare states have been 
implemented within the whole national boundary or at least state/province level. In 
conclusion, comparative historical analysis is suitable for the study of social policy 
and the welfare state because of the historical nature of social policy and because it 
addresses big questions.
Secondly, comparative historical methodology has been shown to be an effective 
instrument for social policy analysis by contemporary middle-range researchers. 
When modem social policy began in the last quarter of the 19th century, the early
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grand theories - the ‘Logic of industrialism’ (Wilensky, 1975) and ‘Neo-Marxism’ 
(Gough, 1979, Offe, 1984) - focused on overarching factors in an attempt to explain 
the development of the modern welfare states. But the theoretical and empirical 
limitations of grand theories, especially when it came to accounting for the historical 
experiences of the existing welfare states, meant that middle-range theories had to 
be developed instead. Meaningful findings have been produced by a number of 
comparative studies within historical institutionalism, a prominent middle-range 
theory: the political origins of social policy in the USA (Skocpol, 1992), the 
institutional approach to the development of Swedish unemployment policy 
(Rothstein, 1992), the politics of health care reform and different outcomes in 
France, Switzerland, and Sweden (Immergut, 1992), the impact of federalism on 
social policy in both the development and retrenchment of the welfare state (Pierson, 
1995). More broadly, some extensive historical studies (Flora and Alber, 1981, 
Esping-Andersen, 1990) also have strong elements of historical institutionalism, 
which indicate the long-term influence of the institutional legacies, particularly in 
Bismarckian welfare states.
Finally, comparative historical methods have contributed to the conceptualisation 
of social policy by refining the ‘ideal types’ that characterise a policy regime as a 
whole (Amenta, 2003: 108). Since the conceptualisation of the three welfare regimes 
proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990) ideal types grounded on historical analysis 
have served as prototypical cases when researchers discuss the different types of the 
welfare states. The ideal types of the welfare states help researchers and readers to 
clarify the societal factors that frame a particular type of the welfare states and how 
welfare benefits are differently delivered in each regime. In addition, the ideal types 
are very useful criteria by which to extend the results of existing analyses to other 
cases situated under similar or contrasting conditions. This feature of CHA has 
attracted the academic interest of scholars pursuing bounded generalisation to the 
extent that the merits of the contextualised comparison arc not lost.
4 .4.2 The application of comparative historical analysis to housing 
policy' analysis
The main methodological advantage of comparative historical analysis stems from 
,he eclectic advantages of the case study over typical quantitative methods. The case 
su%  can readily utilise quantitative evidence to achieve the research purpose 
although it usually collects evidence or data using qualitative methods. The eclectic
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nature of the case study method makes it a powerful tool in the scientific dialogue 
between theory and evidence. The advantages of the case study can be illustrated by 
considered comparative housing research.
Here case studies conducted by comparative historical methods can alleviate many 
difficulties experienced by quantitative researchers. As Wilensky (1975: 7) puts it, 
comparative housing researchers have suffered from measurement problems and 
fragmentary data, which largely remain unsolved until now. For example, tenure is a 
representative operational morass in housing policy analysis. It generally refers to 
rights to the property, but is a historical concept that cannot be narrowed down to 
the limited types of tenures. Confusing terms are similarly witnessed to describe a 
variety of housing organisations in different contexts. As a typical instance, the 
meaning of ‘housing association’ varies across the states dependent upon the 
numerous criteria such as whether it is given financial assistance of the states, 
whether the staff of management boards are paid and whether it provides housing 
units only for rent (Doling, 1997: 37). These ambiguous terms show that it is 
extremely difficult to operationalise the concepts required for statistical analysis in 
comparative housing studies. Historical case studies including quantitative data can 
contribute to establishing a general consensus on the operational definition of 
controversial concepts in comparative housing research. In this respect, given that 
comparative historical methodology is so eclectic and flexible it could offer useful 
guidelines for refining the definitions and measurement of the concepts for 
quantitative comparativists.
Moreover, comparative historical methods have excellent potential to illuminate 
how well matched theories are with methods and to therefore produce meaningful 
findings. The potential of CHA is further enhanced when it is combined with the 
perspective of historical institutionalism in comparative housing studies. The 
literature on housing regimes hugely benefits from the advantages of comparative 
historical methods, just as the literature on welfare regimes does in comparative 
social policy. In comparative housing studies, several case studies are explicitly or 
■ niplicitly influenced by Esping-Andersen’s (1990) criteria for typology summarised 
ln <Table 4-3>. Unfortunately, the authors of these studies have not sufficiently 
examined whether Esping-Andcrsen's framework can be applied to housing without 
significant modifications. They have assumed that the logic of welfare capitalism is 
Som atically  applicable to housing policy but should have handled the essential 
issue of how housing connects with other welfare systems within welfare capitalism, 
which Esping-Andersen disregards in his analysis. It is quite ironic that the most
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consistent approaches to this issue are found in Kemeny’s ( 1995 . 2 0 0 5 , 2 0 0 6 )  
discussion of housing regimes (dualist rental system vs. integrated rental market) 
which is based on a purposefully different set of housing-oriented criteria to Esping- 
Andersen’s. Given that the discourse on housing regimes is still in its infancy, there 
is much room for improving upon previous regime studies by the direct adoption of 
concepts like path dependency and critical junctures from historical institutionalism.
< Table 4.3 > Examples of case studies influenced by Esping-Andersen’s regimes
Author Criteria for classifying regimes
Result
Barlow and
Duncan
(1994)
No criteria for classifying 
housing regimes
• 4 types of the welfare states: Liberal, 
Conservative, Social democratic, 
Rudimentary welfare states
Doling
(1999a)
• Criteria:
Decommodification
• Definition: The level of de­
commodification depends 
on the rules of access and 
exit in housing, 
independently from income
• Constructing housing decommodification 
index
• Comparing three countries (UK, Germany 
and Sweden) as typical welfare states 
according to Esping-Andersen’s regime
• Ranking order in housing system 
approximately runs counter to Esping- 
Andersen’s result
Stephens
and
Fitzpatrick
(2007)
• Criteria:
Decommodification
• Definition: housing 
outcomes are achieved 
independently from labour 
market outcomes
• Correlation between housing outcomes, 
particularly homelessness and the level of 
poverty and equality that are produced by 
welfare regime, housing system
Hoekstra
(2005)
• No criteria for classifying 
housing regimes
• 4 types welfare states: Liberal, 
Corporatist, Social democratic, 
Mediterranean welfare states
• The characteristics of single-family 
dwellings hardly differ between liberal, 
corporatist, and social democratic, but 
there arc significant differences between 
the three regimes and the Mediterranean
„  . rnnceots from historical 
Several case studies of housing l,avc imf 2000| Matznetter,
institutionalism. Some (Klcinnun. institutional analysis by
noon, Nielsen, note, Bengtsson. noon) exp . in(iicatc (ha, insttw,ional
importing the concept of path depen etu>.  ^ ^  o plausible way to
analysis involving the use of the sequential con^  (2()o8; 5) and later with his 
approach the features of housing poliev. Bengtsso ^   ^ ^  accepting ‘pa*
colleague, Rounavaara (20»oa: 4 *5 . 2 0 housing in s t itu t io n s  and
dependency* is possible and necessary n characleristics of being both a
Policy for three reasons. Firstly, housing has
7 ?
fl§&U!
Iconsumption and investment good at the same time. Construction of housing 
necessarily entails the purchase or ownership of land; then there is the lengthy 
process of building physical stock and the considerable financial outlay. The built 
stocks, as composites of multiple resources, form a long-standing heritage that is not 
easily modified by government actions. In addition, losing a home is such a huge 
emotional, social and cultural event that it means households are reluctant to 
transfer from one dwelling to another one. These physical and social features of 
housing act as obstacles hindering radical reforms in housing institutions and policy. 
Secondly, the belief that housing should be provided by the market mechanism is 
widely accepted and many view government intervention in the housing market as 
simply a corrective. From this perspective, arrangements like property rights and the 
regulation of tenure are fundamental to the transaction of commodities in the 
market. Hence it is unlikely that they will be drastically modified by government 
interventions. Finally, any significant amendment of relevant acts on tenure will 
always require consumers and suppliers as well as politicians and voters, to be 
persuaded because of the market-dominated provision of housing.
Another core notion in historical institutionalism, ‘critical juncture’, might provide 
novel points of view for scholars interested in discerning the crucial turning points 
of housing policy reform at the comparative level. Plenty of instances can be 
identified in which the application of the concept of ‘critical juncture’ is extended to 
the analysis of housing policy in Asian Tigers. For example, in the later part of the 
thesis, it is argued that the Singaporean ‘CPF Approved Housing Scheme’ in 1968 
can be regarded as a critical juncture in the early industrialisation of Asian Tigers. If 
we accept that an essential trait of critical junctures is their relative shortness of 
duration compared with the duration of path-dependent processes as defined by 
Capoccia and Kelemcn (2007: 348), the juncture could be extendable to the ‘Home 
Ownership Scheme’ begun in 1964 with the political slogan of ‘a property-owning 
democracy.’ However, the ‘CPF Approved Housing Scheme’ was more important 
than the previous scheme, because it triggered unprecedented growth in home 
ownership by allowing people to withdraw their savings from the Central Provident 
Fund (or CPF, the entirely contributions-based national pension scheme). With the 
introduction of the scheme, a part of savings could be used by CPF members but 
only for the purchase of housing provided by the Housing Development Board 
(HDB), an autonomous government agency. Whether a period (the 1960s) or a new 
Policy (*CPF Approved Housing Scheme’), the concept of'critical junctures is highly 
aPpropriate for analysing the development of housing in Singapore. 
Notwithstanding these far-reaching possibilities of application in housing, the
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institutional approaches to housing policy seem to be underdeveloped theoretically 
and empirically. Therefore, institutional analysis should be promoted by increasing 
the quantity and improving the quality of comparative historical studies, especially 
given the methodological virtues identified in social policy analysis and the 
appropriateness of the concepts for housing policy analysis.
4.5 The utilisation of comparative historical analysis in the thesis
4.5.1 Critiques of comparative historical analysis (CHA)
Although it had made significant contributions to policy analysis, CHA has also 
been attacked by other academic schools. These critiques become acute particularly 
when CHA relies on concepts or ideas from historical institutionalism to examine 
the issues of institutional origin and change. Its emphasis on context, in particular, 
is frequently devalued as “thick description of single cases” or “reliance on simple 
paired comparisons of complex cases” (Pierson, 2004: 169). As historical 
institutionalism lacks a universal tool kit or neatly defined concepts, some rational 
choice institutionalists further criticise the inductive and descriptive inference of 
historical institutionalism with the mocking expression of ‘storytelling (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992: 12). More practically, CHA is exposed to the critiques in data 
collection and analysis given methodological sophistication of CHA is at infancy and 
still made by a modicum number of scholars (e.g. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer). 
Although some methods (e.g. process-tracing or counterfactual analysis) are 
explicitly utilised in CHA, no universal tool kit has been suggested to establish well- 
organised practical skills until now (see Mahoney, 2004, Mahoney and Tcrrie, 2008 
for the methodological issues with CHA).
However, it might not be desirable to pursue a deductive theory or methodology 
"hen we work with institutions in a historical manner. The single-minded pursuit of 
deductive theory' (or methodology) is not compatible with the goals and 
development paths of historical institutionalism and CHA. Historical 
«nstitutionalists refine their original hypotheses in inductive ways when the subjects 
are empirically interpreted and reject the pursuit of identical technique for the 
an*lysis of political phenomena (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 12). When looking at 
the developmental path of historical institutionalism so far, it is apparent that most 
of theoretical and empirical knowledge generated by the perspective has been
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steadily accumulated by continuous individual case studies, most of which could be 
located in CHA, in wide-ranging topics (see Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 694, 
Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 4 for a review). Finally, historical 
institutionalists have not sought to create deductive theories based on numerical 
formulae or general statements. The perspective has emerged mainly through the 
examination and comparison of various cases rather than by suggesting or refining 
standardised models for generalisation. Hence an emphasis on strict modelling 
would weaken the explanatory power of CHA based on historical institutionalism 
while at the same time it is unlikely that a generalised model would overcome its 
weaknesses.
4.5.2 How CHA is used in this thesis
Taking these criticisms of CHA into consideration, the thesis aims to work with the 
strengths of CHA rather than attempt to formulate a general theory (or 
methodology). The main advantage of CHA is its embrace of wide-ranging theories. 
CHA is distinguished by its eclecticism and pluralism in that varying theories are 
adopted to account for cases in a study (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 21, 
Skocpol, 2003: 419). Highlighting the eclectic characteristic, Skocpol (2003: 419) 
argues that the proper way of understanding CHA is to regard it not as a single 
'theory or technique’, but as a 'research approach'. Hence the most important step 
in CHA is identifying the relevant theories and integrating them in a coherent way 
that can account for different periods of history while at the same time incorporating 
the influence of context. This task can be gradually achieved by researchers moving 
hack-and-forth between evidence and contexts while investigating a wide range of 
data sources and arguments.
To make the most of CHA’s pluralistic advantages, this thesis will identify several 
convincing perspectives and link them together. Two key theories arc employed to 
handle the cases: the developmental states and historical institutionalism. 
Developmental states theory, reviewed in Chapter 3, provides a plausible framework 
and convincing evidence with which to analyse the political economy of the Asian 
Ti*ers at the stage of industrialisation. The perspective also expands the temporal 
dimensions of historical analysis, because many studies of how the developmental 
*‘ates arose and evolved include analysis of colonial eras to illuminate the origins 
a°d evolutions of principal institutions. More specifically, key arguments and 
findings from the theory are expected to offer abundant contextual evidence
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surrounding the development of housing policy. They help us understand how 
housing institutions- a component of political economy- were called for and 
implemented in a long run. Meanwhile, historical institutionalism is employed to 
increase the complementary advantages between various theories. Historical 
institutionalism is useful for analysing the enduring impacts of housing and related 
arrangements. In particular, the concepts of generating path dependency- e.g. 
increasing returns, institutional complementarities- are effective for demonstrating 
how path-dependent patterns dominate policy development by placing institutions 
at the centre of analysis. Because analyses “treating institutions as themselves 
important objects of explanation” are underdeveloped (Pierson 2004: 103), focusing 
on institutional contents and self-reinforcing elements will contribute to the 
accumulation of knowledge on institutional origins and changes in housing.
When it comes to evidence and data collection, this study is heavily reliant on 
secondary and tertiary' sources. Since the study concerns the historical development 
of housing policy in two nation states over the course of a century, many old primary 
sources are not entirely available or not accessible. The problem becomes more 
serious when looking for primary sources on the colonial and early post­
independence eras in Asia. This difficulty in obtaining primary sources is not 
confined to Asian countries. Many political scientists studying Western democracies 
face the same restrictions and choose to use secondary' and tertiary documentary 
sources (Burnham et al., 2008:188-189). Reliance on non-primary sources 
necessarily increases in comparative historical studies where many old primary 
sources are not available and interviewing the actors involved is practically 
impossible. In addition, the thesis is intended to be a genuinely 'historical’ study 
examining slow-moving policy developments over the last hundred years or so, since 
the significant transformations of the colonial era. The CHA is thus focused on 
describing and analysing long-term policy developments mainly by working with 
institutional characteristics rather than investigating the details of individual policy- 
making processes. Institutional analysis of housing policy and related arrangements 
is expected to produce significant knowledge of housing development in Korea and 
Singapore, which have lacked organised political groups capable of exerting 
systematic pressures on state governance in the housing policy-making process.
More concretely, the principal secondary and tertiary sources are used as c\idenct 
,n the thesis arc as follows: Ministry reports, yearbooks and documents published by 
P°blic housing bodies, Acts and Ministry Ordinances, Hansard, newspapers, 
Published memoirs and autobiographies, books and academic journals. Reports and
81
documents published by government and key public housing bodies provide 
information on policy goals and achievements including quantitative data. Acts and 
Ministry Ordinances are useful sources for identifying not only the overall direction 
of housing schemes, but also the details of schemes. Above all, drawing upon 
relevant literature from a wide range of fields in the human and social sciences offers 
rich evidence and important clues as to how to create an integrated framework using 
plural theories.
To sum up, the CHA of Korea and Singapore undertaken in this thesis adopts an 
eclectic approach in order to arrive at what Skocpol (2003: 424) calls “double 
engagement”, in other words, a scientific account of social phenomena that the 
educated public as well as academics can understand and relate to. To this end, the 
CHA used in the thesis does not stick to a single method within a narrow theoretical 
framework. Evidence and data have been collected from various secondary and 
tertiary sources, mainly documents and literature. These supporting materials have 
then been organised and integrated using two key theories associated with the 
analysis of housing development. The hope is that the CHA in this thesis will shed 
light on how colonial institutions were combined with different developmental 
models and how housing institutions themselves affected path-dependent 
development over time.
4.6 Concluding remarks
The statistical method and the case study have their own methodological strengths 
and weaknesses in the social sciences and thus the appropriate choice of method is 
contingent on various conditions in individual studies. Therefore, the relationship 
between them should not be understood as exclusive and hierarchical. As a kind of 
the case study method, comparative historical analysis challenges reasoned 
historical accounts about why events took place by comparing the temporal changes 
in different cases or two points in time in a particular case history. Comparative 
historical analysts normally wrestle with a small number of cases and conduct 
intensive investigations into cases in order to deal with the complexity of 
conjunctural causation. This brings out conjunctural effects as well as temporal 
differences between case studies, thereby enabling comparative researchers to pay 
attention to different combinations of social forces and filtering impacts by
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institutions in similar or dissimilar environments. With these methodological 
characteristics, comparative historical analysis is a powerful way to demonstrate the 
varied combinatorial effects of causal factors. In relation to the theories, 
comparative historical analysis has become the preferred empirical strategy for 
testing hypotheses in the tradition of historical institutionalism. The tendency 
largely stems from the positive feedbacks from which both historical institutionalism 
and comparative historical analysis would benefit. The mutual advantages are 
obtained by refining conceptual frameworks in theory and methodology. The fact 
that two key concepts related to temporal structure - path dependency and critical 
junctures - have been developed by historical institutionalists illustrates how theory 
can make the most of methodology in order to elaborate its own logic and vice versa.
The potential of comparative historical analysis is further enhanced in housing 
field as well when it is combined with the perspective of historical institutionalism. 
Esping-Andersen (1985: 179) argues that housing policy is a good subject for testing 
the importance of political mobilisation in the social democratic welfare states, since 
it concerns an area essential to household welfare and housing problems are closely 
interconnected with social policies. Nevertheless, most mainstream social policy 
researchers including Esping-Andersen have disregarded housing by neglecting or 
excluding it from arguments about the major constituents of the different welfare 
states. Even comparative housing scholars are not immune from criticism in the 
sense that they have paid little attention to the subject of how housing has been 
integrated into the overall welfare system in different ways. Housing could be the 
“joker in the pack of welfare policy areas" because of the unique characteristics 
compared with other welfare pillars and thus how it is structured can have wide- 
ranging impacts on the organisation of welfare states (Kemeny, 1995: 174)- 
Therefore, it would be too hasty to designate housing “the wobbly pillar under the 
welfare state" (Torgerscn, 1987: 116) in so far as all conclusions rely on narrow 
ranges of perspectives and methods.
Given that the discourse on housing regimes is still in its infancy, there is much 
room for improving upon previous regime studies by comparative historical analysis. 
CHA has a number of methodological virtues, each of which could contribute to the 
development of comparative housing studies. It can particularly do it by the direct 
adoption of concepts like path dependency and critical junctures from historical 
institutionalism. In addition, it can sene for the conceptualisation of housing 
regimes bv refining the ‘ideal types’ in comparative study. In conclusion, the 
^ergistic effects between historical institutionalism and the methodology are such
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that historical analysis could shape alternative viewpoints to the market-centred 
accounts by testing propositions generated from the institutional ideas and linking 
housing policy to other social policies in a comprehensive way. Against the 
backgrounds of these theories and the method, the following chapters move to the 
cases of Korea and Singapore. Historical development of housing policy in Korea 
and Singapore will be examined in the main body of Chapter 5 to 8 mainly through 
the positive dialogue between historical institutionalism and comparative historical 
analysis.
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Chapter five
The development of housing in Korea
5.1 Introduction: Industrialisation, urbanisation and housing in 
Korea
The Republic of Korea (South Korea, hereafter Korea) was one of the poorest 
countries when it became independent from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Even 
after independence, the socio-economic conditions of Korea became aggravated 
when the countries suffered from the devastating Korean War (1950-53) and 
subsequent political conflicts between communists and capitalists. Most Koreans 
could not meet basic needs and worried about how to survive in such times of 
distress. This situation hardly changed until Park Chung-Hee and his colleagues 
succeeded in coming to power through the military coup in 1961. The new Park’s 
government undertook a large-scale industrialisation project with a long-term plan 
for economic developments to legitimate the forced turnover of power. Korean 
society has experienced a noteworthy transformation over the past five decades 
since industrialisation led by the authoritarian regime commenced in the 1960s. The 
improvement of living standards in the newly industrialising countries including 
Korea was so impressive even when compared with other amazing cases in the 
history of capitalism. Per capita income growth rates of the East Asian societies over 
the second half of the last century - approximately 5 to 6% - were even higher than 
that of European countries and America during the Industrial Revolution (slightly 
over 1%) or during the ‘Golden Age of Capitalism' (around 3% between 1950 and 
*975) (Chang, 2003:108).
More specifically, the outstanding performance of Korea during its economic 
growth and swift shift from an agrarian society to industrialised society is much 
more obvious by comparison with some developing countries in Asia and Latin 
America. In <Table 5.i>, GDP per capita of Korea, US$ 156 in i960, was slightly 
higher than GDP per capita of other underdeveloped countries in Asia such as 
Thailand ($100) and India ($84) but considerably less than GDP per capita of some 
developing countries in Latin America such as Brazil ($208) and Mexico ($353)- Yet 
the Korean economy has outperformed the other developing countries for most
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years of the last five decades and became the only high-income country in which 
GDP per capita was beyond $20,000 in 2007. It is not only GDP per capita but also 
its long-lasting high growth rate that makes Korea more notable than other cases. 
The Korean economy has consistently grown above 5% per year on average over the 
four decades (1960-2000) judged by the indicator of 10-year-average of annual 
growth of GDP per capita in <Table 5.i>. Its high level of stable economic 
development are contrasted with the other developing countries in which growth 
rates have fluctuated or been relatively low in cTable 5.1>. In the 1960s and 1980s 
Korean GDP per capita increased by more than 7% per year on average. During the 
other two decades, a growth rate of approximately 5% was maintained despite the 
fact that two big shocks- the Oil Shock in the late 1970s and the Asian Financial 
Crisis in the late 1990s - caused a significant downturn in other economies.
< Table 5.1 > GDP per capita of some developing countries in Asia and Latin America
Country GDP per capita (current US$) 10-year-average of annual growth of GDP per capita (96)
i960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007 1961-70
1971-
80
1981-
90
1991-
2000
Korea 156 279 1,674 6.153 11347 21A53 7.71 5-41 7.48 5-21
Brazil 208 441 1.932 3.089 3,701 7.013 3-29 5-97 -0.43 1.01
Mexico 353 702 2,876 3.157 5,935 9,715 3-45 3-67 -0.22 1.86
India 84 11 2 267 374 453 1,046 1-74 O.77 3-35 361
Thailand 100 19 1 685 1.506 1,968 3.689 501 4-35 5-96 3-63
Source: World Bank (2011)
As with advanced economies in Europe and America, rapid urbanisation has been 
accompanied by industrialisation in Korea. The more progressed industrialisation 
became, the more migrants rushed to urban areas. The urban concentration of 
population, as a typical phenomenon of urbanisation, has been observed over the 
period of industrialisation. There has been a dramatic rise in the number of 
residents in urban areas as cTable 5.2> shows. The ratio of urban population to total 
Population in Korea has continuously increased since industrialisation was driven by 
the central government in the 1960s. While the percentage of urban residents to 
total population was less than 30% in i960, it amounted to above 80% in 2007. The 
situation was essentially the same in much bigger cities. Despite a small decrease in 
the ratio of urban population after the 1990s, approximately half of the total 
Population of Korea live in metropolitan areas where the total number of residents is 
more than 1 million. International comparison of changes in urban population 
illustrates how striking this swelling of the urban population in Korea is. Korea had 
the lowest percentage of urban population to total population in i960 (27.7%) w,th
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at least a 17.2% point gap between Korea and Brazil (44.9%) the second lowest 
country in the rankings. But with the highest increase in the percentage from i960 
to 2007 (53.5% point) Korea rose to third in the rankings, above France and Mexico, 
of countries in which more than half of total population was urban residents in i960. 
When the urban areas are confined to agglomerations of more than 1 million, the 
increase is so dramatic that Korea stands at the top of the table with a figure of 
48.4% of total population in 2007.
< Table 5.2 >The ratio of urban population to total population in Ko rea
Year
i960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007
Urban population percentage of total 
population 27.7 40.7 56.7 73-8 79.6 81.2
Population in urban agglomerations of 
more than 1 million percentage of total 
population
21.3 31-7 42.6 51-4 5O.9 48.4
Source: World Bank (2011)
Country’ Urban population percentage of total population
Population in urban agglomerations of 
more than 1 million percentage of total 
population
i960 1990 2007 i960 1990 2007
Korea 27.7 73-8 81.2 21.3 51-4 48.4
Brazil 44-9 74-8 85.1 20.2 33-6 38.8
Mexico 50.8 71-4 76.9 22.0 32.3 34.0
France 61.9 74.1 77-1 21.5 22.7 22.3
United
Kingdom 78.4 88.7 89-9 31-4 26.0 26.0
Source: Worl d Bank (2011)
While rapid development brought with it economic affluence along with 
industrialisation and urbanisation, Korean society simultaneously suffered from 
many social problems. In particular, chronic lack of housing stock in metropolitan 
areas brought about multiple urban problems for decades following the onset of 
industrialisation. Absolute deficits in housing stocks resulted in a proliferation of 
condensed residential districts and illegal slums, and general housing conditions 
were poor during the initial phase of industrialisation. Housing problems of quality 
as well as quantity persisted for many years, in spite of the rapid development in 
other sectors of the economy. Housing stocks and housing conditions steadily 
improved, but Korea faced other housing problems such as unaffordable housing 
especially for low-income households and growing inequality in housing assets.
To cope with different kinds of housing issues, Korean governments have tried
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several approaches and this chapter aims to describe the historical developments in 
housing policy in a chronological order, for further analysis in the subsequent 
chapter. This chapter starts by examining urban plans including the rudimentary 
housing policy established during the thirty-six-year Japanese rule, when a limited 
degree of urbanisation proceeded. Next, a brief review of housing policy during 
interim post-independence is followed by an examination of housing policy during 
the Park regime, which oversaw economic development through the 1960s and 
1970s.
5.2 Housing policy during Japanese colonial rule and at the early 
independent era
5.2.1 Policy introductions relevant to housing during the colonial rule
After the Chosun Dynasty - the reigning indigenous dynasty when Korea was 
annexed by Japan in 1910 - the Korean peninsula was ruled by Japanese imperial 
power for thirty-five years. Housing was not a priority for the colonial government, 
which was more concerned with the efficient exploitation of the colony. Public plans 
for housing were largely introduced as an ancillary component of urban planning, 
not separate plans. Hence it might be more appropriate to approach to housing 
Policy in colonial Korea by investigating what key acts were brought in regarding 
urban planning. There were two momentous acts for urban plans implemented by 
the Japanese: the first was the ‘Remodelling City Blocks Act’ in 1912, the other was 
the ‘Chosun Planning Act for Urban Areas’ in 1934- The ‘Remodelling City Blocks 
Act’ was a rudimentary modernity project to repair urban infrastructure such as 
roads, bridges, streams and to build physical artefacts in modern ways (Park, 2007a: 
62). The function was exactly correspondent with that of a Japanese act targeted for 
Tokyo. The original act, the first modern institution in urban planning with 
reference to French law, included only the plans for expanding infrastructures but 
failed to stipulate the regulations on private construction (Kim, 2003: 85-86). In 
spite of the limited coverage, the act provided basic urban plans to improve 
infrastructures in Korea by the mid-i930s (Kim, 2004: 49  cited in Park, 2007a). The 
'Remodelling City Blocks Act’ was also utilised to create new commercial centres 
near which Japanese were able to settle down, thereby the newly constructed areas 
a«cd as the commercial bases for Japanese competition with the traditional
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commercial areas in northern Seoul (Kim, 1982a: 23-24).
More important reform in urban planning was introduced in the 1930s when 
visible changes occurred in industrial structure and the size of the economy. 
Industrialisation steadily proceeded under the rule of Japan, even though the 
benefits of economic growth were largely channelled into Japan. Time-series data of 
GDP 1911-40 estimated by Cha and Kim (2006) in <Figure 5.1> illustrates that the 
1930s was a decade in which there had been a sharp rise in the GDP of Korea since 
Japan annexed Korea in 1910. Substantial change in industrial structure was 
observed over the periods too. Estimated data from Cha and Kim (2006: 46-7) 
shows that the ratio of mining, quarrying and manufacturing to GDP increased from
5-12% in 1911 to 19.41% in 1940 whereas the ratio of agriculture, forestry and fishery 
dropped from 67.22% in 1911 to 41.41% in 1940. The rise in figures for the two 
indicators was dramatic, especially over the last decade of Japanese rule, 1930-40.
Coping with new urban problems in the 1930s, the developmental approach to 
urban planning needed to be reused. In addition, Governor-General Chosun devised 
a scheme linking the core hubs of the economy in Korea to Japan and Manchuria, 
which helped support the successful imperialistic expansion to the continent after 
Japan occupied Manchuria - a part of mainland China in 1931 (Kim, 2007a: 160). 
The response of the colonial government was to introduce the ‘Chosun Planning Act 
for Urban Areas' originated from the modern ‘City Planning Act' implemented in 
Japan in 1920, The 'Chosun Planning Act for Urban Areas' was enacted not only to 
develop Najin as a planned transit port between Manchuria and Japan for the 
invasion of China but also as a basic plan applicable to the development of other 
c*ties in Korea (Moon and Lee, 1990: 29). The features of the act can be summarised
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as follows (Son, 1985: 153-155, Kim, 1982a: 12). Firstly, local authorities had little 
discretion over planning of their own areas and the act provided a legal basis for the 
colonial government to expropriate private land for public purposes. Secondly, the 
law was enacted to develop new urban areas rather than to improve current urban 
conditions. Thirdly, only the Japanese Governor-General had authority to approve 
concrete urban plans for any of the cities in Korea. Finally, private cooperatives were 
not allowed to be the main agents for land readjustment projects, a clause designed 
to push through projects without delay. The land readjustment project was the main 
instrument for urban development and the regulations enabled the colonial 
government to carry out a project without securing a budget for it, which meant it 
did not need to compensate land owners for the expropriation of land (Kim, 2007a: 
163). Since the costs of the land adjustment project were covered in part by the 
increased values of the adjusted land, the method was attractive to the Japanese 
powers as an inexpensive means for securing sufficient lands for infrastructure (Kim, 
1982a: 18).
It was around 1940 that direct regulations on housing were introduced and a 
public body was established to stabilise the upsurge in housing prices and address 
the severe shortage of housing. First of all, the ‘Chosun Planning Act for Urban 
Areas’ was partially revised in 1940, with detailed regulations on minimum housing 
conditions to curb the spread of poor housing. Just before the revision of the act, the 
colonial government also brought in the ‘Rent Control Act’ in 1939 to counteract 
spiralling rents. However, the ‘Rent Control Act’ was a disincentive to private 
landlords and house-builders to increase the supply of new dwellings, which forced 
fhe Chosun Governor-General to directly intervene in the supply of housing by 
founding the ‘Chosun Housing Corporation’ in 1941 (KNHC, 1979: 165). The 
corporation was founded to provide mass housing in urban areas and built 5 
standard types of houses influenced by Japanese design principles (Kim and Yoon, 
r987: 64-65). The 'Chosun Housing Corporation’ helped to relieve housing problems 
a°d in total 12,184 dwellings had been constructed, mainly in large cities, with 
aPproximately one-third of total stock (4,488 houses) in Seoul, by the time Korea 
Sained independence in 1945 (KNHC, 1979:192). The major beneficiaries of housing 
Provided by the corporation were employed wage earners contributing to the 
industrialisation the Japanese colonial government had begun in its own interests. 
Por instance, most of the occupants of the 1,809 dwellings at Youngdungpo built by 
tile Chosun Housing Corporation were part of a ’new middle class’ employed by the 
^rporations of the Youngdungpo industrial complex in Seoul (Yeom, 2005 cited in 
2007a: 169). Thus, despite the contributions of the corporation it was unable to
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satisfy the housing needs of the vast majority of Koreans in urban areas, particularly 
those of the poor.
5.2.2 Policy responses to housing needs 1945-1960
After Korea was liberated from Japan in 1945, its population dramatically 
increased with the return of overseas Koreans who had escaped from Japanese 
repression or were conscripted abroad during Japanese occupation. In particular, 
there was explosive rise in the population of Seoul, because of the inflow of rural 
people from around the country as well as the return of overseas Koreans. In just 
five years the population of Seoul increased by approximately 74%, from 824,976 in 
1944 to 1,437,670 in 1949 (Kwon, 1977: 300). Migrants were attracted to Seoul not 
only by employment opportunities but also by voluntary or international aid and 
relief activities, which were concentrated in the capital city (Yi, 2001: 228).
Even though the housing shortage became acute in a rapidly changing environment, 
the measures adopted by consecutive governments were too ad hoc to be long-term 
plans for the appropriate provision of housing. The American military government - 
an interim government from 1945 to 1948 - handled housing problems mainly 
through temporary directives about how to distribute existing dwelling stocks and by 
supplying makeshift shelters. An important postcolonial issue in housing was how to 
dispose of abandoned Japanese properties. The American military government 
eventually decided to deny Japanese rights of ownership in Act No. 33, the ‘Act for 
acquisition of Japanese property in Korea.’ The enactment of Act No. 33 was 
followed by the sale of confiscated Japanese houses in 1948 at the market price of 
*945 (Yi, 2001: 240). Yet the sales policy had little impact on the serious housing 
Problems faced by low-income households and returning overseas Koreans. It was 
the profiteers that benefited from the sales policy whereas most poor tenants of 
Japanese-owned houses were evicted (Yi, 2001: 240). In terms of supplying 
Makeshift shelters, another measure to reduce the housing shortage, the total 
number of newly built dwelling units was not sufficient to accommodate the 
mcreasing population, especially in Seoul. Overall, the provision of temporary 
housing was not balanced in accordance with local housing needs and the 
transitional government was unable to supply new units due to the inadequate 
hndget for housing (Yi, 2001: 257-258)'
Housing issues continued to be neglected when the First Republic of Korea led by 
Prcsident Rhee Svng-Man was set up. Rhee Syng-Man’s government, because of the
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economic distress and military tensions caused by the emergence of a communist 
regime in North Korea, had to depend on financial aid and political support from 
America. Given these circumstances, the government focused on drawing up a plan 
for economic development and undertaking land reform to reinforce its political 
legitimacy. It pushed through a ‘Five-year Plan for Industrial Revival’ in 1949 
designed to transform Korea from an agrarian society into industrial society, mainly 
by promoting manufacturing industry and complementing industrial structure 
(Chung, 2009: 356). There were no significant responses to the housing problem 
amongst Rhee’s reforms and the housing industry was not targeted for investment 
by the plan; neither was there substantial allocation of resources to the provision of 
public housing. The land reform enacted in 1949 had a little impact on the housing 
system, because its target was the agricultural lands. The reform allowed tenant 
farmers to purchase their plots, significantly redistributing land capital between 
landowners and farming tenants, but did little to address the aggravated housing 
problems of the urban regions. Direct public investment in housing was confined to 
constructing temporary shelters for post-independence immigrants from overseas or 
rural areas.
When the Rhee's government struggled to bring order out of turmoil in the post­
independence period, the Korean War (1950-53) broke out and it made housing 
Problems much worse by destroying the housing stock throughout South Korea. 
Approximately 600,000 housing units (18 per cent of the total housing stock) were 
left uninhabitable by being destroyed or damaged during the war (Ministry of 
Construction, 1987 cited in Kim, 1997: 106). Despite the aggravating housing 
shortage, the government's attitudes toward housing did not fundamentally change 
compared to the pre-war position. They remained essentially a d  hoc. The only long­
term plan for housing - the ‘One Million Units Construction Plan* declared in 1953 ~ 
Was unrealised due to the absence of practical ways to fund the plan. In terms of 
bousing, Rhee's post-war government came to an end without having restored the 
bousing stock destroyed during the Korean War, let alone creating the new housing 
mfrastructure necessitated by geographic social mobility. All plans for the 
construction of massive housing programme were in vain, nothing more than 
Political propaganda, since they lacked a dedicated financial plan and cooperation 
^ ‘b other industries involved in house-building (KNMC, 1979:324).
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5-3 Housing policy in the Park’s regime (1960-1979)
5.3.1 The establishment of key housing acts and agencies
Mr. Rhee attempted to hold onto his presidency permanently by rigging elections 
and amending the Constitution after the three-year Korean War was suspended by 
the ceasefire agreement. His ambitions were frustrated by nationwide protests 
against his corrupt government and he finally stepped down from the presidency in 
i960. After a constitutional amendment adopting a parliamentary cabinet system, 
the Second Republic was launched by general election. However, political instability 
was heightened as the coalition in the majority party collapsed due to internal 
clashes after Rhee’s resignation. This political instability, as well as the slow growth 
of the economy, provided the military elite with a rationale for overthrowing the 
civilian government. Army-General Park Chung-Hee and his elite colleagues 
mounted a coup d’état in 1961 and Park was subsequently elected the president of 
the Third Republic after winning the 1963 election.
The Park government established the Economic Planning Board (EPB) to draw up 
long-run economic development plans, to coordinate the roles of the ministries 
associated with the plans and to secure foreign loans. The first Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan (1962-1966) was followed by four consecutive five-year plans. 
These plans anchored the general direction of Korean developments in the 1960s 
and 1970s. The first five-year plan set out the two basic goals of development, which 
were to break out of a socio-economic vicious cycle and to create foundations for a 
self-sustaining economy by: securing energy resources, correcting the structural 
imbalances of the national economy, investing in the basic industries and social 
infrastructure and correcting the imbalance of international payments (Kim, 1982b: 
15).
Despite the serious post-war housing shortage, investment in housing as a part of 
social infrastructure was not prioritised. As can be seen from <Table 5-4>, only 1.5% 
of GNP was allocated to housing over the five years of the first Economic 
Development Plan (hereafter EDP). Public sector housing constituted a mere 12% of 
the total constructed stock during the period even though the government had 
declared the provision of public housing for low-income households as one of its key 
objectives, summarised in <Tab!e 5-4 >. The table also indicates how the 
government’s stance on the housing issue became reluctant during the second EDP
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(1967-1971) which reaffirmed the importance of encouraging the private sector to 
meet increasing housing needs, but not the commitment to the ‘provision of public 
housing for low income households’ that was made in the first plan, thus suggesting 
that the expansion the provision of housing should be led by private sector.
< Table 5.4 > Main objectives, policy and outputs in housing under the Park regime
1962-1966 1967-1971 1972-1976 1977-1981
Main 
objectives 
and policy 
measures
-Provision of 
housing based 
on census data 
-Provision of 
public housing 
for low income 
households
-Focus on 
nurturing 
private provision 
of housing 
-Pursuing 
apartments as a 
dominant urban 
dwelling type
-Expanding 
the provision 
of housing 
-Improving 
housing 
conditions
-Encouraging 
massive 
provision of 
housing 
-Provision of 
small size of 
dwellings by 
public sector
Total Stocks 
(Stocks by 
public 
sectors)
325,935
(39,915)
540,338
(69,613)
760,591
(228,766)
1,116,074
(495,378)
The ratio of 
housing 
investment to 
GNP (96)
15 2.9 4-5 5-3
Source: KNHC (1993a: 48,62-63)
Nevertheless, the 1960s was the decade in which the institutional settings in 
housing were framed, since relevant housing acts were newly legislated (or 
extensively revised) and key public agencies were founded during the decade. First 
of all, a series of necessary acts were legislated to provide the social infrastructure 
for economic development projects like the Urban Planning Act (1962), Land 
Expropriation Act (1962) and Land Readjustment Act (1966). These acts were 
indirectly associated with the development of residential lands and slums. More 
directly related to housing, the Public Housing Act was legislated in 1963 with the 
goal of serving public welfare. The act designated the principal subjects of the 
provision of public housing for non-homeowners as local governments and the 
Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC). The act stipulated that the central 
government could give financial assistance to local governments and the KNHC 
within the constraints of the budget. According to the act, it was only low-income 
households meeting the income criteria imposed by the central government that 
Were eligible for access to public housing.
Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) was founded as a public
94
housing agency in 1962 to replace the Daehan Housing Corporation, the former 
Chosun Housing Corporation. The KNHC was a state-owned but self-financing 
public firm and charged with the goal of satisfying housing needs mainly through the 
construction of dwelling units. It was given the following detailed directions to 
accomplish this goal: to supply modern dwellings for the low and middle income 
households, to push forward comprehensive land developments and to construct 
massive high-rising apartments (KNHC, 2009: 23). The housing or land 
development projects of the KNHC were largely constrained by the political 
decisions of central government and thus the KNHC was practically under the 
supervision of the state. Hence the KNHC could not carry out the business of 
housing production or land development independently unless it coordinated with 
central government (Ha, 1984: 163-4). Another key housing agency, the Korea 
Housing Bank (KHB) was established in 1967 (and renamed KHB in 1969) as a 
state-owned bank to raise funds for housing builders and consumers. The main roles 
of the KHB were to mobilise private financial resources and to provide loans for 
house builders and purchasers. According to the Korea Housing Bank Act, the 
majority of KHB revenues should be allocated to housing-specific purposes to assist 
the purchase or construction of new houses. Just before the bank was privatised in 
1997» the mandator)' ratio of loan to housing finance went up to 80% of total bank 
loans, but the mandator)' ratio diminished to 50% with privatisation and the Asian 
Financial Crisis (Lim et al., 2008:363).
5<3.2  Changes in housing policy' since the third EDP
The low level of investment in housing throughout the post-war period resulted in 
a severe discrepancy between the provision of housing and the explosive increase in 
population and households when the 1970s began. According to the population and 
housing census of 1970, there were 4.359.962 housing units for 5.856,901 
households, in other words, sufficient stock to accommodate around 74% of total 
households (KOS1S, 2011). The problem was even more acute in urban areas, the 
same census reporting that the 583,612 units in Seoul were only enough to cover 
aPproximately 53% of total households. The Park government, re-elected in the 
presidential election of 1971 by a narrow margin, slowly began to recognise housing 
85 a social problem - a process which speeded up after a riot that took place in 
Kwangju, a suburban area of Seoul where thousands of evicted urban poor lived due 
to slum clearances. This event came to symbolise the unrest caused by the neglect of 
the Park regime, which had failed not only to meet the basic needs of the shanty
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dwellers in urban cities but also to deal with the disruption caused by 
industrialisation in general (Sohn, 1989: 35-36).
These domestic political pressures meant that the third EDP (1972-1976) was 
somewhat different from the previous consecutive plans, in the sense that it 
envisaged a greater role for the public sector in the provision of housing and the 
building of new stock. The original aim of the ‘Ten Year Housing Construction Plan 
(1972-1981)’ associated with the third EDP era was to build 2.5 million homes over 
the course of a decade, 1.1 million units of which were to be constructed with public 
funds (KHB, 1975 cited in Lim, 2005: 68). To support the plan, the ‘Housing 
Construction Promotion Act’ was enacted in 1972 repealing the former ‘Public 
Housing Act.’ The act was designed to encourage the mass production of high-rising 
apartments by both public and private sectors. There were several newly introduced 
or significantly revised articles compared with the previous act. Firstly, the state was 
added to the main agents of public housing provision with the other agents being 
local governments and the KNHC - already entitled in the former ‘Public Housing 
Act.’ Secondly, a set of the new articles was introduced on how to raise funds for the 
continuous provision of public housing. There were two major resources to finance 
public housing programmes: the Korea Housing Bank (KHB) and the local 
governments’ special accounts for housing. The KHB was to raise funds through the 
sales of the national housing bonds, loans from the central government and foreign 
countries, the revenues from the sale of national lottery tickets. Special housing 
accounts of local governments were mainly composed of various loans from the state 
and the KHB as well as the allotments of local governments. Thirdly, privileged 
benefits were granted to private agents when they constructed massive dwelling 
units in a single project. For example, state-owned lands could be preferentially 
allocated to private agents and local governments had to install infrastructure 
facilities at their own expense when private enterprises built more than fifty units in 
a project. Finally, a housing policy committee was to review basic housing policy 
including long-term plans and the management of housing funds. Overall, the act 
"a s  characterised by the introduction of key legislative stipulations involved in 
bousing plans at both annual and long-term levels, fund raising and management 
for massive housing construction. On the other hand, the act granted a legal basis to 
states for necessary regulations when private enterprises undertook house-building 
complex. Under the act, central and local governments could regulate a wide range 
°f details on recruitment of purchasers and housing price in the case of newly 
constructed housing units beyond 50 units.
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There were significant changes in performance due to the new policies introduced. 
These changes can be seen in the former cTable 5.4> which shows how the number 
of units constructed and public sector share of overall stock increased considerably 
during the second decade (1972-1981) of the EDP. The number of units constructed 
in the second decade was twice as many as in the first decade. In terms of the 
quantitative share of the public sector, while the ratio of the units constructed by the 
public sector to the total newly built units was around 10% in the first decade, the 
ratio rose to about 30% in the second decade. When it comes to dwelling type, the 
introduction of the key acts and agencies was a turning point at which high-rise 
apartments became the most popular dwelling type and the proportion of 
apartments has steadily increased (below <Figure 5.2>). From the early 1960s, the 
Park government promoted the construction of apartments as a solution to the acute 
shortage of housing through standardised mass production in highly populated 
regions. Apartments were regarded as ‘low-quality housing’ or a ‘dwelling type for 
low-income households’ until the late 1960s. This negative perception started to 
change when well-equipped high quality apartments begun to be built in the early 
1970s. The shift was further cemented by the inducements of the ‘Housing 
Construction Promotion Act’ and since the 1970s high-rise apartments have become 
home to the vast majority of the growing ‘new-middle’ class as well as many high- 
income families.
< Figure 5.2 > The ratio of the apartments to total newly built units (1977-1999)
100
Source: KNHC (2002: 224-225)
Meanwhile, although the quantity and quality of housing stock was improving, 
house prices continued to rise due to speculative activities particularly in the Seoul 
metropolitan area in the mid-1970s and because supply could not keep up with the
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growing demand for housing. The economic boom, coupled with improved levels of 
income, led to over-demand for housing which in turn stimulated more speculation. 
Insofar as the supply of housing was insufficient, the over-heating of speculation 
consequently brought about higher inflation in housing than in other areas of the 
economy. To stabilise volatile housing prices and to manage demand, a range of 
measures were introduced from the mid-1970s in both the supply side and the 
demand side. Firstly, on the supply side, a designation system was introduced to the 
house building industry in 1978. According to the new system, registered house­
building firms were entitled to be the ‘designated house builders’ if they met the key 
criteria imposed by central government (to do with the amounts of capital, annual 
outputs of housing units and numbers of qualified skilled employees). In 1978» the 
Ministry of Construction designated the first 46 house-builders to foster larger and 
specialised house-building companies (The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1978). Once 
designated, firms had several advantages over normal registered builders in housing 
finance. Designated builders were permitted to issue corporate bonds to sell to 
prospective house buyers to finance their house-building projects in advance. 
Whereas normal registered builders could only recruit prospective purchasers when 
20% of the construction process had been completed, designated builders could do it 
at the outset of the construction providing they met a couple of conditions.
< Table 5.5 > The number of designated and registered builders: 1981-1991
1981 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Designated
builders 68 55 52 72 71 71 117 117
Registered
builders 860 2,079 2,373 2,318 2,610 4-043 6,260 8,869
Source: KNHC (1993a: 148)
The ‘advance sales system’, by which they were permitted to recruit and contract 
the purchasers of new apartments at the initial stage of construction, g 
designated builders a significant advantage over their competition. Dc g 
builders were also given priority in public housing complex developments, 
publicly developed residential lands were favourably assigned to those m e 
Public housing projcds. Only a small number of big firms were 
designated builders, less than to per cent of registered >ou*_ " ,hc
designated builders could increase their shares to total tons,™c ‘  rMull
private sector due to benefits from the designated system K r° 5_5> , ,
a few large-scale designated firms built about one-,bird (593.065) of
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housing units (1,609,421) constructed by the private sector between 1978 to 1992 
(KNHC, 1993a: 146).
More direct regulation on the supply side was made by the enforcement of a price 
ceiling on the sale of newly built apartments. When the price control was executed, 
the coverage was subject to new small-size apartments funded by the public sector 
but it was extended to new apartments provided by the private sector as house prices 
rose in the late 1970s. The ‘price ceiling system’ was introduced for the first time by 
the Seoul metropolitan government in 1977 for the provision of affordable home 
ownership. The Seoul metropolitan government made private house-builders sell 
their new apartments within the maximum price proclaimed by the administration 
guidance. Although the regulation was not prescribed by the act, the controlled price 
was effectively enforced. This is because the local government could refuse to give 
constructed permission unless they accepted the regulated price. The purchasers of 
new apartments anticipated windfall gains from the gap between the market price 
and the controlled price under the system.
Beneficial systems for suppliers were also institutionalised by the new regulations. 
The ‘advance sales system’ was the most obvious of the ways in which house builders 
benefitted from the changes to regulatory framework, funding construction costs by 
contracting the incomplete stocks at the very initial phase of construction. This 
system, occasionally implemented in the early 1970s, started to be officially fulfilled 
in the late 1970s by the Construction Ministerial ordinance. According to the 
Construction Ministerial ordinance of 1978, private builders could recruit 
prospective purchasers when 20 per cent of the construction process had been 
completed. Payments were made by purchasers in instalments of up to 80% of the 
total housing price before completion. The system was disadvantageous to house 
buyers, since the policy placed additional financial burdens on the consumer 
because the mandatory prepayment of the majority of housing price was set even 
before the production of the final good had been completed. Housing purchasers 
were hard pressed to find funding in the absence of an adequate institutional 
mortgage system and also had to pay additional interest costs on the instalments.
Along with the measures targeted at suppliers, interrelated policies affecting 
housing consumers were also pursued during the same period. The most significant 
measure to be introduced was the 'Housing Related Saving Scheme’ (HRSS) which 
v' as basically concerned with how to select from a long queue of potential buyers 
onder conditions of chronic shortages of housing supply. The scheme was invented 
,0 gh-e account holders exclusive eligibility for new apartments provided under the
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ceiling price. It was originally designed to draw private resources to housing finance 
at the national level and to limit the opportunity to apply for new apartments to non­
homeowners who had deposits above a fixed lump sum under the price ceiling 
system (Kim et al., 2003: 63). This scheme invented by bureaucrats aimed to handle 
complaints about housing shortage by giving the ‘white-collar group’ advantages for 
new apartments (Kim, 1997: 114). There were two main types of saving accounts: 
one was a monthly-instalment savings account up to a certain amount of deposits 
and the other was a fixed-deposit savings account scheme (Construction Ministerial 
ordinance, various years, Kim, 1997: 113-114). The monthly-instalment savings 
account scheme was operated under the name of ‘Cheongyak-Bugeum' (later 
renamed 'Cheongyak-Jeochuk') prior to the introduction of the fixed-deposit savings 
account scheme, ‘Cheongyak-Yegeum.’ When the ‘Cheongyak-Bugeum’ was created, 
the plan was to limit access to small-size public housings to non-homeowners. 
Amongst the account holders, the prospective applicants were placed into the three 
categories depending on the number of instalments and total amounts in their 
savings accounts. The account holders of the ‘Cheongyak-Bugeum’ (later 
‘Cheongyak-Jeochuk0 were also able to apply for new apartments provided by the 
private sector as well. The fixed-deposit savings account scheme ‘Cheongyak- 
Yegeum' was introduced when the government decided to expand the HRSS to new 
apartments built by private enterprises in 1978. Homeowners as well as non- 
homeowners could open the deposit savings account. Even owner-occupied 
households maintaining accounts with the minimum deposits were given priority if 
they applied for new privately-built apartments with floor space of more than 85 
square metres with their own financing. The households could choose both the type 
of savings account and the type of housing provider depending on their financial 
conditions and individual preferences, even though eligibility for small-size public 
housing was confined to low-income households passing means tests set by central 
government.
5.4 Housing policy in the post-Park regime
5 -4*1 Housing policy from 1980 to the mid-1990s
After Park Chung-llce was assassinated, a military coup brought General Chun 
t^ oo-liwan to power on 12*, December 1979- Chun was indirectly elected president
100
in 1981 but his presidency - a period known as The Fifth Republic of Korea’ (1981- 
1987) - suffered from the same lack of political legitimacy as Park Chung-Hee’s 
military regime in the early 1960s. Just as Park’s government had tried to overcome 
its political weaknesses by industrialising the underdeveloped Korean society, the 
Chun government also attempted to bolster his political legitimacy through the 
“Realisation of Welfare Society” - a slogan that reflected the extent to which Korea 
had managed to achieve its industrial goals over the past two decades. Affordable 
housing for the working classes was made one of the key policy goals of the new 
‘welfare society’ and the ‘Five Million Housing Units Construction Plan’ of 1980, 
which was subsequently revised after Chun Doo-Hwan ordered the Minister of 
Construction to make provisions for the building five million housing units over the 
coming decade (The Maeil Economy Times, 1980). The revised plan extended the 
construction period to fifteen years, with 1.7 million units to be built over six years 
during Chun’s term (The Maeil Economy Times, 1981).
The modifications made to the plan were not unexpected as the original plan was 
wildly optimistic and without a well-organised blueprint for funding. The new 
government could not even realistically fulfil the revised plan, constrained as it was 
by rising inflation caused by global oil-shocks and the overheating housing market at 
the end of the 1970s. The main reaction of the government was to employ a set of 
regulations on the newly built houses and to create the National Housing Fund. 
Firstly, the government prohibited the original contractors from selling the rights of 
home ownership obtained by the price ceiling system and the advance system in 
*981. The government consecutively brought in the bond-bidding system and the 
National Housing Bonds (NHBs) in 1983. With the former actions, the onginal 
contractors selected by the combination of price controls and the HRSS were 
Prohibited to sell the property' rights of allocated houses before the original 
contractor registered the built house at the completion of construction. A bond­
bidding’ system came into effect combined with the ‘Housing Related Saving 
Scheme’ to mobilise private resources from the buyers of new houses. The system 
*as designed to dampen housing speculation and to collect financial returns 
generated by the differences between the controlled price and the market price (Lee, 
2002a: 117). Housing-related accounts holders were entitled to apply for new 
apartments and selected by lottery under the bond-bidding system combined with 
lhc HRSS. The applicants then bid for the right to buy and those submitting the 
highest bids for NHBs (Type 2 NHBs) could then buy new apartments m lngh-
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demanded metropolitan areas.11
To reorganise the scattered institutional arrangements, the National Housing 
Fund (NHF) was founded in 1981 to integrate dispersed housing-related funds 
under the control of the Ministry of Construction, with the fund now managed by the 
KHB. The installation of the NHF was to support the efficient operation of housing 
construction plans by lending loans for developers below the market rates. The other 
beneficiaries of the NHF loan were low-income households maintaining housing- 
related saving schemes. They were able to borrow low-interest loans from the fund 
when purchasing or renting houses. The revenues of the NHF were collected from 
state subsidies, deposits from housing-related saving schemes, the sales of the 
national housing bonds and the national lottery and foreign loans. <Table 5.6> 
shows the two major resources of revenues, which came from the sales of national 
housing bonds and the HRSS deposits, accounting for half of total revenues of the 
fund. The figures demonstrate that the NHF was raised mainly by earmarked 
arrangements (or schemes) for housing financing rather than general tax revenues.
< Table 5.6 > Revenues of the National Housing Fund (unit: million won)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Total
revenues 3,132,668 4,422,668 4.958,502 5.557,182 5,838,025 6,333.108
Type 1 
National 
Housing 
bonds
612,011 875.978 1,005,984 1,168,376 1,431.352 1,690,786
Type 2 
National 
housing 
bonds
9J.581 279,006 645.097 656,587 309,223 219.153
Housing-
related
savings
scheme
deposits
858,493 1,289,502 1,412,969 1,201,215 966,507 768,008
Loan
collections 583.490 479.970 684,607 542,080 1,199,594
934.315
Revenues
interests 435,971 566,050 730,221 948,322
1,056,276 1,212,328
National
Jotterv 30,658 40,184 58,406 54,052
55.625 59,657
Others 520,464 891.978 421,218 986,550 819,448 1,448,861
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation (1995: 298)
n
, Typ. . NHBi w«y rtunditorOy purché! I* the
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102
The late 1980s and early 1990s were characterised by the acceleration of mass 
housing production and the adoption of a targeted approach to provisions according 
to the varying income levels. Launched amidst growing pressures for 
démocratisation after the successful ‘June Démocratisation Movement’ in 1987, Rho 
Tae-Woo’s government - the Sixth Republic (1988-1993) - carried out a policy 
agenda designed to soothe these demands. Influenced by the upsurge in house prices 
and overheating speculation, the provision of affordable housing was highlighted 
during Rho Tae-Woo's presidential election campaign. The emphasis in housing 
policy did not change after Rho was inaugurated President. Rho underlined the 
importance of affordable housing in the statement below:
Having workers settled in places of their own will be of the highest priority 
during my presidency and constructing two million dwelling units is my 
most important presidential election pledge (The Kyunghyang Shinmum, 
t 98g).
In the first year of his presidency, Rho and his government published its ‘Two 
Million Dwelling Units Construction Plan’ to build 2 million dwelling units in four 
Kars, including 600,000 new public rental units. Their intention was to redress the 
chronic shortage of housing and to stabilise house prices by building 2 million new 
houses over the course of the presidency. To achieve this goal, they enacted the 
Residential Land Development Promotion Act’ to increase the supply of residential 
land available. The government encouraged the development of residential land by 
*he public sector and sold public land below market prices. In particular, public land 
c°uld be bought by private developers below cost, providing it was used to build 
^ntal and small-scale housing (less than 60 square metres). To mitigate the 
Perennial housing shortages in Seoul, the Rho government announced that it was 
80ln8 to develop five new towns (Bundang, Ilsan, Jungdong, Pyongchon and 
Sflnbon) nearby the capital, building approximately 292,000 dwellings by 1992. 
Meanwhile, there were considerable relaxations of the regulations on newly built 
#Partments to stimulate the construction of housing in private sector. The price 
ConlroU imposed on new apartments were relaxed so that the altered system, the so- 
'cost-linkage pricing system', reflected varying land costs plus maximum 
tandard construction costs when the government set the controlled prices. The 
Or*trolled price could be annually adjusted from 1989 in the new system. With the 
j*la*ation of price controls, the bond-bidding system was simultaneously modified 
Pfcvem excessive rise* in house prices caused by competitive bids. The 
*0Vcr»nicm dfcidrd lo brin» in an upper limit on the bidding price within which
103
consumers could purchase the mandatory national housing bonds.
What made housing policy during Rho presidency distinguished from other ones 
during the previous regimes was the substantial emphasis on the provision of public 
rental housing. The public rental units before 1988 were subject to the condition of 
conversion into units for sale when five years passed, since the newly built stocks 
were leased for rent. The most distinguished new type of public rental units was 
permanent rental housing designed to be rented for the lowest income households 
without the mandatory' transfer from rent to sale. A total of 189,570 permanent 
rental units (22-43 square metres) were built by local governments and the KNHC 
over four years (1989-1992) seen in <Table 5.7X According to the figures displayed 
in <Table 5.7> the increase in the construction of the public rental units was so 
drastic that the stock supplied in 1990, the highest output year during the plan, was 
almost tw'ice as much as the total stock built over the five years from 1982 to 1986, 
before the plan was implemented. Permanent rental housing accounted for the 
majority of the constructed rental units. Yet the additional construction of 
permanent rental units was terminated by the succeeding government in 1993 and 
replaced by three types of rental units with varying rental periods of 5/i°/50 years, 
which could be converted into rental units from the units for sale.
< Table 5.7 > The construction of public rental units: 1982-1992
Year
Non-permanent public rental units Permanent public rental units
Local
governments KNHC
Private
providers
Local
governments KNHC
Total
82-
86
14,025 34.994 28,700 - - 77,719
— §z__ 135
0r-cd« 31.713 • • 51,918
88 1.164 25,188 25,866 . . 52,218
J 2J ' 11.025 10,020 18,177 13,227 30.026 82,475
-22__ 4.173 12.117 48.600 19,250 40,754 144,544
s l J 3.500 8,690 2.884 15,432 34,175 76,391 „
— ----- SJ-99 - 1.583 35,123 62,6791 7 „O , — . . A I '          .. ■
KNHC (2008), Year Book of Housing Statistics
5*4.2 Housing reform* during the era of the Asian Financial Crisis
Housing reforms before and after the Asian Financial Crisis were characterised by 
continuous deregulation. As soon as Kim Voung-Sant - head of Ihe first purili 
"«Han government since the Park regime - was inaugurated in 1993. <>«= 
Roeernmcnt undertook a wide range of economic and political reforms to 
OWerentiate it from the former authoritarian-military governments. The kernel of its
‘New Five-year Economic Plan’ was to end direct government interventions into the 
economy and to promote enthusiastic entrepreneurship in market, mainly through 
extensive deregulation, instead. The general direction of housing policy was to relax 
public controls, which had caused normal market functions to deteriorate, and to cut 
government expenditure on public housing (Lim, 2005: 263). The cost-linkage 
pricing system was abolished step-by-step, starting with apartments of more than 85 
square metres all the way down to small-size apartments in the local provinces. By 
1997» private providers could freely determine the price of new apartments outside 
Seoul metropolitan area and they were able to do it in Seoul metropolitan area if 
they did not employ the advance sales system. On the other hand, public 
involvement in rental units was significantly reduced in order to roll back the state. 
While the provision of new permanent rental units was terminated, only housing- 
related account holders (later evicted tenants for redevelopment) were eligible for 
the new type of 50-year rental units (Ha, 2007: 213, Kim, 2006: 13). Yet the 
provision of the planned 100,000 units was not fully accomplished, with 
construction only amounting to 30,000 units due to the constraints of the budget 
(Park, 2007b: 90).
The deregulation of the housing sector speeded up with the onset of the Asian 
Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. When Kim Dae-Jung came into office in 1998 
under the bailout plans of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the new 
government abolished the regulations on housing and enacted pro-market 
legislations. The deregulation aimed to uphold housing finance for both private 
credit providers and house buyers in order to revive the stagnant housing market. 
Here are key deregulations of the housing sector during the Kim Dae-Jung 
government (Kim, 2004: 329, Park, 2007: 90-91). The Kim government removed all 
price controls on new apartments and the bond-bidding system, which had been 
steadily relaxed in line with the general liberalisation of other sectors since the late 
1980s. Due to the elimination of price controls, the prices of all new apartments 
could be freely set by providers except for units of less than 60 square metres floor 
space funded by the NHF. More drastic policy reforms occurred in housing finance: 
the privatisation of the KHB and the creation of the second mortgage market in the 
domestic capital market. The state-owned KHB, an official housing finance agency, 
was privatised in 1997 and merged with the Kookmin Bank (KB), which formed the 
biggest private commercial bank in 2001. The legislation of the Asset Liquidation 
Act in 1998 started the institutionalisation of a secondary mortgage market. The act 
was a legal foundation for the asset liquidation required to expand housing finance 
resources and to protect investors in the asset-backed securities. The government
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consecutively enacted the ‘Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) Company Act’ in 1999 
to stipulate the key issues associated with the foundation of MBS companies and the 
issue of mortgage-backed securities. On the basis of the act, the government held a 
major share in the Korea Mortgage Corporation (K0M0C0), later succeeded by the 
state-owned Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC) in 2004, when it was 
founded in partnership with private financial organisations. The company issued the 
first MBS backed by the mortgage that the NHF held in April 2000 and the private 
agency also started to issue MBS from 2002.
Notwithstanding continuous deregulations, there was a considerable difference 
between the Kim Young-Sam government and the Kim Dae-Jung government. While 
the former government had no interest in increasing public rental units in its pursuit 
of liberalisation, the Kim government attempted to cater for low-income households 
by the expansion of the public rental sector. Firstly, new types of rental units - 10- 
year and 20-ycar dwellings - were introduced and they were entitled as the ‘National 
Rental Housing.’ There are several characteristics of the National Rental Housing as 
follows (Ha, 2007: 220, Lim, 2005: 310-312, Lim et al, 2008: 386-387, KNHC, 
2009: 277-278, Kim 2006: 14). The rental duration of national rental housing was 
longer than the pre-existing five-year rental units. This longer duration was expected 
to improve the dwelling stability of low-income households to some extent, because 
five-year rental units accounted for the vast majority of public rental housing and 
these were normally sold off after the compulsory five-year rental period. New rental 
units were provided with fiscal assistance from budget depending on the size of the 
dwelling units. For example, 80% of construction costs came from the budget (40%) 
and the NHF (40%) respectively in the case of units with a floor space of less than 50 
square metres. Another feature of national rental housing was that it made clear 
which income cohorts were being targeted. Income levels of households eligible for 
national rental units could be no more than 7096 of the average income of urban- 
working families in the case of units with 60 square metres floor space. For units of 
more than 60 square metres, applications were only open to non-homeowners 
whose total household income was no more than the average income of urban- 
working families. Secondly, the government announced the ‘One Million National 
Rental Housing Construction Plan’, a long-term plan for the construction of new 
rental units for low-income and middle-income households over the next decade 
(2003-2012). To institutionally back up the plan, the 'Act on the Special Measures 
for the Construction of National Rental Housing’ was legislated in 2003. In the act, 
the duration of national rental housing was extended to 30 years and the necessary 
institutional arrangements for the mass construction of rental units such as public
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financial support, land expropriation and the compulsory installation of a task force 
for the plan were specified. Finally, the ‘National Basic Living Security Act’ replacing 
the old ‘Protection of Minimum Living Standards Act’ created separate housing 
benefits for the beneficiaries of public assistance. Based on the new act, public 
assistance benefits were made available to anyone under the minimum income as a 
social right, including those aged between 18 and 64 un-entitled under the old act 
(Hwang, 2006: 50). Housing allowances were designed to partially assist with the 
payment of rents of beneficiaries in the case of tenants or management costs when 
beneficiaries were owner-occupiers. Although the amounts paid were too small to 
cover housing costs and coverage was extremely limited, the significance of the act 
was that separate housing benefits were introduced for the first time in the history of 
the Korean public welfare system.
5.4.3 Housing policy' of the Rho Moo-Hyun government
In housing policy, the priority of the Rho Moo-Hyun government (2003-2008) 
was to stabilise the upsurge of housing prices in the Seoul metropolitan area that 
began around 2000. In particular, the price rise in the richest districts was much 
higher than in the other districts, which aggravated inequalities of wealth by income 
as well by region. As soon as Rho assumed his presidency in 2003, the new 
government designated Seoul and other highly-speculative provinces (Kyung-gi and 
Chung-cheong) as speculation-prone zones and reformed the estate taxation system 
towards levying progressive tax as the values of real estate increase. Anti-speculation 
and price-reduction policies primarily targeting the Seoul metropolitan area were 
consistently implemented over the whole term of the presidency as below <Table 
5-8> shows. Meanwhile, the government decided to revive the price ceiling system to 
control housing prices. It was less than a decade since this long-standing regulation 
had been repealed, despite the considerable distortions of the housing market that 
inevitably followed. New apartments with floor space of less than 85 square metres 
built on public residential land were brought under the price ceiling system in 2005 
and coverage was extended to all new apartments in 2007. In addition, all housing 
providers had to make the details of construction costs public when it came to 
apartments built on public residential land.
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< Table 5.8 > Taxation and regulations on housing during the Rho Moo-Hyun 
_______________________government_________________ _
Year Main Contents
2003
■ Designating Seoul and other highly-speculative provinces (Kyung-gi and 
Chung-cheong) as ‘speculation-prone zones’
» Lowering loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of short-term (less than 3 years) loans 
from 60% to 50% in speculation-prone zones
2005 • Introduction of the ‘Gross Real Estate Tax ‘
2006
■ Tightening regulation on LTV in private sector (Lowering LTV from 60- 
70% to 50% in the case of mortgage loan by non-bank agencies)
• Extending the regulation of DTI (Debt To Income) to houses in 
speculation-prone zones
2007
■ Réintroduction of price control (price-ceiling system) on newly 
constructed apartments in both the public and private sector 
• Unfolding construction costs of new apartments built on public lands
Source: Kim (2008: 271-277)
On the other hand, the various long-term plans were designed to meet the housing 
needs of low-income and middle-income households and more concrete means were 
introduced to increase the provision of public rental units. In 2003, the government 
announced that 1.5 million long-term rental units (1 million national rental and 500 
thousand private rental units) would be provided over the next decade and the 
financial support from central budget would rise from 30% to 40% in the case of 
small-size national rental housing. The ‘Act on the Special Measures for the 
Construction of National Rental Housing’ was passed in 2003 in order to achieve the 
construction of national rental units and to curtail the construction period. The 
government was paying attention to improving the housing quality of the vulnerable 
at the lowest income level through setting the minimum standard. The ‘Housing Act’, 
newly enacted by repealing the old ‘Housing Construction Promotion Act’ in 2003, 
Imposes a legal duty on the Minister of Construction and Transportation to declare 
the minimum housing standard including dwelling space, the number of rooms, 
housing equipment and environmental elements.
5-5 Concluding remarks
This chapter described the policy changes that have been made to reform Korean 
housing over the past 100 years or so, a period in which the country experienced 
a^panese colonial rule and witnessed rapid industrialisation under an authoritarian
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regime, followed by démocratisation with regular power changes since the late 
1980s. Basically, residual views on housing have remained deeply entrenched 
through these swift transformations. Governments have tended to experiment with 
a wide range of regulatory measures designed to cope with housing issues rather 
than directly invest in the building of housing stock, or a competitive public sector 
or well-running housing market that would help these policies about. While 
coherent policy concerns about a sustainable private sector or competitive public 
bodies have been missing, the various regulations have distorted the housing 
market. The majority of policy measures in housing were introduced and extended 
to avoid public responsibility' for meeting housing needs when the country 
embarked on industrialisation project in the 1960s. Resources were channelled 
away from housing and into export-oriented manufacturing industries as far as 
possible. The development strategy' of selective investments in key industries 
shifted away from the light-manufacturing industry' to heavy-manufacturing 
industry in the 1970s. Although housing was a growing social problem, the 
response of the authoritarian government was not to switch towards reliable public 
involvement in the provision of housing. The government took a carrot-and-stick 
approach to both private house-builders and housing consumers, even though this 
combination had serious negative side effects.
Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, there was change of heart to a certain 
extent. Many regulations were relaxed or abolished and the public rental sector was 
expanded to cater for low-income households whose housing needs could not be 
met by the market. It can be argued that the changed system is moving towards 
Kemeny’s ‘dualist rental market’ position. However, the shift either to a dualist 
rental market or liberal home-owning society has not fully occurred at least until 
now* because the housing sector is still constrained by the institutional legacy of the 
past to the extent that it hindered fundamental change. The Korean housing system 
has been structured mainly by a mixture of earmarked regulations on home 
ownership of new units and passive cultivation of a rental sector. This kind of 
regulating housing’ strategy framed the persistent shortage of housing units and 
u°equal distribution of housing for most of the development period. Given the 
‘nfluence that the enduring institutions exert on subsequent transformation, the 
drastic shifts toward liberalisation since the 1990s seem to have aggravated the lack 
affordable housing for middle-income and low-income households. More 
concretely in the next chapter, I will discuss the general housing consequences of 
housing policy, followed by an analysis of housing outcomes. In particular, 
in %t»c*l points will be put forward on the institutional aspects and their impacts
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on the housing system.
Chapter six
Analysis of Korean housing: The regulatory framework 
and its path dependency
6.1 From the Japanese colonial era to the early terms o f the Park 
regime
6.1.1 Colonial housing policy: Coercive policy transfer
It is widely accepted that the Korean people and their resources were consistently 
exploited by Japanese powers over the whole colonial period. It is claimed, on the 
one hand, that Japanese colonial government transferred modern institutions 
originating in Western societies to Korean society and thus the era was referred to as 
a transformative period from traditional peasant society to the Western type of 
modern society (Rhee, 1996: 94-101). Whichever argument one leans towards, it is 
obvious that the Japanese colonial government sought to set up an efficient but 
highly repressive ruling system in Korea to further its imperial ambitions. To fulfil 
its aims, the Japanese powers were ready to import a wide range of policies 
implemented in their homeland.
Housing is one of the areas in which substantial policy transfers were made. The 
two basic acts, the ‘Remodelling City Blocks Act’ and the ‘Chosun Planning Act for 
Urban Areas' are seen as the typical cases of policy transfer. More specifically, in 
terms of the type of policy transfer, many features of Japanese colonial urban policy 
including housing fit the stereotype of extreme ‘coerced policy transfer.’ Dolowitz 
and Marsh (1996: 347-348) argue that the most direct coercive policy transfer takes 
place ‘when one government forces another to adopt a policy’ and refer to the 
Principal enforcing agents as supra-national institutions and trans-national 
corporations in global circumstances. Besides these, this study argues that 
superpower countries in pursuit of imperial expansion can also be seen as 
representative agents of coercive policy transfer insofar as the enforced policy 
transfers are between national borders. The 'Remodelling City Blocks Act’ was 
Proclaimed by Governor-General Chosun, head of the colonial government, 
fallowing a similar Japanese act implemented in 1889. The ‘Chosun Planning Act for
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Urban Areas’ - the most influential act in urban planning and housing - was basically 
grounded on the Japanese ‘Urban Planning Act’ enacted in 1919. The implantation 
of the two acts was so coercive and experimental that they were imported for the 
purpose of efficient rule with hardly any consideration of their appropriateness for 
the Korean context. Their coercive and experimental characteristics are revealed 
when compared with the original Japanese acts. Several articles absent from the 
original versions, successfully vetoed by opponents in Japan, were steamrollered 
through the dictatorial colonial state. For example, a couple of articles - relating to a 
government land readjustment project and the restriction on the participation of 
private bodies in land readjustment projects - were too radical for Japanese tastes in 
their homeland (Kim, 2007a: 165). Yet the favourable conditions of the colony made 
it possible for Japanese powers to easily bring in radical measures in Korea without 
strong resistance. Another similar case of transferring Japanese arrangements took 
place at the organisational level. The ‘Chosun Housing Corporation’, the public 
housing agent, was transferred by the colonial government. Its foundation was 
significantly affected by the role of the ‘Japan Housing Corporation’ established two 
months earlier to manage housing shortages in Japan (KNHC, 1979: 166). The 
organisation survived after independence and was re-launched as the Korea 
National Housing Corporation (KNHC) without many modifications by the Park 
government.
When these instances are viewed from within the analytical framework proposed 
by Rose (1991: 21-22) and Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 351), they appear to fall into 
the categories of ‘copying’ or ‘emulation.’ Their dominant characteristics were either 
simply copies of existing Japanese housing legislation or slightly adjusted to the 
different circumstances in Korea. Meiji Japan had done a similar thing with the key 
institutions it adopted from the Western modern economies. Yet it could be argued 
that the policy transfers made in Korea were neither copying nor emulation. The 
'Chosun Planning Act for Urban Areas’ was not just ‘copying’ because some core 
articles were adjusted or newly created. The adjustment of the mother law was made 
in experimental ways on behalf of the Japanese occupying powers to promote 
administrative efficiency. Meanwhile, the adjusted policies cannot be categorised as 
‘emulation’ either, because the delicacies of the different local conditions were not 
taken into account by the colonial rulers. Their experimental and exploitative 
features probably have as much to do with the exceptional requirements of Japan, a 
latecomer to the imperial stage but without the material resources to realise its 
expansionist aspirations. Thus, while the Japanese colonial officers were able to 
carry out the same kinds of policies in colonies as their forbears had done during the
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successful modernisation project of the Meiji era, they were also obsessed with 
extracting the maximum amount of material resources from the colony (Booth, 
2007: 3). Therefore, rather than simply copying the policies of Meiji Japan, the 
colonial powers chose to insert experimental clauses in order to create a powerful 
and efficacious administration system capable of maximising the economic potential 
of the colony.
< Table 6.1 > Housing shortages in Seoul under Japanese rule
Selected Year Housing stocks (A) Households (B) Deficiency rate (B-A)/B *100 C96Ì
1925 63,802 67,530 ______ÜLÜ______
1931 69,453 77,701 10.6
1936 107,946 138,583 22.1
___ 1244___ 132,000 220.938____ _____ 4°-3
Source: Kim (1986: 224)
The spatial structures of Korean cities were inevitably distorted since urban policy 
was designed on the basis of the imperial interests. Urbanisation under the rule of 
Japan was promoted not by maturation process of indigenous factors in the 
economy, society and culture, but by Japanese strategic plans for effectively 
governing Korea (Yoon, 1999: 205). In a distorted spatial allocation, the housing 
needs of Koreans were largely neglected in favour of those of Japanese residents. 
Park (2007a: 62) argues that residential segregation in urban areas was structured 
by discriminatory policies against Koreans in which the improvements of 
infrastructure were concentrated in Japanese residential areas. In Seoul, Koreans 
residing in northern Seoul and suburban slums suffered from poor housing quality, 
water supply and sanitation as a result of discriminatory housing policy when the 
Seoul population was growing fast in the 1920s (Kim, 2007b: 35).
An absolute lack of dwelling stocks was another aspect of ethnic discrimination in 
housing along with the segregated residential districts. <Table 6.i> illustrate how 
serious housing shortages were in Seoul under Japanese rule. Unfortunately, there 
was no segregated time-series data between Koreans and Japanese in <Table 6.i>. 
The ethnic data was available only in 1936. According to cTable 6,i>, total 
deficiency rate was 22.1% in 1936. The ethnic data of 1936 reported that Japanese 
deficiency rate was 4.97% whereas Koreans’ deficiency rate was 26.8% (Kim, 1986: 
224). Despite the limited availability of ethnic data, the result indicated that Koreans 
faced acute housing shortage compared with Japanese.
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The severe deficit of housing stocks necessarily produced dense residential areas 
where multiple households lived in very overcrowded conditions. In particular, it 
was the urban poor that severely suffered from the absolute shortage of housing and 
poor housing conditions. ‘Tomakmin’ - normally migratory peasants or unskilled 
manual workers - lived in dugout huts and they formed a number of illegal slums in 
Seoul (Kim, 1986: 205). As well as the poor housing conditions, there was also a 
strong correlation between persistent low income and long-term residency in slums. 
A survey conducted in Seoul indicated that the longer low income households stayed 
in slums, the more difficult it was to escape to better accommodation (Kim, 1986: 
238).
It was not until the early 1940s that separate housing policy was made to address 
housing problems. The colonial government introduced the ‘Housing Price Control 
Act’ and set up the Chosun Housing Corporation (CHC) as an independent public 
agency’ in 1941. However, this belated concern for housing policy was far from 
comprehensive. Housing units provided by the CHC covered a very small portion of 
Koreans, most of which were urban labourers serving Japanese imperial objectives. 
Priority to purchasing new CHC houses was given to public servants or wage-earners 
employed by companies in key manufacturing or military industries (KNHC, 1979: 
185-6). Benefiting from the priority, Japanese normally bought large-size houses 
(more than 60 sq. m) whereas Koreans had to make do with much smaller ones (less 
than 30 sq. m) (KNHC, 1979: 185-6). On the other hand, the vast majority of 
Koreans, particularly the urban poor, were still excluded from the benefits of the 
CHC standardised houses. However, this segregationist housing policy did not last 
for long and it was terminated when Korea achieved independence in 1945-
6.1.2 Housing policy during the cnrly terms of the Park regime
In the previous chapter, we saw how housing was neglected in the economic 
development plans of the Park government and its drive towards industrialisation. 
The preferential aids of financial resources and administrative benefits were given to 
core manufacturing industries for export-led growth. The necessity for government 
control over these industries in order to increase exports is evident in the following 
excerpt from Park Chung-Hee (1970):
The oivr-u// national development program may necessitate, for the 
rational operation o f the economy, reluctantly imposed administrative 
controls over the regional relocation o f various industries and planning for
investment. (...) In a country like Korea, whose area is small and resources 
are scarce, expansion of foreign trade and acquisition of modern industries 
are vital conditions for full employment (...) (Park, tgyo: 214).
Selective assistance was crucial to the Korean developmental scheme if this 
underdeveloped laggard was to survive against the global competition and the 
government’s discriminatory attitude towards industrial financing was particularly 
pronounced during the initial phase of development. When the military regime came 
to power, most private commercial banks were placed under the direct control of the 
government in 1961 and special banks were founded to aid specific industries (Cho 
and Kim, 1995: 31). The government appointed nationalised bank managers and 
forced them to follow policy guidelines based on the development plans rather than 
the maximisation of profits (Cho and Hellmann, 1993: 13). The government allowed 
exporting companies to obtain short-terms loans with just a letter of credit and 
indirectly subsidised the export industry by fully rediscounting long-term loans 
(Virmani, 1985: 49). Cho and Hellmann (1993) describe the Korean coordination 
system between the government, the financial sector and the industrial companies 
as “government-led internal organization.” As a consequence of the selective benefits, 
the large business conglomerates (chaebols) were grown by taking a lion’s share of 
exports and became leading agencies of the Korean economy in developmental 
processes.
It is widely accepted that the house-building industry’ was not a major beneficiary 
of governmental selective assistance and the channelling of public financial 
resources into the housing sector was curbed as much as possible, in order to avoid 
crowding out financing export industry (Renaud, 1993: 292-7, Kim, 1993: 278, Kim, 
2004a: 324, Ahn, 2002: 255, Kim and Ahn, 2002: 215). Despite its lack of concern 
for housing, it should be noted that the 1960s was the decade for establishing the 
related acts and institutional organisations under the government initiative in 
accordance with the economic development plans.
When it comes to the nature of the changes, this study argues that many 
institutional arrangements in the institutional reforms were inherited from the past
voluntarily transferred from Japan and thus they were largely incremental to 
maintain the status quo in housing. Reasonable grounds for the argument come 
from the institutional similarities in legal and organisational structures of the 
Japanese ones as well as the past ones. Firstly, the institutional similarities can be 
found between Japanese housing policy and the Park regime's by comparing the 
relevant key» acts. For instance, the ‘Land Readjustment' (LR) scheme is the most
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remarkable case in which the Japanese housing legacy was sustained during the 
post-independence decades. The LR refers to a land assembly process by which 
landowners get back developed land or a proportion of development costs in return 
for lands given over to the government for urban development. The legal rationale 
for the LR scheme can be traced back to the ‘Chosun Planning Act for Urban Areas’ 
and it was legislated for in a separate act, the ‘Land Readjustment Act’ (1966) 
introduced by the Park government (La Grange and Jung, 2004: 570). As we saw in 
the previous chapter, the scheme meant there was no need for the government to 
finance the whole cost of development, because compensation would be paid for by 
the rising values of the developed lands. This cost-cutting scheme was attractive to 
the Park government, which was reluctant to invest financial resources in housing, 
and through local governments was the most popular way of public land 
development before the 1980s without allocating much budget, even though 
landowners took most profits from LR projects (Yoon, 1994: 58). Therefore, it can be 
argued that the early Park government preferred LR to other types of land 
development in urban areas, including residential use, because the Japanese legacy 
provided it with an effective means for avoiding huge outlays in non-priority sectors 
and minimising the crowding-out effects of public financing.
There are also institutional similarities between the Japanese and Korean 
situations, with respect to the role of key housing agencies and the relationship 
between these. Post-war Japanese housing policy was shaped by the three ‘pillars’: 
the ‘Public Housing Act’ (1946), the ‘Housing Loan Corporation Act’ (1950) and the 
'Housing Corporation Act’ (1955) (Hirayama and Hayakawa, 1995: 217, Hirayama, 
2003: 153, Hirayama, 2007: 104, Ronald, 2008: 170). Public housing was 
constructed and managed by local governments, subsidised by central government 
under the Public Housing Act for low-income families. The Housing Loan 
Corporation (HLC) provided low-interest mortgages for households pursuing home 
ownership. The principal role of the Japanese Housing Corporation (JHC), a 
government housing agency, was to construct rental units and condominiums for 
sale, from which urban middle-income households mainly benefited. The emphasis 
on providing mortgages through the HLC to create a home-owning society, meant 
that the status of public housing in housing policy declined over time (Ronald, 2008: 
170, Hirayama and Hayakawa, 1995: 217-8). There are clear parallels with the 
institutional arrangements made for Korean housing policy from the 1960s. In the 
Korean ‘Public Housing Act (1963)’, local governments and the Korea National 
Housing Corporation (KNHC) were made responsible for providing public housing 
for non-homeowners with the fiscal assistance of central government. The other key
apparatuses - the KNHC and the Korea Housing Bank (KHB) - were equivalent to 
the Japanese HLC and HC respectively, in organisation of the agencies. The KNHC 
founded in the Japanese colonial era and re-established by the 1962 KNHC Act, was 
the public agency charged with constructing rental or for-sale units for low- and 
middle-income households under the supervision of the Ministry of Construction, 
just as the corresponding JHC was. The state-owned KHB was parallel to the HLC in 
Japan, since it played the earmarked role of public agency for long-term mortgages 
and bricks-and-mortar subsidy.
6.1.3 Evaluating housing policy up to the 1960s
There are contrasting arguments as to the long-run impacts of Japanese legacy on 
post-war developmental strategy in Korea. Kohli (1994: 1269-1293, 2004: 27-61) 
argues that the Korean economy was transformed by the totalitarian bureaucracy 
that the Japanese colonial rulers set up, which penetrated the fabric of the society to 
such an extent that it exerted a long-lasting influence on post-independence 
economic growth. From a related stance, it is argued that policy similarities e.g. 
authoritarian states, financial regulations, nurturing business conglomerates can be 
identified between the Japanese developmental strategy of the 1930s and Park’s 
developmental strategy in the 1970s (Woo, 1991: 20-21, 38-42). This viewpoint 
advocates the inheritance of colonial policy in the ‘continuity or discontinuity of 
legacies of colonialism’ in Korea (see Kohli, 1997, Haggard et al., 1997 for the review 
of the theme). However, the general discourse on the issue barely touches upon the 
more concrete question of how the institutions have evolved, which is crucial for 
explaining the differences in economic performance between pre- and post-colonial 
societies (Kim, 2010: 1). As far as we admit that individual policies need to be 
investigated for the rationale for the ‘continuity of legacies of colonialism’, the 
findings of this study indicate that the history of housing policy from the Japanese 
era to the early terms of the Park government lends empirical support to the 
‘continuity’ argument. In other words, housing policy transferred during Japanese 
rule was not substantially altered by the Park government in the 1960s. The reasons 
for this enduring legacy are related to the point made earlier about Japanese 
housing policy in the colonial era, that it was designed to realise the broad ruling 
plans through minimum public expenditure on housing. This well-controlled and 
cost-saving approach to housing was compatible with the economic aims of the Park 
government, since it prevented precious resources from being channelled into the 
relatively unproductive housing sector, hence the continuation in policy direction.
6.2 From the late Park regime to the Sixth Republic
6.2.1 The early 1970s: A ‘critical juncture’ towards furthering 
regulatory controls
The reluctance to invest in housing during the 1960s led to severe housing 
problems and a distinctive tenure structure at the start of the 1970s. Above all, as the 
census data in the previous chapter illustrates, there was not enough housing to 
accommodate increasing urban population. This underinvestment in housing made 
the housing shortages even worse while more people rushed to the metropolises and 
the nuclear family became more pervasive. Eventually, the government recognised 
that housing reforms were necessary when it became clear that the severe lack of 
housing was jeopardising social stability and the political legitimacy of the 
government. There was nationwide resistance against the Yushin reforms that 
allowed the current president Park Chung-Hee to indefinitely be re-elected and to 
execute absolute powers through the amendment of the Constitution. Along with 
anti-government demonstrations and parliamentary opposition, the unrest amongst 
the urban poor in Kwangju persuaded the government that the housing problem had 
become an urgent issue to be handled.
< Table 6. 2 > Housing units by suppliers: From the first to the fourth EDP
Year Total Housing Units Public sector (%) Private sector (%)
1* plan (62-66) 325.935 39,915 (12.25) 286,020 (87.75)
2nd plan (67-71) 540.338 69,613 (12.88) 470,725 (87.12)
3rd plan (72-76) 760,591 228,766 (30.08) 531.825 (69.92)
4th plan (77-81) 1,116,074 495.378 (44-39) 620,696 (5561)
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation, various years, Year Book of
Housing and Transportation
The immediate response was the new enactment or amendment of enforcing acts 
to foster mass housing construction. The 'Housing Construction Promotion Act’ was 
the main instrument employed to achieve this. The Act without a doubt contributed 
to relieving the quantitative housing shortage by promoting high-rise apartments 
since it was enacted. However, a quantitative-focused housing policy worsened other 
aspects of the housing problem. Firstly, the government was committed to the 
provision of units for sale because of the low budget outlays on housing. <Table 6.2> 
shows a total of 1,876,665 units were constructed in the decade between 1972 and 
»981. But just 64,739 of these were for rent, with 63.4% being transferred to units for
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sale as soon as the short-term mandatory rent period expired (KNHC, 1993b: 564). 
This predominance of for-sale-units by the public authorities was inevitable without 
adequate government subsidy as long as the rent was strictly controlled. The average 
ratio of housing budget to total government budget was just 1.4% for the decade 
(1971-80) (KNHC, 1983: 100). Under the circumstances, public agencies like the 
KNHC had to balance its revenues and outlays through the sale of units and keep 
unprofitable rent business to a minimum not to violate government guidelines.
< Figure 6.1 > The ratio of each tenure (1975-2000)
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Secondly, given that access to long-term mortgages was limited due to impartial 
credit rationing, the home ownership was put beyond the reach of moderate-income 
households. Many middle-income households that could not afford to buy their own 
homes either had to rely on a form of tenure known in Korea as 'chonsei’ or informal 
financing such as private transfers from relatives or the informal credit market. 
'Chonsei' involves renters paying a lump sum deposit to landlords at the outset of the 
tenancy, instead of monthly rents, which they get back when the rental contract is 
terminated. In general, the chonsei tenancy is a two-year contract and the deposit is 
normally set at between 40 % and 70% of the unit market price. This kind of tenure 
has been the prevailing rental type since the 1970s as <Figure 6.i> illustrates. 
Chonsei, which developed in the Chosun Dynasty and continued under Japanese 
colonial rule, was embedded during the industrialising period because it increased 
the funds available to landlords and enabled tenants to save deposits in an 
underdeveloped institutional housing finance market (Park, 2000: 37-4 0 - Families 
who had to find a lump sum for home ownership or chonsei deposit depended on 
kinship networks (private transfer or inheritance) and the unregulated curb 
market." In the “curb market" nominal interest rates were charged ranging from 
three to six times the rates of the institutionalised banking sector during the two
Li-1 m. I i - j  i - U L
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decades of industrialisation, as a consequence of the regulation stipulating that 
commercial banks give priority to export industries (Renaud, 1993: 297). Influenced 
by the priority of industrial financing and consequent underdevelopment of 
institutional housing finance, the heavy reliance on informal financing escalated 
financial burden of moderate- and middle-income families when they purchased 
houses and paid for deposit for chonsei.
In the absence of sufficient public rented accommodation, the vast majority of 
poor families were forced to resort to sheltering in urban squatter settlements or 
sharing a single unit with multiple families. Kim (1996: 91-92) estimates that the 
number of Seoulites residing in illegal units in 1970 was approximately 770,000 
people, which was around 13% of total population in Seoul. The tenure of squatters 
was legalised in the 1970s and refurbishment schemes provided low-wage earners in 
a number of urban squatters settlements with cheap housing on the basis of the 
“Temporary Act on the Promotion of Housing Improvement” (Kim, 1996: 94-96). 
The other last resort was to share a housing unit with a couple of households. 
<Figure 6.2> shows how overcrowded housing units were in the 1970s despite the 
governmental drive to construct more units. It reveals that slightly over half of urban 
households occupied a separate unit in the 1970 and the percentage had decreased 
by 4% in a decade. Although there is no corresponding income data, it can be 
presumed that it was normal for more than two families at low- and moderate- 
income levels to reside in a single unit due to the lack of affordable rental units.
< Figure 6.2 > Percentages of number of households per unit in cities (1970-1985)
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In terms of the characteristics of the policy means employed during this period, 
the more obsessed the government became with the quantitative objective, the more 
constraints it placed on the housing sector. The ‘Housing Construction Promotion 
Act' imposed strict regulatory controls on private builders. In the act, central or local
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government was given the authority to determine the details of the construction and 
allocation of housing such as the recruitment of contractors, or preferential 
conditions for the allocation and unit price of new apartments. Later, a wide range of 
housing-specific regulations (such as a price ceiling, advance sales system and 
housing related saving scheme) were introduced through frequent amendments of 
the act and enforcement rules. The controlling elements were reinforced particularly 
in the late 1970s when an upsurge in the housing prices took place affected by the 
estate speculation boom. The government intended to curb soaring housing prices 
by augmenting direct regulations rather than assuming greater responsibility with 
extra public expenditure on housing. Consequently, the formal housing finance 
system was distorted by direct interventions into the construction process and 
allocation of new units.
The government’s decision to bolster the constraints on housing finance seems to 
have been motivated by the changes in developmental strategy' from the mid-1970s. 
In the third economic plan, the Park government declared its intention to nurture 
heavy and chemical industry' for export. As the government decided to shift the 
economy away from light industries to heavy and chemical industries, the tendency 
of forced loans was enhanced in the banking sector from the mid-1970s (Virmani, 
1985: 50). What should be noted about this process is to differentiate overseas 
construction industry' from domestic house building industry'. In the house building 
industry, the remarkable increase in the bricks-and-mortar subsidy was 
substantially frustrated by the government’s plans to restructure the economy even 
though the demands for new housing had been escalating. The overseas construction 
industry, on the other hand, was actively encouraged because of its contribution to 
exports as well as employment during the Middle East construction boom. One of 
the characteristics of the overseas construction industry as an exporter of 
construction services was that construction firms working in developing countries 
generally brought their own workers to sites in the Middle East (Kim, 1988: 228). 
The government therefore supported overseas construction companies by 
implementing the ’Overseas Construction Promotion Act’ from 1976. 
Notwithstanding the segregation between the two industries, the large-scale 
instruction firms became so important that they turned their attention to the 
domestic housing market after the end of Middle East construction boom and thus 
became influential agents in the domestic housing policy' process from the late 1980s.
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6.2.2 The Fifth and Sixth Republic: A series of incremental housing 
reforms
The political legitimacy of the Fifth and the Sixth Republics was weakened because 
their respective presidents - Chun and Rho - were leaders by virtue of the coup d'état 
that brought Mr. Chun to office. As Korean society had already achieved 
industrialisation to a considerable extent, these authoritarian governments began to 
look for new ways of repressing demands for further democracy. Affordable and 
decent housing rose to the top of the political agenda, encapsulated in the 
catchphrases, ‘The Realisation of Welfare Society’ and ‘An Era for Ordinary People’ 
respectively. Notwithstanding these overt declarations of change, the housing 
reforms that ensued were so incremental that they were virtually indistinguishable 
from the previous path-dependent routes taken in housing policy. The incremental 
nature of policy changes during the two governments can be identified by examining 
two major cases: the foundation of the NHF and the provision of permanent rental 
housing.
The National Housing Fund (NHF) has offered supply and demand subsidies, 
mainly in the form of loans below the market rate, since it was established in 1981. 
The initial aim was to raise funds for housing construction and provide housing 
stability for non-homeowners via subsidised loans. Yet there were several limitations 
of the NHF which meant that it can hardly be seen as a turning point or 
paradigmatic shift in housing policy. This viewpoint is grounded in the fact that the 
Fund neither changed the means of financing the housing sector nor the primary 
recipients of subsidies. The two major sources of the Fund were national housing 
bonds and the deposits of the HRSS. These sources were not new because the 
revenues were collected from arrangements implemented in the 1970s. In addition, 
the resources were accompanied with the compulsory repayments of bonds or the 
returns of deposits in future. Later, an important resource (Type II national housing 
bonds) was added by the ‘bond-bidding system’ but the revenue came from the 
purchasers of new apartments without further public expenditure. The annual 
average proportion of funds from central budget to total net revenues was a mere 
6.8% for the first six years (1981-86) that the fund was operated (Yoon and Kim, 
1995: 28). In conclusion, no significant public expenditure was channelled into the 
Fund besides the debt-based resources.
In terms of the cohorts subsidised, the central target group of the NHF was low- 
income households. It is generally believed that the NHF and KHB have shared their 
rt>les in public housing finance system: the NHF has primarily subsidised low- and
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moderate-income families (or the construction of smaller units) and the KHB has 
subsidised upper-middle-income families (or the construction of larger units) (Kim, 
2004a: 329, Lim et al., 2008: 363). However, given that the full information on the 
NHF loans is not available, the studies argue that considerable amounts of the 
subsidised NHF loans were assigned to middle- and upper-middle income 
households for home ownership purposes (see Kim, 2004b: 104-105, Yoon and Kim, 
1995: 52-54). These findings indicated that the NHF did not fully succeed in aiding 
the declared income cohorts. What makes the path-dependent nature evident is the 
fact that the related regulation was newly put into action for the Fund. The ‘bond­
bidding system' - an additional source of the NHF - was such a good instance that it 
was designed not only to reduce speculation activity, but also to withdraw 
consumers’ windfall gains by price control. To the government, the new regulation 
complemented the price ceiling system and the Housing Related Saving Scheme 
(HRSS) through the mutual feedback.
The provision of public rental units for low-income households was a flagship 
welfare policy of the Sixth Republic. The Rho government started to construct a new 
type of rental units. ‘Permanent rental housing' was the first rental housing not 
subject to the rule of compulsory transfer from rent to sale. Moreover, there can be 
no doubt that the increases in rental housing under the Rho government were much 
more remarkable than those achieved during the former governments. Nevertheless, 
the growth of the public rental sector was not sweeping enough to provoke a 
fundamental reform of housing policy. First of all, the changes in policy were largely 
brought about in response to economic factors and political threats, not by any 
ideological shift. The Rho government was forced to set up emergency measures to 
roect the housing needs of low- and moderate-income households when the post- 
Olympic housing bubble caused rents to soar and the urban poor lost their squatters 
settlements following a number of clearance schemes (Lim et al., 2008: 3781 Lim, 
200S: 155-157, Kim, 1996: 118-127). In addition to these ad hoc features, the strict 
^les limited the capacity of public rental units to accommodate poor families. 
Basically, only the poorest households entitled to public assistance benefits were 
eligible for the new permanent rental units. The government was determined to 
exclude applications from single-person households and households failing to fulfil 
*be minimum residence criteria (e.g. five years living in Seoul) amongst the public 
d istan ce  recipients. The path-dependent characteristics of the programme are not 
0n,y confirmed by the strict eligibility criteria but also by the reductions in its scope 
and reach. Originally, the government planned to provide 250,000 permanent rental 
Unit*. Yet the initial plan was frustrated and the objective was reduced to 190,000
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units in the policy-making process due to the strong opposition of the Economic 
Planning Board prioritising economic growth and policy efficiency (Lee, 1995: 116- 
117). Therefore, the case of permanent rental housing illustrated how incrementally 
the government’s approach to housing was changing and that the government still 
stuck to the priority of economic growth over other welfare policies.
Although the 1980s policies were basically path-dependent, a temporary but new 
nexus between housing and the other welfare pillars could be observed during the 
decade. The Chun and Rho governments made an explicit policy linkage between 
housing and pensions when they began to institutionalise the welfare policy package. 
The direction was a one-sided flow in which pension funds were invested in short­
term NHF bonds. The loose linkage was identified when the NHF was established. A 
minor source of the NHF was short-term deposits from the occupational pension 
funds of, for example, public servants, professional soldiers and private school 
teachers. The relationship became clearer as the Rho government utilised reserves of 
the new national pension scheme, launched in 1988, for house-building projects. In 
1991, the government decided to issue the NHF bonds and the national pension fund 
was supposed to purchase them. The revenues from the sale of the bonds was to be 
used to construct new housing units for wage earners who did not own houses (The 
Maeil Economy Times, 1991). The national pension fund invested a total of 390,000 
million won in short-term NHF bonds over three years (1991-1993)» 100% of 
investment in the welfare sector during the period (Lee and Do, 2004: 112-113)- The 
investment of the national pension fund in the NHF bonds is not negligible when 
looking at the trend afterwards. The amount invested in 1993. the last >’ear *he 
investment, was 4.6% of the total accumulated funds - 8,424,628 million won 
according to National Pension Corporation (NPC) (2002: 332) data - that year. The 
annual percentages of investment in the welfare sector to total accumulated funds 
calculated on the basis of NPC (2002: 232) data reveal the 1993 percentage as the 
highest annual figure of the decade and that it dropped to 1.7% in 1999 as the annual 
Percentage consistently decreased. However, this relationship between public 
housing and national pension turned out to be temporary, because the next 
government terminated the issue of NHF bonds. Notwithstanding the short duration
the relationship, it gives hints as to how a new nexus between housing and other 
wdfare pillars might be formed in Asian contexts in contrast with the relationship in 
European contexts reviewed in Chapter 2.
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6.2.3 Evaluating housing policy from the 1970s to the Sixth Republic
It is frequently claimed that the early 1970s was important for the development of 
Korean housing in positive sense, since the government began to be interested in 
housing shortage and reformed the housing system to encourage the quantitative 
increase in the construction of new housing units (e.g. Lim, 2005, Lim et al, 2008). 
This is because the government recognised the perennial scarcity of housing stock as 
a challenge to its political legitimacy. It began to substantially intervene in housing, 
in contrast with the previous strategy of ignoring housing.
However, this thesis argues that this new direction was neither a commitment to 
public responsibility nor the pursuit of free market solutions. What to be more 
critical than the concern in housing shortage in the 1970s was that the regulatory 
framework was cemented by the government’s controlling approach to housing. 
Housing policy and its outcomes during the period can be summarised as 
authoritarian governments shaping an institutional entity of complementary 
regulations to control the forces threatening their developmental strategies, thereby 
continuously distorting the provision of housing. This study defines the institutional 
feedbacks in Korean housing policy as the “negative institutional complementaries” 
derived from the concept of “institutional complementarities" in the thesis of 
■ Varieties of Capitalism’ (VOC). Before accounting for the Korean case, the argument 
starts by reviewing the original concept of “institutional complementarities.” The 
recent discourse on VOC is raised to get over the weaknesses of ‘corporatism’ 
without undermining its theoretical merits. The VOC approach emphasises both the 
relation between private agents (firms and financial institutions) and the relation 
between firms, financial institutions and government, while corporatism basically 
focused on tri-partite interaction within the official system (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 
4 -7, Soskice, 1999:101-103).
The basic concepts and theoretical frameworks of 'Varieties of capitalism’ are 
brought together in the collection “ Varieties o f Capitalism" (2001). According to 
Hall and Soskice (2001), the economies of developed capitalism can categorised into 
two ideal types: liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market 
A n o m ies  (CMEs). This classification is based on how rational firms coordinate 
Vv’ith various actors in market and government. Whereas firms in the liberal market 
A n o m ie s  solve coordination problems mainly through hierarchies and competitive 
Market arrangements, firms in coordinated market economies tend to rely on non- 
market relationships to coordinate their activities. The key point is that the strategy 
°f firms depends on the institutional structures in place for addressing coordination
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problems. Corporate coordination primarily relies on official institutions providing 
information, monitoring and sanctioning defections as well as deliberate institution 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001: 9-10). The VOC approach highlights the factor of institution 
to account for different micro behaviour and seeks a theory of “comparative 
institutional advantage” (Soskice, 1999: 102). The distinctive institutional features 
of the two economies are summarised in <Figure 6.3>. The idea of institutional 
complementarities is very useful for understanding the logic of comparative 
institutional advantages. The concept of “institutional complementarities” is defined 
as follows: “two institutions are said to be complementary if the presence (or 
efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other” (Hall and 
Soskice 2001: 17). This means that a specific type of coordination in one area of 
economy could promote complementary activities in other areas.
< Figure 6.3 > Institutional framework of CMEs and LMEs
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This study suggests that the concept of ‘institutional complementarities’ can be 
applied to middle-range policy analysis, since it acts as a useful framework for 
analysing historical development. The concept can be imported to explain the 
development of interconnected housing regulations excepting the point that the 
Korean case concerns how complementary institutions produce negative side effects 
in society as a whole. The analysis of the Korean case starts by examining the 
balance sheet below of the agents involved i.e. housing consumers, house-building 
firms and the objectives of regulations that the state aimed to fulfil. The interesting 
Point is that the government consistently benefited from the regulations since the
126
most important objectives were largely achieved by the regulations without much 
outlay on housing.
< Table 6.3 > Key housing regulations and the balance sheets of private agents 
New Housing Consumers House-building Firms
Policy
Package
Objectives of 
Regulations
Benefits
(including
pseudo-
benefits')
x.
2.
3-
4-
1. Price ceiling system (A)
2. Housing Related Saving Scheme and Allocation rules (B)
3. Advance sale system (C)
4. Designated builders (D)
To curb upsurge of housing price
To diffuse discontents over perennial housing shortages through 
carrot-and-stick strategies
To prevent economic resources from channelling into housing 
To mobilise non-productive private resources for housing funds
A worsens the problem of 
housing shortage by shrinking 
supply of new units.
B violates the principle of free 
choice, because it forces all 
prospective consumers to 
participate in the scheme.
C increases housing costs for 
payment of instalments before 
the completion of 
construction.
Pseudo-benefits
benefits of the regulations.
Profits are substantially limited by 
A.
Affected by B, consumers were 
largely confined to the HRSS 
holders, but little damage from 
excess demands.
Small and medium house-builders 
are discriminated by preferential 
conditions for big ones.
• Other benefits were provided to 
ensure profits to some degree 
(e.g. the provision of cheap 
publicly developed lands).
• House-builders are subsidised 
with the public funds raised by 
B.
■ C plays the key role of financing 
when institutionalised housing 
finance is underdeveloped.
• D enjoys more favourable 
conditions than non-designated 
builders, particularly in 
financing.
While consumers seek excessive windfall gains and thus fuel 
speculation, many house-building firms are too inflexible to adjust 
fluctuating economic cycles under the package. These responses bring 
about the volatile housing market.
The myth of ever-profitable home ownership makes the middle-class 
acquiesce to the constant lack of housing and endure increasing 
financial burdens of home ownership.
Not only do firms build as many large-size apartments as possible to 
maximise profits, but also consumers prefer to purchase larger-sized 
ones in expectation of bigger capital gains under the package. 
House-building industry is dominated by a small number of big firms, 
with small or medium firms sub-contracted by big firms or public 
bodies.
arc not benefits in real terms but ones which make people perceive the
Housing purchasers are 
expected to take windfall 
gains under A.
B made the HRSS holders 
believe they are exclusive 
beneficiaries and thus 
comply with policy.
C guarantees contractors 
lucrative assets in the future.
The pay-off matrix that the combination of the regulations offered new housing 
consumers and house-building firms is shown in <Table 6.3>. The policy package 
worked well without serious challenges almost for two decades. This was mainly 
because the policy mutually complemented other policies by compensating those 
who lost in specific measures. When discontent over housing heightened, additional 
measures were adopted or current ones were revised in the package to soothe the 
counter-forces. As a result, the state designed the regulatory entity of housing 
schemes and prevented housing sector from crowding out the economy when 
implementing the development plans.
What characterised the policy system at the time was that it was ad hoc and 
generated considerable social costs. Most individual policies were not designed to 
operate as parts of a well-integrated entity keeping social costs to a minimum. In the 
previous chapter, we saw how most policies were introduced or reinforced without a 
long-run blueprint with yearly intervals. More importantly, the package was so 
negative that it generated considerable social costs, even though there were few 
mechanical problems to be managed. Firstly, it fuelled the volatility of the Korean 
housing market and the interest-maximising behaviours of the agents. Many 
families were ready to join the long queue for prospective home ownership, because 
they believed their patience would be rewarded with windfall gains. Constrained by 
the regulations, house-building firms could not run their businesses without being 
seriously affected by economic booms and slumps and the supply of new housing 
units grew inflexible. Secondly, the package manipulated the Korean people 
especially the middle-classes who acquiesced to the constant lack of housing and 
inflated costs of home ownership, falling victim to the mythology of home ownership 
*s an investment. The myth made the constant lack of housing and escalating 
financial burden tolerable. In particular, the middle-class benefited from ownership 
° f apartments as assets and their political support provided the governments with a 
t^tionale for authoritarian rule (Chun, 2009: 131, Gclezeau, 2004: 147)- Thirdly, 
while package was operating, larger-size apartments were generally preferred and 
the other regulations - i.e. the mandatory quota of smaller units -were necessary not 
hinder the stable provision of smaller units. Kim and Kim (2000: 1159) account 
the preference for larger units amongst both consumers and suppliers when the 
Price of new apartments was controlled, arguing that profit-maximising suppliers 
w°uld take the maximum portion of large units beyond 85 sq. metres in a building 
* * * « * . This is because the price per square metre of apartments over 85 sq. metres
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units is higher but the production costs cheaper, due to economies of scale. 
Consumers prefer larger units as long as they can access the available funds, since 
capital gains increase proportional to size under the price ceiling system. Kim and 
Kim (2000: 1159-1160) argued that price controls on new apartments and the 
subsequent mandatory quota of smaller units have distorted the distribution of new 
apartments in size. Finally, the house-building industry was dominated by a small 
number of large firms. The package created advantageous policy environments for 
big firms in licensing, subsidy and finance. Small or medium firms were sub­
contracted by public bodies or large firms and thereby it was large firms that took 
the lion’s share of the market and benefitted most from the preferential policies in 
the house-building industry.
6.3 The pre- and post-Asian Financial Crisis period
6.3.1 Housing policy of the Kim Young-Sam government
Kim Young-Sam labelled his government the ‘Civilian government’ to differentiate 
it from the former authoritarian and military-backed governments. The power elites 
of the new government were pro-market ideology'. Financial technocrats, most of 
whom were educated in American universities to PhD level, managed the project of 
financial liberalisation at the practical level and enabled the ‘ideological osmosis’ 
(Woo, 1991: 191-192). The period saw the decline of the previous developmental 
strategy' and the arrival of the ‘New Five-year Economic Plan’ stressing free-market 
principles and abolishing the EPB. There was a de facto dismissal of investment 
coordination by the government and the selective industrial policy was dismantled 
(Chang, 1998: 1558). Large Korean business conglomerates (chaebols) became less 
dependent on governmental assistance as they could borrow from the foreign capital 
market or domestic commercial banks. The new direction of the government was 
immediately mirrored in the reforms to the housing finance system. The biggest 
change in the financial sector was that commercial banks and other private financial 
agencies could select their own interest rates for loans and saving. Moreover, the 
government announced giant state-owned banks including the KHB were to be 
privatised within a few years according to the New Five-year Economic Plan. The 
Sovcrnment planned to allow the KHB to issue the MBS ulong with the privatisation 
of the banks. Although all these processes were completed in the next government, it
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was the Kim government that set up the transformation of the housing finance 
system and first proceeded with it.
Coupled with the liberalisation of the financial system, house-building firms’ 
demands for deregulation of price controls had been mounting since the late 1980s. 
This was a time when many construction firms owned by chaebols were expanding 
their operations in the domestic housing market, as the Middle-East construction 
boom began to wane and profits from overseas construction declined. Given that 
profits were constrained by the price control system, the Korea House-building 
Business Association, mainly composed of large-scale designated builders, officially 
urged the government to abolish the bond-bidding system and to allow the price of 
new apartments to be set by market forces (Donga Ilbo, 1991)- Finally, the 
government gradually eliminated the cost-linkage pricing system from local 
provinces to Seoul metropolitan areas. Meanwhile, a rolling back of the state took 
place in the public rental sector mostly by withdrawing the provision of public rental 
units and raising the rents which tenants of public rental units paid. The 
government commenced the scheme of private rental enterprises with the 1993 Act 
of Rental Housing. When the act was amended a couple of times in the 1990s, it 
provoked investment in the private rental sector and gave the rental enterprises 
considerable discretion over choice of tenants and allowance reserve for 
management (Lee, 2004: 213-214).
6.3.2 Coping with the Asian Financial Crisis and its aftermath
After Korea was sucked into the financial turbulence during the last year of the 
Kim government, the transformation process was accelerated by the IMF bailout 
plan. The incoming Kim Dae-Jung government had to carry out neo-liberal reforms 
° f core economic policies based on the guidelines enforced by the IMF. Neither was 
housing policy immune to the neo-liberal prescriptions. The demands for housing 
reforms became pronounced, as the housing system was not working in a deep 
r<H5ession. Mass unemployment and decreased income reduced the demand for 
houses and this was linked to delays or cancelations in the purchase of new houses.
steep decline in housing prices reduced the asset values of homeowners and 
brought about payment disputes between landlords and tenants in chonsei contracts. 
° n the supply side, the drop in sales of new houses meant private house-builders 
lost their biggest source of finance, as they were heavily dependent on purchasers 
down payment and instalments under the advance sales system. The outcome was
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the consecutive bankruptcy of house-building firms. The year of 1998 was the peak 
year for bankruptcies and 432 firms (14.3% of all registered builders) were 
bankrupted that year (Lim, 2005: 297). Faced by the economic shocks and the 
failure of the system to operate, the government’s reaction was to decontrol the 
housing sector and liberalise the housing finance market. Privatisation of the KHB 
was completed and the relevant acts permitting the issue of the MBS were legislated 
to open a secondary mortgage market just after the crisis occurred. The persistent 
price control on new apartments was virtually eliminated and house-building 
companies were allowed to determine prices in self-funded house-building projects.
The consequences of the housing reforms were the growth of home ownership with 
mortgage loans and subsequent rise in house prices. Banks began to readily provide 
more mortgages, which were less risky than loans for firms in an economic slump 
and thus more households purchased houses with high mortgage rates. The rates of 
mortgage loans to total household loans from banks rose from 47.8% in 2000 to 
59.3% in 2002 while total amounts of household loans from banks in 2002 (107 
billion won) were more than twice as much as in 2000 (222 billion won) (Kim and 
Kim, 2004: 41-42). cTable 6.4> shows the ratio of Loan-To-Value just before the 
crisis, which stayed at around 25% while the Kim Young-Sam government drove 
through the financial liberalisation. When LTV regulations were relaxed just after 
the crisis, the figure jumped to 38.3% in 2001 and had settled between 32% and 39% 
by the mid-2000s. Financial liberalisation and the subsequent changes to people’s 
behaviour this caused led to steady growth in home ownership. As can be seen in 
former <Figure 6.1>, the owner-occupier rate, which had been decreasing since 1975, 
suddenly increased when two consecutive governments liberalised the Financial 
system and housing regulations before and after the financial crisis in the 1990s.
< Table 6.4 > PIR (Price Income Ratio) and LTV (Loan-To-Value) ratio (1996-2005)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
P1R
Not
Avail­
able
46 4.2 4.6 5-0 46 5-5 6.2 5-5 5-6
LTV
Ratio 250 26.2 27.1 28.0 33-9 38.3 32.1 32-4 369 38.2
Source: KB (2011a), Demands for Housing Finance Survey
This set of changes might indicate that the structure of home ownership in Korea 
was musing towards the home-owning societies of Western economies, backed up by
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the market mortgage system after the crisis. However, in relation to the mortgage 
structure, there was a significant difference in the duration of mortgages compared 
with the typical mortgage offered in Western economies. Mortgage loans, in general, 
are scheduled to amortise over a long-term period - normally more than 20 years 
with periodic repayments. The increased mortgages during the post-AFC (Asian 
Financial Crisis) period differed from typical mortgages in that most were short­
term, maturing in three years, and bullet mortgages in which the principal of the 
loan should be paid when the mortgage expires (Kim and Kim, 2004: 43, Lee, 
2002b: 31-32). The KB bank’s preference for short-term mortgages is a quite recent 
phenomenon, if we take the case of the KB bank, the biggest commercial bank, 
which merged with the KHB in 2001 (see <Figure 6.4>). In 1998 mortgages of 20 
years and over accounted for 74% of all new mortgages, but by 2001 the situation 
had been reversed and short-term mortgages of 3 years were now the norm. This 
dramatic shift towards short-term mortgages was desirable neither for borrowers 
nor for the housing market. As long as borrowers are not in arrears with their 
interest payments, the duration of a short-term mortgage can be extended but 
borrowers take higher risks on short-term mortgages than they do with long-term 
mortgages (Kim and Kim, 2004: 43). Moreover, bullet mortgages encourage 
speculation and incentivize borrowers who intend to pay off mortgages with the 
profits they make from future sales (Lee, 2002b: 32). Hence it is highly likely that 
any move to short-term mortgages will fuel speculative demands for housing in a 
real-estate boom.
< Figure 6.4 > Maturation of new mortgage loans from the KB bank
1998 Mortgage
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2001 Mortgage
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Source: Lee (2002b: 31)
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< Figure 6.5 > Housing Purchase (and Chonsei ) Price Composite index
* ioo.o=December, 2008
Source: KB(20nb), Housing Price Investigation Data
This was certainly the case in Seoul at the end of the Rho Moo-Hyun government, 
just as the economy was crawling out of the Financial slump (see <Figure 6.5>). 
Strong anti-speculation policies were designed by the new Rho government to 
restrain upsurges in house prices. The main focus of the reforms was to reinforce the 
regulation of the housing market, not only through new measures like the ‘Gross 
Real Estate Tax’ but also with the revival of abolished means like price controls on 
new apartments.
Nevertheless, the Kim and Rho governments can be distinguished from the Kim 
Young-Sam government by their commitment to expand the role of the public rental 
sector in many respects. In the presidential campaign, Kim Dae-Jung pledged to 
reconstruct permanent rental housing, the additional provision of which was 
terminated by the former government. Although the plan was frustrated by the 
Financial restrictions of the bailout scheme, it was substituted with the provision of 
new long-term rental units, "National Rental Housing” for which the units were 
supposed to be rented for 10 or 20 years (later 30 years). The new rental housing 
was designed to serve the various households in terms of income levels and sizes. 
Moreover, the government started to give public assistance beneficiaries separate 
housing allowances, even though the amounts were small lump sums depending on 
the number of entitled households. Yet the decision was so meaningful that the 
targeted bencFits could be regarded as the first explicit housing allowance in Korea.
The succeeding Rho government went even further than its predecessor with the
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public rental sector. Firstly, the income-targeted approach was further refined as 
soon as Rho took office. The Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT) 
(2003) differentiated core means of mitigating rental unaffordability for the lowest 
and the moderate-income cohorts in the roadmap for housing policy. According to 
the roadmap in <Figure 6.6>, the government would construct small-size national 
rental housing and purchase multi-household dwelling stocks for the lowest income 
decile. It was planned to construct varying sizes of national rental housing and to 
provide more rental subsidies on behalf of the cohorts between the second and 
fourth income decile. Following the guideline, the government provided a mixture of 
rental units and endeavoured to increase the stocks of long-term rental housing. 
There was much criticism of the public rental units constructed in large scale 
apartment complexes in suburban areas, because it necessitated expensive land 
costs for development and dislocated tenants from their workplaces and 
communities. To alleviate the dislocation, public agencies like the KNHC began to 
purchase or rent a small number of built stocks in inner-cities and to let the 
refurbished stocks at low rents for poor families. A residents’ survey by the KNHC 
reported that the project contributed to improving housing standards and tenants 
were highly satisfied with their dwelling stocks (Kim et al., 2006: 21). Besides 
varying rental types, the government strived to increase long-term rental stocks 
including those held by the public sector, given that the majority of rental units were 
sold on when the minimum legal period expired. The government increased the total 
stocks of public rental housing that were available for more than 30 years. The 
available long-term stocks rose from 288,733 in 2002 to 403,543 in 2006, or 3% of 
total dwelling units (MOCT, 2007: 539). The MOCT (2007: 23) aimed to raise the 
rate of long-term rental stocks to total dwelling stocks to 15% by 2012.
< Figure 6.6 > Roadmap for increasing housing welfare
Source; MOCT (2003)
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6.3.3 Evaluating the pre- and post-Asian Financial Crisis period
The 1990s, before and after the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), was regarded as one 
of the most critical decades in the history of housing policy as well as the Korean 
economy. In this study, it is not the 1997 AFC but the decade as a whole that is 
designated the critical juncture in Korean housing, because the path-breaking 
transformation was already in progress before the crisis with the Kim Young-Sam 
government’s liberalisation of the economy in the early 1990s. The critical juncture 
of housing in the 1990s was specified as short periods of time rather than a specific 
event or point. As we have already seen in the previous sections, the traditional 
developmental strategy was drastically reformed by the Kim government in the 
pursuit of deregulation and the transformation process was accelerated by the 
succeeding government under the IMF bailout. Although the Kim Dae-Jung and Rho 
Moo-Hvun governments were less conservative and more democratic than the 
preceding government, they by no means sought a return to the past. Rather their 
basic concern was about how to reduce the rising social costs of liberalisation such 
as higher unemployment and growing inequality. Their common responses were to 
enhance the public social safety net against new social risks and to organise the 
general welfare system in accordance with changing social needs. With respect to 
social policy, the post-AFC reforms fuelled academic debated about how the reforms 
changed the Korean welfare state and which welfare regime Korea belonged to (see 
Kim, 2002 for the review of the theme).
Policy changes in housing are generally in line with the overall directions in other 
welfare policies. While regulating frameworks were continuously dismantled in the 
*9905, the post-AFC governments assumed higher public responsibility for 
providing affordable housing mainly through expanding rental sectors on behalf of 
low- and moderate-income families. Of course, the Rho Moo-Hyun government was 
relatively dualistic up to the mid-2000s in the sense that it tightened or restored 
regulations on housing to curb price upsurges, but took the cornerstone of its policy 
Was to foster rental sector. At the same time, it reaffirmed the importance of the 
Market and home ownership in the provision of housing. In the policy roadmap 
announced by the Rho government, the government made sure that upper median- 
‘ncome households would pursue home ownership in the market to meet their 
housing needs.
In «ummary. Korean society has I wen moving towards a home owning society
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backed up by mortgages on the capital market since the deregulations before and 
after the AFC sparked the transformation process. The post-AFC developmental 
phase was differentiated from the previous ones during which governments created 
a mythology of state-sponsored home ownership and reinforced it with a wide range 
of complementary regulations. However, the path-breaking system does not seem to 
improve the affordability of housing and housing inequality in society. The past 
strategy filled with regulatory controls led to a stagnant or occasionally shrinking 
home-owning society and made both home ownership and rent unaffordable in 
Korea. Middle income households who wanted to buy houses relied on informal 
housing finance or the limited opportunities for purchasing new apartments under 
the regulated system. On the other hand, moderate- and low-income households had 
to depend on a largely unsubsidised private rental sector or the residual and 
sometimes stigmatised public rental sector. Once this kind of extraordinary housing 
system was established, the post-AFC radical shift aggravated the position of the 
lower classes with respect to both home ownership and rent. In the circumstances, 
the governments began to perceive housing as a constituent of the welfare state and 
they were committed to developing small-size public sector homes for rent. Yet it is 
unlikely that these commitments will bring about a significant transformation 
towards ‘Anglo-Saxon’ home-owning societies'2 in Korea, as long as governments 
continue to believe in the essential values of housing. Moreover, given the strong 
temptation that the future governments will restore abolished or relaxed regulations 
as the post-AFC governments occasionally did, it is likely that Korean society' might 
suffer from a coexistence of ‘government failure’ and ‘market failure’ caused by an 
institutional vicious cycle in the future as it did in the past.
6.4 Concluding remarks
Housing is one of the areas in which substantial policy transfers were made under 
Japanese colonial rule. Many policies were so coercive and experimental that the 
colonial government instituted many experimental clauses in an authoritarian 
nianner on behalf of the imperialists’ interests. Housing policy transferred during 
Japanese rule was not substantially altered by the Park government in the 1960s.
'* Anglo-Saxon home-owning (or homeowner) societies’ is a frequently used term to 
designate Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the UK. USA and Australia, in comparative 
bousing studies (e.g. Lowe, 2011:181, Ronald, 2008:119)-
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The reasons for this enduring legacy are related to the point made earlier about 
Japanese housing policy in the colonial era, that it was designed to realise the broad 
ruling plans through minimum public expenditure on housing. This well-controlled 
and cost-saving approach to housing was attractive to the Park government, which 
sought to curb the draining of limited resources into peripheral sectors such as 
housing.
Insofar as the Korean development model was basically maintained, the responses 
of the late Park government and the following authoritarian (Chun Doo-Hwan and 
Rho Tae-Woo) governments were neither a strong drive to the provision of public 
housing nor a resort to laissez-faire remedies. The 1970s was a critical decade 
during which the regulator)’ framework was cemented by the government’s 
controlling approach. A series of measures such as the price ceiling system, housing 
related savings schemes, designated builders and the advance sales system were 
implemented in the 1970s. These controlling approaches were significantly 
deregulated in the 1990s and accelerated before and after the Asian Financial Crisis 
(AFC) by the civilian governments. Deregulation in the housing finance sector was 
achieved through the privatisation of public housing agencies and the creation of a 
second mortgage market. The public rental sector, on the other hand, has been 
fluctuating with the ideological stances of the civilian governments and overall 
economic situation, although the post-AFC governments have achieved considerable 
improvements in the housing stock and tenure stability.
However, it would be too hasty at this stage to predict that continuous 
deregulation and privatisation will eventually dismantle the existing Korean housing 
system, or that the liberal model or Kcmcny's ’dualist rental market’ model will be 
embedded in the future. Although far-reaching deregulations were brought about in 
the 1990s, the regulatory framework from the past is still alive. Some regulations 
such as the advance sales system, housing related saving schemes persistently 
survive up to now. Abolished regulations (e.g. the price ceiling system) were often 
^stored even in the 2000s. It is possible that an extraordinary reform characterised 
by old or new regulator)’ controls will occur in the future by the prospective 
K,,vcrnmcnts reluctant to invest national resources in housing.
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Chapter seven
The development of housing in Singapore
7.1 Introduction: Independence, industrialisation and housing in 
Singapore
The Republic of Singapore (hereafter Singapore) is a city-state consisting of 63 tiny 
islands in Southeast Asia. Singapore was initially developed as a trading post by the 
East India Company in the early 19th century. More specifically, the origin of modern 
Singapore can be traced back to the year of 1819 when the Temenggong of Johore, 
the local ruler, signed a settlement agreement with Sir Stamford Raffles on behalf of 
the East India Company (Turnbull, 1989: 1). The country became an official British 
Crown Colony in 1867 after being one of British Straits Settlements since 1826. 
Singapore was ruled by the British colonial government until it became a self- 
governed state in 1959.13 Instead of remaining a fully independent state, the self- 
appointed PAP government decided to join Malaysia in 1963 along with the other 
former British colonies in the Malay Peninsula. The PAP government then declared 
independence again in »965 separating Singapore from Malaysia.
The country’s survival as an independent state was not a foregone conclusion, due 
to its small size and the scarce resources under its command. Nevertheless, 
Singapore managed to achieve outstanding economic growth largely thanks to the 
industrialisation projects of the Peoples’ Action Party (PAP) led by Lee Kuan Yew. 
The economic prosperity of Singapore has been consistently pursued under the long­
term rule of the PAP that has won all the general elections held since gaining full 
autonomy over the territory - At the early stage of development, the long-running 
government set up core statutory boards e.g. the Economic Development Board 
(EDB) and the Housing and Development Board (HDB) to support public plans for 
Gnomic growth and social stability. Tire developmental strategy of the government 
Was basically devoted to export-led growth and focused on attracting foreign 
invcstment represented by multinational corporations (MNCs) rather than 
enuring domestic capital. There are several features of its economic policy to date: 
the regulation of the labour market through wage determination and curbing union
o^ridVV C° °^nu  ^ w*a suspended while Japan occupied Singapore during
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activities, generous tax incentives for MNCs and public investment in human capital 
and infrastructure (Huff, 1995: 740-747, 1999-’ 36*44 , Soon and Tan, 1993: 18). 
Hugely influenced by government’s steering development, the GDP per capita of 
Singapore jumped up from US$ 395 in i960 to US$ 38,645 in 2007 (World-Bank, 
2011). Judged by the indicator of GDP per capita, Singapore has moved ‘from Third 
World to First’ as the title of Lee Kuan Yew’s (2000) book puts it, in just half a 
century. In terms of economic structure, the country shares many characteristics 
with the developed economies where the service industries have grown much bigger. 
<Figure 7.1> illustrates these features well, in particular the country’s relatively large 
financial sendees (12%) and business sendees (14%) sectors. Financial services and 
business sendees were set up as an engine of growth for developing an international 
financial centre in Singapore and become the fastest-growing sectors after the late 
1970s (Huff, 1995: 739). Nevertheless, manufacturing continues to be an important 
part of the Singaporean economy and its products have led export-oriented growth 
during most phases of its industrialisation, accounting for 76 per cent of total 
merchandise exports in 2007 (World Bank, 2011).
• *k0. nf a citv-state composed of 
Singapore's social, cultural and political pro 1 e ls as a protot>pical
multiple ethnic groups. T V  relevant indicators P™lr»> population has
extreme c i t r a t e .  According to the World «“ * dt y in » 0 7 .
keen completely urban since i9 6 0 , wdh to '1» RSK " ^  J§pM> Singapore's
U rt*e more homogeneous Fas, Asian sta t«  s -  > ^  „ 3 .7 * ,,  Indian
Population Is heterogeneous nurture of Chtne* l . ^  0f natural
« • * )  and other ethnicities <».6%> good, «>•
Figure 7.1 > Structure of economy: Nominal value-added share (%)
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resources available in such a small territory, the PAP government has placed great 
emphasis on investment in human capital. The consequence of this is an extremely 
high level of literacy and high proportion of educated citizens with a secondary or 
higher qualification. In 2006, the national literacy rate reached 95.4% and more 
than half the population (58.8%) had acquired a secondary or higher qualification 
(SDOS, 2007: 11).
This chapter starts by depicting what happened in housing under British colonial 
rule, with the sections that follow devoted to accounting for the policy changes 
implemented by the PAP governments from Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister 
of the Republic of Singapore, to Lee Hsien Loong, the current Prime Minister. This 
structure can contribute to our understanding of not only how the PAP regime has 
framed an unprecedented public housing sector, but also what characteristics of 
home-owning society have been structured into the relationship between housing 
and the welfare state. This examination, in turn, can help us to ascertain how crucial 
occurrences in housing policy have executed long-run impacts on the housing 
system, which is analysed in the next chapter.
7.2 Housing policy under British colonial rule
7«2.i British housing policy during the colonial era
Tlic British occupation of Singapore began in the year of 1819 when Thomas S. 
Raffles signed a set of agreements with the local authorities. This occupation was 
initially driven by the East India Company, which was eager to develop Singapore as 
a trading post. As British founders pioneered the port along the Singapore River, the 
small fishing village turned into a commercial base consisting of new public 
buildings, wharves, warehouses and trading houses (Teo, 1992: 165). The initial 
development was implemented on basis of the 1823 Raffles plan, which was drawn 
UP mainly by Jackson and revised with Raffles’ directions.« In the plan, the 
development of settlement was designed to use the natural advantages of the site as 
much as possible and the residential districts of various ethnic groups were 
^Parated from those of Europeans (Waller, 200»: 23)- Apart from the Raffles plan, 
00 other significant official plans were drawn up by the colonial government until
of Jackson's major contribution to the plan, it is called the Jackson s 
*°mc «tidies (eg. Teo, 1992)-
H O
the end of the century.
It was not until the dawn of the next century that other practical urban plans were 
made and relevant acts introduced. Around the commencement of the 20th century, 
Singapore experienced an abrupt upsurge in population. <Figure 7.2> reveals how 
fast the population was growing in the early 20th century compared with the initial 
years of colonial era in the previous century. This growth was due to large inflows of 
immigrants from other neighbouring countries, mainly China. Combined with the 
scant concern of the colonial government for housing, the country suffered from a 
severe housing shortage and consequently over-crowded residential density 
symbolised by subdivided ‘cubicles’ in multi-storey dwelling units or multi­
functional shophouses. Reflecting the overcrowded conditions in Singapore, the 
number of persons per occupied house rose from 7.2 persons in 1881 to 12.5 persons 
in 1915 (Wee, 1972: 218).
< Figure 7.2 > Population during colonial rule: Selected years
1824 1849 1871 1881 1901 1921
Source: Tch (1975: 2)
Besides highly crowded dwelling units and households, the poor quality of housing 
conditions caused residential environments to deteriorate. The excerpt below from a 
newspaper article written in 1907 about the Simpson Report succinctly portrays the 
P°or sanitary circumstances of Singapore at the time.
Professor Simpson says that the conditions which make for unhealthiness 
ore the overcrowding o f the site for  a dwelling house and the 01 crerowding 
o f the houses by tenants, the absence o f back lanes and open yards to all 
for drainage, s c a v e n g i n g  and a free circulation of air (The Straits Time.,
1907).
The state of the built environment induced the colonial government to change its 
strategy towards urban problems and begin to take housing issues more seriously. 
As well as periodic but sluggish interventions, the government brought in relevant 
acts and arrangements to relieve quantitative and qualitative housing problems. The 
Municipal Bill of 1896 specified that it was the responsibilities of local authorities, to 
engage in improvement schemes to refurbish slums and built environments, but 
there was little substantial change (Teo and Savage, 1991: 327). More significant 
measures accompanied by the requisite financial resources were taken in 1927, with 
the passing of the Singapore Improvement Ordinance Bill and the foundation of an 
independent Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) which was a government 
organisation, not a statutory board. The priority goal of the SIT was slum clearance 
and improvement with funds raised by the colonial government (Wee, 1972: 220). 
The SIT was financed by revenues from: the Improvement Rate (2% of the annual 
value of inner-city properties), government contributions, rents from properties, 
government loans and two funds (the 10 Million Fund and Princess Elizabeth fund) 
(Chua and Ho, 1975: 59). The SIT constructed the first public housing town (Tiong 
Bahru) in which housing units were provided for about 6,000 people (Teo and 
Savage, 1991: 327). From when the Trust came into force in 1927, until it was 
dissolved in 1959, the SIT provided approximately 23,000 housing units in 32 years 
(Yeung and Drakakis-Smith, 1974: 764). Yet the activities of the SIT benefitted only 
a tiny proportion of the populace and were thus not enough to accommodate a 
skyrocketing population. Wong and Yap (2003: 362) estimated that the total 
number of residential units provided by the Trust could accommodate 9 per cent of 
the population at the time.
Except the SIT, the other significant policy affecting urban planning and housing 
did not appear until the last stage of colonial rule. It was from 1951 that the Master 
plan was conceived. The plan was approved by the colonial government in 1958. The 
plan aimed to redevelop the overcrowded inner-city regions and to relieve an acute 
housing shortage. The Master plan was not only for general land-use in the long run, 
but also for preventing the overpopulation of the central city' through the 
construction of new towns in the suburban areas. Although the original plan was not 
implemented because of the power transition to a self-governing system, the colonial 
attributes of the plan arc worth noting. Firstly, medium-sized towns were designed 
following standard British urban planning and the towns can be easily extendable to 
any directions via ring road links (Chua, 1997: 32). Secondly, the plan was colonial, 
because the housing policy’ in the plan aimed to ensure minimum housing standards, 
^  was the case in other colonies (Teo, 1992: 169)- Notwithstanding the colonial
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nature of the plan, the key idea of organising city space and planning housing 
provision was continued by the PAP government even after independence.
7*2.2 Prospective financing mechanism: The Central Provident Fund
When it comes to financing public housing in the post-independence era, the 
development of a key institutional arrangement was made in the social security field 
during British occupancy. The British colonial government introduced the Central 
Provident Fund (CPF) as a compulsory savings scheme to provide for retirement in 
1955- The multifaceted roles played by the fund in contemporary Singapore were 
made inevitable when the PAP government directly linked the CPF to the formation 
of a public housing sector by utilising it as an essential financing mechanism.
The CPF was originally conceived to incorporate civil servants into a fully-funded 
pension scheme but post-independence PAP regime enormously expanded the role 
of the fund, which eventually became a core institution in economic and social policy 
(Peebles and Wilson, 2002: 87). The original type of social security system devised 
for retirement payment was not actually a provident fund, but a pension scheme as 
social insurance. The McFadzean Commission, appointed to investigate the public 
retirement benefits in 1951, considered the two alternatives - a central provident 
fund and a pension scheme - for retirement benefits. The majority of the 
commission were in favour of a pension scheme as a type of social insurance with 
the rationale that "a pension scheme would be better adapted to the circumstance 
Prevailing in Singapore' (The Strait Times, 1952). Nevertheless, the proposal was 
frustrated by the colonial government and a provident fund was ultimately selected. 
Tvvo reasons are posed to account for the rejection of a pension scheme (Low and Aw, 
‘997: 15, Lin, 2010: 135-136). The first and most important reason was the 
reluctance of the colonial government to assume full financial responsibility for a 
pension scheme. Through the adoption of a central provident fund, the British 
Colonial government intended to avoid the possibility of having to meet the deficit 
^ al a social insurance scheme might face and thus to maintain the self-funding 
Principle in the colony. Secondly, the policy choice in Singapore was affected by the 
ket that the neighbouring Federation of Malaya had already implemented a 
Provident fund in 1951 under British rule. Finally, as the colonial government 
te n d e d , the CPF Ordinance of 1953 »«t,he legal grounds for the retirement scheme 
48 * provident fund and the CPF came into operation in 1955 with the 10 per cent 
Rro** contribution rate (5 per cent by employer and employee, respectively).
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7-3 R e fo rm s d u r in g  th e  PAP g o v e r n m e n t le d  b y  L ee K u an  Y ew
7.3.1 Before and after independence
Singapore became a self-governing state within the Commonwealth in 1959, 
headed by the People’s Action Party, which was formed in 1954 and despite its poor 
showing in the 1955 election became the majority party in the 1959 election under 
the leadership of Lew Kuan Yew. The party’s leaders - Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng 
Swee - were from middle-class backgrounds and educated in UK universities. In the 
beginning, they brought leftist groups into the party in order to resist colonial rule 
and attract more workers’ votes, but the alliance was broken soon after the PAP won 
the 1959 election and the leftist faction created a new socialist party, ‘Barisan 
Sosialist’ in 1961. To compete with a socialist party in domestic politics, the PAP had 
to find ways of consolidating its rule in the early 1960s and the passage through 
independence from Britain in 1962 and unification then withdrawal from the 
Federation o f Malaysia in 1965.
Given the urgent need to enhance legitimacy, the most remarkable reaction took 
place in housing policy as soon as the first PAP government was inaugurated. The 
Housing and Development Board (HDB) was established in i960 to replace the 
existing Singapore Improvement Trust and provide mass public housing. The HDB 
was created as a statutory' board, autonomous public bodies established by Acts for 
specific purposes. The origin of the modern statutory boards in Singapore dates back 
to the height of British colonial rule and the launching of the Board of the 
Commissioners of the Currency’ (1899) to issue and manage currency. Other boards 
formed by the colonial government ranged from the Singapore Harbour Board 
C*9 *3 ) created in the early 20th century to the Central Provident Fund Board (1955) 
and Singapore Telephone Board (1955) set up towards the end of the colonial period. 
Statutory boards were generally given greater operational autonomy than other 
government organisations but were supervised by the relevant Ministers, which 
meant that the overall direction of their businesses was guided by government policy 
(Ow, 1986; 241 cited in Soon and Tan, 1993: 20).
The HDB was the sole public body responsible for the provision of public housing 
bas«d on its five-year plans and enjoyed comprehensive autonomy in the areas of 
,a^  acquisition, town planning, building design and materials (Yuen, 2002: 40). 
'Yhcn the HDB came into forte in i960, its primary* aim was the provision of low-
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cost public housing to urgently relieve the perennial housing shortage that had 
existed since the colonial era. The HDB focused on the construction of standardised 
small-size flats sacrificing the quality of housing to a certain extent in order to 
increase the available stock as soon as possible. At first, the HDB let completed 
public stock at subsidised rents, not for sale, for low-income families. On the 
demand side, consumers preferred affordable rental units to expensive units for sale 
as the record of the applicants to respective tenure in <Table 7.i> illustrates. The 
first generation of HDB flats was mainly high-rise apartments in the first new towns 
(e.g. Queenstown). Most rental units were assigned to fire victims, residents in 
urban squatters and displaced farmers for resettlement and households meeting the 
income criteria of the HDB were eligible for the rental units as well (Castells et al., 
1990: 229).
< Table 7.1 > Key data of public housing managed by the HDB (1960-1972)
Year
Cumulative total 
number of HDB 
fiats
Percentage of 
population in 
public flats
Number of applicants Number of 
flats soldRent Buy
i960 21,968* 90 2,627
1961 26,168 »1-4 3,38i
1962 37,374 »53 13,177
>963 43,889 18.3 11,895
1964 54,3»2 22.0 9.928 1.451 1,451
1965 69,660 23.O 11,400 1.516 1,516
1966 80.915 24.0 17,313 1.576 1,320
»967 84 ,,(>84 26.0 »5.562 2,384 1,499
»968 98,289 29.6 9,501 7,407 8,504
»969 »»1.539 32.6 n ,305 8,048 9,897
>970 »23.124 359 12,324 20,598 6,967
»97» 132.286 38.1 10,671 20,305 6,062
»972 »47,636 43-7 11,888 24,644 9,142
Most fiats were constructed by the previous Singapore Improvement Trust 
Sourec: Castells et al. (1990:232)
"3.2 The full-scale drive toward» a home-owning society
cn»phasis on the mass production of rental units started to shift towards the 
Pursuit of a home-owning society, initiated by the government policies, as early as 
^ v*riety of important measures were implemented to foster home ownership 
°Vcr following decade. In 1964 the ‘Home Ownership for the People Scheme
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(HOS) was introduced “to encourage a property-owning democracy in Singapore 
and to enable Singapore citizens in the lower middle income group to own their own 
homes” (HDB Annual Report, 1964 cited in Tan, 1998: 13). To make home 
ownership more affordable, the HDB offered purchasers a long-term mortgage of up 
to fifteen years at a fixed annual interest rate (6.25%). Although the scheme was 
envisaged as a highly attractive incentive to promote the sales of HDB flats, the 
initial response to it amongst the general public was far from enthusiastic. The drive 
toward prevailing home ownership gained momentum with the subsequent policy 
actions, the first of which was to legislate for the 1966 ‘Land Acquisition Act’ 
enabling the state to obtain land at below market price. The act enabled the 
government to purchase the land necessary for public housing projects cheaply. In 
the amendment of the act in 1973, the state purchase price was pegged at 1973 levels 
to further the supply of land at discounted price.
The most influential action, occasionally called the ‘Central Provident Fund 
Approved Housing Scheme’, was taken in 1968 to help consumers finance home 
ownership by linking the CPF to the purchase of HDB housing. The government 
allowed CPF members to withdraw part of their CPF savings for the down payment 
and monthly instalments on purchases of HDB flats. Prior to this, CPF members 
could not withdraw CPF balances for any purpose before they reached retirement 
age; under the new scheme CPF members could pay not only the 20% down 
payment for the HDB flats, but also the mortgage instalments of HDB loans with 
their CPF savings. In addition, preferential treatment was given to sitting tenants of 
HDB flats, who could buy their current houses with just a reduced down payment.
< Table 7.2 > Amount of CPF balances withdrawn for HDB flats purchase
Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972,
Amount of CPF balances 
withdrawn ($, Million) 6-3 21.7 22.9 23.2 25-t
Proceeds of sales ($, Million) 45-6 62.5 63-7 58.9 yi O b
Ratio of amount withdrawn to 
proceeds of sales (%) 13-8 34-7 35-9 394
50.2
Source: Chua and Ho (1975: 68)
The impact of these measures on the growth of home ownership is well illustrated 
by the significant increase in applications for HDB units for sale. Compared with the 
1967 figure shown in <Table 7.i>, the 1968 figure is more than double the previous 
year. The number of applicants continued to rise dramatically and the figure for
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1972 was approximately ten times more than in 1967. The importance of CPF 
savings in financing home ownership is more apparent when examining the data in 
cTable 7.2>. <Table 7.2> reveals that CPF savings had already become embedded as 
a major financial resource for consumers to fund HDB flats in the few short years 
since the 1968 scheme began operating.
With the encouragement of home ownership, the HDB established an allocation 
system for sale and a peculiar concept of ownership in the Singaporean context. 
HDB flats for sale were assigned to qualified applicants by administrative rules set 
by the HDB, not by market mechanisms, which determine housing transactions and 
prices by mutual consensus between buyers and sellers. The only applicants eligible 
for HDB housing were families or married couples who satisfied the HDB’s terms 
and conditions such as citizenship, income ceiling and non-ownership of private 
property. Allocation was on a first-come-first-served basis amongst qualified 
applicants in registered queues. The final distribution of individual flats was done by 
a random balloting system in each estate. In terms of tenure, the rules of ownership 
for HDB housing were clearly differentiated from the regulations for private 
properties in Singapore.
The property rights that people obtained when they purchased HDB flats was a 99- 
year lease-ownership. Generally, the HDB owned leased lands from the state to build 
public housing and in turn granted 99-year lease-ownership of HDB flats built on 
the leased land to the purchasers. Therefore, the ownership of HDB housing was 
more restricted than the general ownership of private property in several aspects. 
Tan (1998: 136-137) pointed out three primary elements by which a lease-ownership 
of HDB housing was differentiated from exclusive property rights in the purely 
private sector. Firstly, the category of authorised occupants was confined to the legal 
lessee and their legal dependents according to the HDB rules. Secondly, the right to 
sell the property on the open market was not permitted before 1971 when the resale 
market was officially launched by the HDB. Even after 1971, the alienation of 
property rights was subject to HDB resale regulations when HDB housing was sold 
on the open market. Finally, the settlement of mortgage was limited without the 
consent of the HDB and the post-acquisition property conditions of mortgaged HDB 
housing were different from those of fully private property when the fiat owner was 
bankrupt.
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7-3*3 Establishing a state-governed market in the 1970s
The government’s endeavours to promote home ownership were furthered in the 
1970s. As continuous construction of new towns increased the volume of housing 
stock, other new policies were executed to boost demand for public housing and to 
comprehend high-income households in the public sector. The first measure was to 
create the regulated resale market through the transaction of HDB flats in 1971. >5 
Before 1971, homeowners had to resell their flats to the HDB at a reduced price 
reflecting depreciation during occupancy. Therefore, the asset values of HDB flats 
were substantially constrained, because purchasers of HDB flats could not gain 
capital gains from sales in the absence of the resale market. This situation was 
changed by the PAP government to allow homeowners of three-room and four-room 
flats who had been resident for more than 3 years to sell their occupied houses to 
buyers who qualified for HDB flats at a mutually agreed price in the resale market. 
However, families who sold their flats in the resale market would be barred from 
applying for another HDB flat for 12 months.
Meanwhile, the government decided to broaden the coverage of publ' g
and in 1974 a new public authority, the state-owned Human and Urban 
Development Corporation (HUDC) was founded to provide high quality pub ic 
housing for households whose income was beyond the income ceilii g 
houses, but not enough to get them on the private property marke g 
income level had been rising for a decade since industrialisation, the HUDC was 
created to target the increasing number of upper-middle income families 
the richest who could afford to pay for private houses and the vast majority 0 t e 
population dependent on HDB flats. In targeting these cohorts, the 1 erence 
between the HDB and the HUDC was obviously identified by the income ee g 
imposed by each agency. While maximum monthly income was $1,200 and $1,500 
for HDB flats with three and four rooms respectively, the income ceiling or 
housing was set at $4,000 in 1974 (Chong et al., 1985: 245)- The HUDC a 
built in independent estates separated from the HDB estates and subject to HUL 
eligibility conditions that were largely similar but not the same as HDB con 1 
These conditions included citizenship, family nucleus and income ceiling, 
ownership of private property. As CPF members could use their savings or
According toChu. and Ho (1975= <*>thc *l-19901 ^ '
loVfcd in 1970. Nevertheless, many previous This is probably becam e
***) regard the »9?» policy as the creation of th whcre*s most one- and two
«  nu>ontv of aold Oats *rre three- or ^ r^ 0^ n^ dcni,ion. this study accepts the 
»»»were for rent. Taking all of ihesejhmg* ^ ^ 1  in »971- 
*Jorit> description that the official resale market was err
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purchase of HDB flats, CPF members who wanted to buy HUDC flats were also 
allowed to withdraw part of their contributions to assist financing for the purchase 
of HUDC flats in 1975.
However, public housing for the upper-middle class turned out to be not entirely 
successful. The HUDC was disbanded and the role of the HUDC was transferred to 
the HDB in 1982. Several reasons significantly affected the absorption of the HUDC 
into the HDB: the narrowing price gap between HUDC housing and private property, 
significant improvements in the quality of HDB flats and the rising income ceiling 
for HDB housing (Teo and Kong, 1997: 447). Even with the merger, the construction 
of HUDC flats did not continue for long. A total 7,750 HUDC flats were constructed 
in 19 estates until 1985 when the construction of HUDC estates was terminated (Teo 
and Kong, 1997: 447).
7.3.4 Reinforcing the state-governed market in the 1980s
The policy changes in the 1980s can be summed up by stating that the decade was 
a phase during which a series of steps were taken to reinforce the state-governance 
of the public housing sector, and to make the private sector a viable option as 
Singaporean society became more affluent. Meanwhile, the government actively 
utilised the established public housing sector to realise the desired values across the 
society.
< Table 7.3 > Changes in income ceiling for HDB and HUDC flats
Year Flat Type Income Ceiling
3- and 4-room $ 1,200
1974 5-room $ 1,500
HUDC $ 4,000
3- and 4-room $ 1,500
»979 5-room $ 2,000
HUDC $ 4.000
3- and 4-room $ 1,500
1980 5-room $ 2,000
HUDC $ 6,000
3-room $ 1,500
1981 4- and 5-room $ 3,500
HUDC $ 6,000
»985 3-,4- and 5-room HUDC
$ 4,000 
S 6,000
Source: Chong et al. (1985: 245)
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To cement the state-governance of the public housing sector, HDB rules were 
modified in many respects like income ceiling, resale restraints and allocation 
procedure. Firstly, the income ceiling for eligibility for new HDB flats was raised. 
<Table 7.3 > captures the adjustment of the income ceiling from the late 1970s to the 
mid-1980s reflecting rising income levels from prosperous economic growth and 
national housing conditions. Secondly, regulations on the resale market were 
occasionally adjusted to make the market as stable as possible. As far as the price in 
the resale market fluctuated, it was not uniformly tightened or relaxed. There was a 
strengthening of the minimum occupancy period. The HDB allowed homeowners 
who had been resident for more than 3 years to sell their flats in the resale market 
when opening the market in 1971. The 3-years minimum occupancy period was 
extended to 5 years in 1973. Besides the adjustment of the minimum residency 
period, the levy system was added in order to reduce the profits from sales. From 
1979. a 5% levy was imposed on the sales price in order to collect part of the windfall 
gains from the resale market. The rate of the levy varied in the 1980s depending on 
the number of rooms and flat types. In 1982, the rates charged varied from 10% for 
3-room flats to 30% for HUDC flats. The implementation of a levy system ensured 
that the subsidy on the first-time purchases of public housing was bigger than that 
on the second-time purchases when households bought flats directly from the HDB 
(Phang, 2007: 23). On the other hand, the income ceiling for resale flats was entirely 
removed and owners who bought flats on the resale market were able to invest in 
private property'.
Finally, the rules on allocating flats were altered, primarily to reinforce consumers’ 
choices. The HDB’s previous rule on the selection of applicants worked on a first- 
come-first-served basis amongst registered households meeting HDB requirements. 
Individual flats were randomly distributed through a balloting system amongst 
successful applicants. In 1989, the HDB put into practice a booking system in 
accordance with “the HDB’s objective for the coming years - Quality and Choice in 
Public Housing’  (The Straits Times, 1989a). According to the new system, 
information on estates was given to prospective applicants in advance. With the 
information, the applicants could apply for a number of estates in rank order based 
on their individual preferences.
In relation to the private sector, the government perceived it necessary to expand 
the availability of private property in the early 1980s as an increasing number of 
high-income households were aspiring to ownership of private property. The 
government introduced the ‘Approved Residential Properties Scheme (ARPS) in
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1981 to permit the use of CPF savings for private property. At first, CPF members 
could use CPF balances to redeem an outstanding loan on one private residential 
property. Next year the usage of CPF savings was extended and CPF members were 
allowed to withdraw their balances for the purchase of a private residential property.
7.3.5 The development of the Central Provident Fund
Considering the importance of the CPF in financing public housing, it is necessary 
to grasp how the fund developed in the 1980s and how the changes were affected by 
the direct linkage between the CPF and public housing. Since the fund came into 
force in 1955, it has been developed with varying contribution rates and several 
accounts within the CPF.
< Table 7.4 > The development of the CPF (1955-1990): Selected years
Year Contribution Rates (%) Account Credit into
Maximum/ 
Month ($)
Employer Employee Ordinary- Special Medisave
>955 5.0 5-0 - - - 50
>975 150 15-0 - - - 600
>977 >5-5 *5-5 30.0 1.0 - 620
>980 20.5 18.0 32.0 6.5 - 1.155
»984 25.0 25.0 40.0 4.0 6.0 2,500
>990 16.5 23.0 30.0 3.5 6.0 2,535
Source: Low and Aw (»997: 34)
As shown in <Tablc 7.4>. the three-account system of the CPF became embedded 
mid-1980s. Total contributions were separately assigned to individual 
nts. the Ordinary’, the Special and the Medisave Account. Savings in the 
mar> Account could be used to purchase private housing and pay education 
in the 1980s. By the 1981 ARPS, CPF members could withdraw CPF 
{ ° Ccs l*,e purchase of private housing. They were allowed to use the balances 
»  c^uca,’on «wts as a form of loan from 1989. Currently, the deposits in the 
,nar> Account are available for the payment of home ownership, educational 
«nd approved investments in capital markets. The Special Account opened 
j *977 ^parated from the Ordinary- Account in order to reserve savings solely 
U*c °ld age. This was to ensure that the usage of the balances would be
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confined to living costs in old age to some extent, as far as withdrawal of CPF savings 
were made for home ownership (Low and Aw, 1997: 23). The Medisave Account was 
established in 1984 to help CPF members to pay medical care expenses and 
insurance premiums with CPF savings, as the country was moving towards an ageing 
society and the demands for medical services were rising.
Organising the CPF with three internal accounts, the government introduced the 
Minimum Sum Scheme and the Retirement Account in 1987. The rationale for the 
measures was to guarantee a minimum reserve of the CPF balances for old age. 
Under the new scheme, an imposed minimum sum had to be reserved in the 
Retirement Account at the age of 55 when CPF members could draw out their 
savings from the Ordinary Account and Special Account. This scheme was necessary 
to secure minimum deposits for the maintenance of long-lived retirees as the 
balances of the Special Account were low and CPF savings substantially drained into 
the purchase of housing (Low and Aspalter, 2003: 307). From the development of 
the CPF, it was the widespread use of the CPF balances for home ownership that 
affected a set of pension reforms to bring in creating specified accounts within the 
CPF. The PAP’s choice to link the national pension scheme to financing public 
housing acted as a core mechanism to make home ownership in the public sector an 
overwhelming tenure in Singapore. Yet the nexus between the CPF and financing 
public housing created by the government jeopardised the stability of the pension 
fund to significant extents. As a consequence, the government faced a self-imposed 
dilemma to maintain dominant governance in the public home-owning sector 
without damaging the function of the CPF as retirement benefits in old age given the 
CPF members used their balances to purchase the HDB fiats.
7*4 Policy reforms in the post-Lee regime
When Lee Kuan Yew resigned in 1990, the first leadership transition was made 
since independence. Goh Chok Tong took over the premiership and became the 
second Prime Minister of Singapore. As soon as the new government was 
inaugurated, large-scale upgrading projects were planned to improve the condition 
old fiats and common facilities in the public sector. In addition, the government 
*Wved not only to liberalise constraints on HDB loans and CPF savings, but also to 
broaden the impact of the public housing sector on private housing sector by
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facilitating a complementary relationship between the two sectors.
First of all, the PAP government declared to carry out large-scale and long-term 
upgrading projects in 1989 to improve the quality of old estates and to avoid the 
monotonous design of HDB flats in appearance. As the National Development 
Minister put it at the time, the aim of the programme was to “do more than give a 
facelift to old blocks” but rather to provoke “a complete change in the perception of 
public housing” (The Straits Times, 1989b). Estimated total costs were $15 billion 
for 15 years and the costs were to be shared between the government and residents. 
The upgrade activities contained refurbishments within each block as well as inside 
flats, precinct improvements and building new blocks in available lands where rental 
blocks had been demolished (The Straits Times, 1989b). Following the long-term 
plan, old estates such as Toa Payoh, Bedok and Queenstown were steadily 
refurbished. In 1995, the government announced the Selective En-bloc Renewal 
Scheme (SERS) to promote upgrade programmes. The SERS was distinguished by 
the fact that current residents did not need to move out their estates during the 
process of renewal. This was because under the scheme new blocks had to be 
constructed on vacant land near the old ones before the demolition of the old blocks 
could take place.
Apart from its upgrade programmes, the government liberalised HDB mortgage 
and CPF terms. The revised Mortgage Loan Financing Scheme (1993) allowed 
purchasers of HDB resale fiats to take out HDB mortgages up to a maximum of 80% 
of the purchase price or the market value, whichever was lower. The terms turned 
out to be more generous than the previous ones pegged at 80% of the HDB’s posted 
Price in 1984, which failed to mirror the increasing market values or purchased 
prices over time. The liberalised elements were also found in the revised 1993 ARPS. 
In the 1993 revised scheme, CPF members were allowed to use a greater amount of 
their CPF balances for the payment of interest on loans, even when the withdrawn 
amounts exceeded the price of private property. At the same time, the government 
offered further financial assistance to purchasers of public housing through cash 
grants. Eligible families who were first-time purchasers of HDB resale fiats could 
obtain a $30,000 grant under the 1993 CPF Housing Grant Scheme. The scheme 
v' as revised in 1994, with the grant increased to $40,000 and eligible purchasers 
''h o  resided near their parents’ house could apply for $50,000. In terms of financial 
d ista n ce  for low-income households, the government provided preferential 
rnort*age terms with low-income families to help them to own HDB fiats. The Sale 
of ^«ts to Sitting Tenants Scheme’ 0 9 9 3 ) enabled sitting tenants to buy their
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current flats at up to a $10,000 discount depending on their length of occupancy. 
The ‘Low Income Family Incentive Scheme’ raised the income ceiling for loans 
($1,500 in 1996) and permitted the eligible households to obtain loans of up to 95% 
of the sale price. Besides supports for home ownership, subsidies were given to 
lower income level households in the public rental sector to alleviate the financial 
burden of rent and utility bills. Needy tenants in the public rental sector could apply 
for financial assistance under the ‘Rental and Utilities Assistance Scheme’ from 1990 
and the scheme comprehended the assistance to homeowners occupying 3-room 
flats later.
For the higher income level, the government decided to provide a new type of high- 
quality’ housing (Executive Condominium) and privatised HUDC estates in 1995. 
The executive condominium (EC) was a ‘hybrid public-private sector’ in which 
private or government-linked companies were in charge of the development and 
construction of estates on land purchased from the state, thus reducing the activities 
of the HDB in the market for the upper-middle class (Phang, 2001: 448). Influenced 
by the decision, the HDB would phase out existing executive flats at the high-end of 
varying types of HDB flats (Tan, 1998: 107). The EC units were normally designed as 
high-rise apartments with four or five rooms and high quality condominium 
facilities. The monthly income ceiling was set at $10,000 and occupying purchasers 
had to obey the regulations that the government imposed on the units for ten years. 
To meet rising aspirations for owning private property, the experimental 
privatisation of public housing was accompanied by the provision of the EC. In 
accordance with the trial, parts of HUDC estates were privatised as well. The 
privatisation was confined to several HUDC estates catering for upper-middle 
income cohorts. The privatisation of the first two estates - Gillman Heights and Pine 
Grove - in 1995 was followed by a small number of other HUDC estates with the 
approval of residents, who voted in favour of the transition to private property.
On the other hand, the movement towards the liberalisation of HDB rules to 
activate the resale market in the 1990s was not always consistent. An upsurge in the 
housing price was experienced in the 1990s and the government had to curb house 
Prices to avoid provoking widespread estate speculation. Changes in the HDB Resale 
Price Index (<Figure 7.3>) reveal how steeply house prices increased during the 
decade. Faced with a housing boom, the HDB imposed more restraints on loans 
rulcs. in particular on the availability of subsidised loans and the repayment period. 
Pfom 1997, eligible families could only apply for HDB loans at concessionary' rates 
twice and buyers were subject to credit assessment depending on age and income. A
maximum repayment period was imposed up to 65 years old or 30 years, whichever 
was shorter. The rules on subsidised loans were made even more rigorous in 1999. 
When it came to entitlement to second concessionary loans, it was only upgraders 
buying larger flats than they currently occupied who could apply for HDB loans at 
discounted rates.
< Figure 7.3 > Resale price index: 1990-1999 (100=1998.4(5)
When the new millennium commenced Gohs government, succeeding Le 
government, had to cope with a decline in demand for housing. This was main > 
caused by economic recession in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis a 
as a matured public housing market. The decline in demand for housing resulte 
falling house prices and an increase in unsold flats in both the public and pri 
sector. With more flats unsold, the HDB brought in the new Built To Order (BT ) 
in 2001 as a pilot scheme and the scheme officially replaced the Registration 
or queuing system the following year. Under the new scheme, the HDB ad 
several sites for the construction of new flats in the media, giving key info 
location, indicative prices, preliminary design and total number of flats 
Purchasers. After investigating the demand for each estate, the tenders for new ats 
could be called only at the sites where congruous demands were met - norma y a 
least a 70 per cent booking of all flats in an estate - amongst the 
candidates. Otherwise, the project would be cancelled. The scheme helped the 
fo match the supply of flats to the real demands for housing at the loca
GoJ, fn ,
the eldnt °  ‘1eTPcd down in 2004 after fourteen years of service. Lee Hsien Loong, 
had ten-rd*’*1 ^  ***urnpd office as the third Prime Minister of Singapore. He
PotitiQ-. t Pome Minuter during Goh’s premiership occasionally with concurrent
n ine C ahnet e.g. Minister for Trade and Industry or Minister for Finance.
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prevent it from over-supplying housing in low-demand regions.
To boost low demand for housing, the government relaxed the regulations on 
mortgages and the CPF to expand the availability of housing finance. As 
contributions to the Ordinary Account were reduced from 2003, the CPF members 
were allowed to cover the shortfall from the cut with part of their balance in the 
Special Account when they had to pay for housing loan instalments. A total of 
178,350 CPF members had withdrawn $279.5 million from the Special Account for 
the purpose by the end of 2004 (CPF, 2004: 26). Coupled with the relaxation of the 
public finance resource, the HDB’s role of mortgage lender was partially transferred 
to financial agents in the private sector. From the outset of the home ownership 
scheme, the HDB had played the role of the biggest mortgage lender by providing 
two types of housing loans for the purchasers of HDB flats. The first loan was 
granted to eligible buyers for the HDB housing at subsidised interest rates. Two 
concessionary rate loans were available to applicants qualifying for HDB housing. 
The second loans were provided at market rates for HDB flat buyers who were 
ineligible for concessionary rate loans or had enjoyed the subsidised loans twice. In 
January 2003, the government transferred the role of providing loans at market 
rates to the private financial agencies. While the HDB kept offering the subsidised 
loans, buyers ineligible for concessionary rates loans would have to take loans from 
banks or financial companies licensed by the Monetary Authority' of Singapore at 
market rates, even when they bought HDB flats.
The trend of partial privatisation was also witnessed in the re-organisation of the 
HDB and the participation of private builders in the provision of public housing. The 
Building and Development Division of the HDB was separated and corporatised as 
HDB Corporation Private limited (HDB Coq>) in 2003. The rationale for privatising 
several sections of the HDB was that the HDB would enhance the role of the public 
housing authority whereas other ancillary' roles were devolved to subsidiary firms or 
the private sector (Ho and Hui, 2008: 153). The new HDB Corp took the 
Responsibility of designing and developing all HDB projects by 2006 (Phang, 2007: 
a8)* Next year the HDB Corp was acquired by Temasek Holdings, the government’s 
investment firm and renamed Surbana Corporation Private Limited in 2005. 
Operating a building consultancy and township development business in Singapore 
and overseas, the company has been growing as an international firm with offices in 
16 cities across Asia and the Middle East. The market principle was furthered by the 
‘ntroduction of the Design, Build and Sell Scheme (DBSS) in 2005, the intention 
n8 greater choice and variety of designs for consumers. The scheme permitted
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private builders to take responsibility for all processes such as land bids and flat 
design to construction. Despite these variations, the DBSS flats can be still regarded 
as public housing in the sense that they were subject to the same eligibility rules and 
constraints applicable to new HDB flats when the completed stocks were sold.
7.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter reviews the constant commitment of the PAP government to 
structuring a sound public housing sector, one in which most of population could be 
accommodated. The PAP governments have been consistently committed to creating 
the unprecedented public housing sector since the initial post-independence era. 
Public housing was deemed worth promoting because of the manifold roles it could 
play such as organising infrastructure, stabilising the multi-ethnic immigrant society 
and generating employment in the domestic economy. Benefitting from the 
institutional advantages of British colonial arrangements, the PAP government 
easily integrated the national pension fund into public housing programmes without 
significant crowding-out effects and sought its development model at the early stage 
of industrialisation. Notwithstanding the remarkable achievements, it was doubtful 
that the grandiose ambition of a ‘100% home-owning society (Hansard, 1985) "Quid 
come true even when the government declared the goal in the mid-1980s. Yet 
Singapore has succeeded in achieving its goal to the extent that a vast majority of the 
population own their public sector flats, even though their property rights are 
constrained by the HDB regulations.
As well as the government strategy towards the public sector, what makes the 
Singaporean case interesting and distinctive is that the dominant tenure of public 
housing pursued by the government was home ownership. The Singaporean 
experience contrasts with that of the Western welfare states in which the public 
sector has been overwhelmed by rental units and increasingly residualised for the 
lowest income level. Despite the successful formation of a home-owning public 
sector housing class, Singapore is simultaneously at risk of becoming ont of the 
‘collateral-indebted dtswelfare states’, as 1 described in Chapter Two, because most 
citizens over-accumulate wealth in mortgaged home ownership. The ris ’
P ^ n t in such a home-owning society where the wealth of individual house hoi s 
**!! fluctuate with volatile house prices. However, the risk varies from state • 
depending on the structure of the home-owning sector and housing po ,t,es
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home-owning sector. For the nuanced understanding of achievements and risks in 
Singaporean home-owning society, the next chapter will analyse the driving forces of 
the Singaporean housing system and its impact on the welfare state. In particular, it 
will underscore why and how public home ownership continued to be expanded by 
the PAP government.
Chapter eight
Analysis of Singaporean housing: The structuring of the 
state-governed system
8.1 From British colonial rule to the early post-independence era
It is widely argued that the British colonial government consistently upheld a 
laissez-faire stance on the issue of housing while Singapore was under its rule (Teh, 
1975: 3 . Teo and Savage, 1991: 327, Teo, 1992: 167). Without referring to ‘laissez- 
faire’, other previous studies agreed that the colonial government disregarded urban 
planning including housing without significant public efforts before the creation of 
the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) (Castells et al., 1990: 215, Yeung and 
Drakakis-Smith, 1974: 764). The irresponsible policies of the government resulted in 
an acute housing shortage combined with poor performance of the market, in terms 
of offering affordable housing with acceptable facilities and density, during the 
colonial era. Even the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) did not undertake large- 
scale housing construction, since its main role was confined to the improvement of 
insanitary housing units and built environments, and providing new units only for 
homeless people (Teh, 1975: 3). As well as these problems with the primary goal of 
the fund, the limitations of the SIT could be observed at practical levels and these, in 
turn, hindered it from developing large-scale provisions at most stages of its 
existence. First of all, in legal terms, the SIT’s operations were constrained by the 
decision of the Privy Council to favour the property rights of owners over the SIT in 
slum clearance projects (Wee, 1972: 220). Next, the fund had difficulty in mobilising 
additional financial resources, especially obtaining loans from extraordinary sources. 
It was not until 1948 that the SIT took out its first official loans with the approval of 
the Legislative Council (Chua and Ho, 1975: 60). These limitations clearly 
demonstrate how reluctant the colonial government was to take full responsibility 
for reliering housing problems, even though they were ostensibly involved in 
housing projects through the operation of the SIT.
The policy process leading up to the foundation of the Central Provident Fund 
(CPF) further illustrates the British colonial government’s unwillingness to play an 
active role in the provision of institutional welfare in colony. Although the policy
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process of the CPF concerns the foundation of retirement benefits, the unfolding of 
the CPF story is important, because it partly links to the nature of the public housing 
system in the post-independence era. When the government conceived welfare 
schemes in the 1950s, many ideas were rooted in residual remedies. When a new 
public assistance scheme was implemented in 1951, the 1951 Annual Report o f the 
Social Welfare Department indicated that policy emphasis would shift from a public 
assistance scheme to social insurance in the long-run (Chow, 1981: 357-358). 
However, the idea of comprehensive schemes in social policy never crystallised 
under colonial rule. The birth of the CPF was no more than a realistic compromise 
between comprehensive and residual ideas at the late stage of the colony’s history. 
The compromise basically derived from the ground rule of self-funding, which 
British colonial governments normally abided by in their management of the 
Empire’s colonies around the world. The British approach to social policy in 
Singapore was similarly residual as other ones in other British colonies were. There 
is plenty’ of historical evidence to suggest that residual approaches were 
predominant in other empire's colonial social policies, because the main concern of 
the colonial powers was setting up stable ruling systems to ensure the interests of 
their mother countries (MacPherson and Midgley, 1987: 119). Colonial social policy 
in Singapore was not only subject to the self-funding principle but also based on a 
‘residual welfare model’ with beneficiaries restricted to the most vulnerable in 
society (Mehta and Briscoe, 2004: 93-94). Nevertheless, the fact could not be denied 
that vital welfare schemes were launched by the colonial government and these 
schemes laid down the foundations of the Singaporean welfare system in the post- 
independence era.
When it comes to ruling styles in Singapore, the British colonial government 
considerably transferred modem Britain institutions to Singapore, which was a 
unusual case in the non-settler colonies.'? Mahoney (2010: 238-239) re crs t0 
conditions that account for why Britain, an otherwise liberal coloniser chose 
transfer institutions wholesale to Singapore and Hong Kong rather t an 0 
settler colonies. Firstly, the institutions of the two city-states were easy to c lsI™ " 
and substitute with new institutions, since neither society was 
institutionalised before colonisation. Secondly, the colonial governmtn s *
» p h i , i n s t i t u t i o n s .  „p c d .U y  with rcgard ,o p ro p « *  « * • .  “ ‘
H .K  m„W  the most of .ho economic po.cn.ia. of .he two m « * -  ^
K°r example, the British ruling sty le was generally regarded as indirect ™!c mark^  > 
mil Italy bureaucratic presence' in Ainca. whereas the Frenchmling style
Mrdrd as direct rule* pursuing assimilation of civilised Africans (Bcvan, 2004. 213)-
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in Asia. More specifically in Singaporean housing, the process of conceptualising the 
legal aspects of lease-ownership was framed by British law and legal concepts (see 
Tan, 1998: 126-129 for the details on legal elements). Besides the field of property 
rights, institutional transfers were also made in social policy, particularly after the 
modern welfare state began to take root in Britain during the first half of the 20th 
century. At the organisational level, the colonial government founded the Social 
Welfare Department in 1946 based on existing British domestic policy (Mehta and 
Briscoe, 2004: 93). Regarding the discourse on the desired direction of social policy, 
described in Chapter 7, the majority of the McFadezean Commision agreed that 
retirement benefits provision should be a social insurance scheme rather than a 
central provident fund. Although its suggestions were sacrificed to the prevailing 
residual orthodoxy, they nevertheless show how institutional and ideological 
developments at home provoked concern for social policy elsewhere in the Empire 
during the period of colonial rule.
More importantly and interestingly, what should be noted is that even the residual 
elements in the CPF acted as favourable factors in Singapore to some extents, when 
the indigenous PAP government designed the new relationship between financing 
public housing and the CPF. To adopt a social insurance scheme meant that 
redistribution effects would take place between contributors in a scheme. The 
redistribution in a social insurance pension scheme generally yielded complicated 
problems- e.g. conflicts between different income cohorts or generations- in pension 
reforms as pension systems grew matured over time (sec Myles, 2002 for a review of 
the issues in matured economics). However, the British colonial government got rid 
of these potential risks that a social insurance pension scheme would generate when 
it decided to implement a fully-contributed pension fund without any redistribution 
effect between members. The choice enabled the PAP government to take advantage 
of the non-redistributing fund when creating the new connection between public 
housing finance and the national pension fund. If a social insurance scheme had 
been in force instead of a central provident fund under colonial rule, the new trial of 
the post-independent government should have been seriously challenged or 
frustrated by conflicting interests about complex issues generated by the principles 
° f social insurance. Therefore, the PAP government accidently owed its success in 
the establishment of the nexus between housing and pensions to the British colonial 
Rovernment in the sense that the colonial power designed the CPF as a fully funded 
**vtnR scheme without redistribution between members and thus removed potential 
rtlk* of political conflicts between members which a social insurance scheme might 
Iterate,
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In summary, housing had been treated as an insignificant subject not to be 
urgently addressed during the whole British era. The British government 
consistently approached housing problems with residual solutions grounded on the 
principle of self-funding. The minimum intervention of the British government is in 
line with the argument of several case studies (Hodge, 1973, Midgley, 1981, 
Macpherson, 1982 cited in MacPherson and Midgley, 1987-' 119) that statutory 
programmes in colonies were desinged to serve European imperial interests and 
look after the settler community. Nevertheless, the case of Singapore was 
pronounced in some respects especially when compared with other colonies ruled by 
European countries. The institutional arrangements transferred by the British 
colonial government laid down the foundations of the post-independent 
Singaporean system in housing and welfare. Although many implemented schemes 
were fundamentally residual, it was ironic that some of them- e.g. the case of the 
CPF- accidently rendered the PAP government institutional advantages when the 
government constructed housing or welfare systems in the post-independence era 
because it linked the national pension fund to housing finance. This is mainly 
because the non-redistributive pension benefits and fully-funded system made social 
consensus on the withdrawal of the funds easy to accept for the home-owning public 
sector.
8.2 The PAP’s strong drive towards a home-owning society
8.2.1 PAP perspectives on housing and economic development
The most puzzling question is why the PAP government committed to building a 
large scale public housing sector when there were many urgent needs in the post­
independence era. The search for answers to this question starts by ascertaining the 
Perspectives of key PAP leaders on housing and the relationship between 
developmental strategies and housing in the Singaporean context.
The initial PAPs key figures - Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew and Minister for 
Finance, Goh Kcng Swec - came from a middle-class background and were educated 
in UK universities before embarking on political careers in Singapore. They leaned 
Inwards pragmatism motivated by nationalistic passions rather than ideologi 
developed in Western societies. However, Lee Kuan Yew was influenced by Fabian 
■ *Wtt«n while studying at university and his socialist ideas survived at least until
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the early years of the PAP, despite the ambiguities in his speeches and writings (Barr, 
2000: no). The Fabians agreed with the Marxists in the view that capitalism was an 
inefficient mode of production and it would be necessarily substituted by a more 
efficient planned system (Page, 2012: 73). Fabian socialism, formed by the 
movements of the Fabian society since the late 19th century, basically pursued 
gradual social changes through the parliamentary system rather than intended to 
overthrow capitalist orders through revolution. Unlike other derivatives of Marxism, 
Fabian socialism did not regard capitalist states as a barrier to the achievement of 
socialism and maintained that collective goals could be accomplished by the 
parliamentary system (Sullivan, 1996: 14). This Fabian ideas were crystallised by the 
1945-1951 Labour governments which embraced planning and nationalisation in the 
economy and created the welfare state to solve the 'Five Giants’ identified by 
Beveridge (Page, 2012: 73). Therefore, as Peebles and Wilson (2002: 30) argue, the 
ideological legacy’ of Fabian socialism provided PAP leaders with a rationale for the 
provision of public housing and medical care.
Meanwhile, the PAP’s pursuit of public housing was closely linked to their 
developmental strategies during the early phase of industrialisation. In contrast with 
other East Asian states - Japan and Korea, whose governments fostered domestic 
capital as the engine of economic development - the PAP government decided that 
attracting foreign investments was the highest priority. Despite the potential hazards 
of dependence on international capital controlled by neo-colonialists, the PAP 
leaders decided to take the risk and adopted a pragmatic approach to economic 
growth well-illustrated by the following citation from lice’s book:
A fte r  se i'era l y ea rs o f  d ishea rten in g  trial a n d  error, w e con cluded that 
S in g a p o re 's  best hop e lay w ith the A m erican  m ultin a tion a l corporations 
(M N C s). ( ...)  T hird  W orld  leaders believed  this theory o f  n eocolonialist 
exp lo ita tion , but K eng S w ee a n d  l  w ere not im pressed. W e had a real-life  
p rob lem  to so lv e  a n d  co u ld  not a ffo rd  to be con scribcd  by any theory or 
d og m a . (...)  I f  M N C s co u ld  g iv e  o u r  w orkers em p loym en t a n d  teach them  
tech n ica l a n d  en g in eerin g  skills a n d  m a n a g em en t know -how , w e should  
brin g  In the M N C s (L ee, 2 0 0 0 : 5 7-5#)■
The government dedicated itself to its pragmatic goal of enticing multinational 
00tporalions (MNCs) to Singapore. Economic growth was to be secured by MNC 
exPorts of manufacture goods, which would at the same time create employment. 10 
end. the PAP government organised an efficient professional bureaucracy with a 
dicent salary and strict disciplines to bind it into the control of the politic
leadership. The Singaporean bureaucracy was made pragmatic through the 
pervasive application of meritocracy and instrumental rationality (Hamilton-Hart, 
2000: 205-206). As well as putting bureaucracy in order, the government also set up 
a number of statutory boards and government-linked corporations as the major 
agencies for domestic economy. These relatively-autonomous statutory boards and 
government-linked companies occasionally enjoyed monopolistic status in their 
business and made secured profits protected from fierce competition in domestic 
market (Asher, 1999: 1). In particular, the Economic Development Board (EDB) 
played a major role in promoting economic development through overarching tasks. 
While the primary status of the EDB was coordinating public bodies to correspond 
to the needs of foreign capitals, it simultaneously carried out joint ventures with 
foreign partners or opened training programmes for workers (Peebles and Wilson, 
2002: 41).
Housing was of significant importance to the success of the industrialisation 
project when these sorts of developmental strategies were set. The Singaporean 
development model, in general, was characterised by the following elements: 
government control over wage determination and union activities, generous tax 
incentives for MNCs and public investment in human capital and infrastructure 
(Huff, 1995: 740-747. »999 : 36-44 . Soon and Tan, 1993: lS* Peebles and Wilson, 
»996 : 35). Amongst these characteristics, one of the essential conditions for 
appealing to foreign capital was a well-developed infrastructure. The essence of 
planning a residential complex was clarified in the Concept Plan , the guide to 
organising urban space. In the island-wide Concept Plan, the public housing 
programme was the central variable in determining the development tempo a 
significantly affected the pace of the construction of industrial estates and ot 
infrastructures (Goh, 1988: 148). Moreover, new towns designed in a self-sufficient 
but highly interconnected manner dispersed the surging population and created 
extra job opportunities within the individual estates of new towns (Field, 1987: »49- 
»50).
Mass production of public housing also facilitated the development of the 
instruction industry and created employment in the early stage of industrialisation. 
Investment in the highly labour-intensive construction industry was the principal 
indigenous vehicle driving the growth of the domestic market insofar as the 
Singapore economy absolutely depended on export-oriented manufacture industry
d*Thr Con"P» N*« a •!<»«-r a n ^ ^ J ^  ^ cnü 07^ ^  p^atiTn ofTm illi° n,
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run by global capital. The large-scale public housing programme contributed to 
industrialisation by generating employment in other associated sectors as well as the 
house-building sector when unemployment was high in the early 1960s (Fuerst, 
1974 cited in Tyabji and Lin, 1989: 25). It was estimated that 9 months employment 
at the construction site was created per unit of public housing during the 1960-1965 
HDB Building Programme, which on average generated 15,000 jobs per 10,000 
units (Yeh, 1975 cited in Yuen, 2002: 48). More importantly, the PAP government 
aimed to stabilise society by providing public housing for various social and ethnic 
groups, whose competing interests imperilled the future of the country at the onset 
of the independence period. Challenged by the socialist party and leftist labour 
unions, the PAP had to urgently deal with highly politicised housing issues such as 
soaring rents, an overcrowded city and sprawling slums along with high 
unemployment (Pugh, 1987: 313).
Given the importance of housing in developmental plans, the PAP’s emphasis on 
housing was revealed in both perceptions of its leaders and the prompt 
institutionalisation of the HDB. Lee Kuan Yew revisited these themes and the 
reasons for creating a home-owning society, to bolster national pride and identity, in 
his book.
M y p rim a ry  p reoccu p a tion  w as to g ive every  citizen  a stake in the country  
a n d  its fu tu r e . I  w a n ted  a hom e-ow n in g society. (...) I f  the soldier's fa m ily  
d id  not ow n th eir  ow n hom e, he w ould  soon con clude he w ould be fig h tin g  
to p ro tect the p ro p erties  o f  the w ealthy. I  believed  this sen se o f  ow nership  
w as v ita l f o r  o u r  new  society  w hich h a d  no deep roots in a com m on  
h istorica l exp erien ce  (Lee, 20 00 : 95-96).
Lee's assessment of the PAP public housing programme, as a means for promoting 
a sense of national identity in a post-independent multi-ethnic society, granting 
people the ownership of property and mixing together various ethnic groups in 
harmony, is supported by the literature (Chong et al., 1985: 231, Quah, 1990 cited in 
Ooi, 1994: 72-73, Yeung and Drakakis-Smith, 1974: 765. Chua, 1997: 142). But there 
Was also a political motivation behind the public housing programme, which aimed 
to tear down the racial enclaves that were the latent bases of opposition to the PAP s 
legitimacy (Tremewan, 1994: 46, Ian and Tyabji, 1991: 17-18). Whichever view is 
more persuasive, most commentators agree that mass public housing was a 
stabilising mechanism for economic development in a multi-ethnic society.
The necessity for public housing is also well-demonstrated by the early foundation
165
of the HDB. The HDB along with the Economic Development Board (EDB) was one 
of the ‘twin institutional pillars of the developmental state’ giving migrants the 
opportunity of owning houses as a ‘political stakeholdership’ (Low, 2001: 418). The 
HDB was the first statutory board in Singapore, predating even the EDB founded as 
the coordinating and investment promotion agency in 1961. The decision to set up 
the HDB first illustrates that the PAP government recognised how important and 
urgent the housing shortage was and that it had to be solved to ensure the 
stabilisation of the immature independent state. In addition, the prompt 
institutionalisation of the public housing authority and immediate commencement 
of a large-scale construction project by the HDB indicate that mass public housing 
was integrated into economic development plans right from the very start. The 
complementary nexus between housing and economic development was further 
reinforced by directly linking finance of public housing to the CPF, a connection 
which is analysed in the following section.
8.2.2 The CPF Approved Housing Scheme and its great ripple effect
The PAP leaders, as Vasoo and Lee (2001: 277) argue, influenced by Fabian 
socialism and succeeding a British colonial administration system, saw social policy 
as part of a wider developmental strategy’, of which public housing was a major pillar. 
The integral relationship between social policy and economic development was 
epitomised by the linkage between the retirement benefits and public housing 
programmes. The CPF, a mandatory saving scheme, was deliberately tied to not only 
the supply side but also the demand side in order to back up the public housing 
programme.
On the supply side, the CPF was the source of development loans to the HDB to 
cover construction costs. The PAP government assisted the HDB with subsidised 
loans lower than market rates or grants from the budget to pay for construction 
costs. The HDB's annual deficit was always met by government grants and long-run 
loans were offered for the construction of HDB flats for sale writh the preferential 
terms of fixed 6 per cent annual interest rates over 10 years by 1986. Amongst the 
hrick-and-mortar loans at subsidised rates, considerable amounts came from the 
CPF in the form of investments in government securities. Despite the lack of 
concrete data, it is clear that this function of the CPF enabled the government to 
Provide a stable line of credit to the HDB for the construction of new fiats. Affluent
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credits from the compulsory fund financed development funds for public housing 
programmes, especially from the 1960s to the early 1980s (Sim et al., 1993: 94).
< Table 8.1 > Various annual interest rates and inflation rates (%)
Year CPF rates Prime rates HDB mortgage Inflation rates
1968 5-50 8.00 6.25 0.70
1970 5-75 8.00 6.25 0.40
1974 6.50 10.25 6.25 22.30
1975 6.50 7.08 6.25 2.60
1980 6.50 13.60 6.25 ____ 8,50____
Source: Tu (1999:110)
A more critical connection was the use of the CPF to boost demand for public 
housing and assist subsidised purchasers of HDB flats. As the initial response to the 
1964 Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) was less popular than anticipated, the 
government decided to utilise the fully contributed pension scheme to catch the 
attention of potential consumers and offer assistance to prospective home owners in 
the public sector. In a path-breaking action it allowed the CPF contributors to use 
r CPF sa\ ings for the purchase of public housing. As long as the estate price was 
ing in the fast growing economy, investment in home ownership was rewarding 
enough to readiK withdraw balances; otherwise the compulsory savings were illiquid 
until the legal age of retirement. The appeal this gave to mortgaged home ownership 
,S evident when investigating the more favourable terms of HDB loans compared 
With ot^er pH\ate lending rates or CPF interest rates. <Table 8.i> shows the various 
interest rates and inflation rates after the launch of the 1968 scheme, which 
influenced the decision of whether and when to obtain mortgages. It reveals that the 
HDBs mortgage rates of 6.25 per cent were more generous than prime rates (the 
average banking lending rates). Moreover, the annual real costs of HDB home 
ownership plummeted in 1975 and 1980 due to high prime interest rates and 
inflation. On the other hand, the probable risk of having a low-balance CPF account 
flnd losing a stable pension resource for retirement was not properly evaluated, 
because the future was too far away and impossible to predict when the decision to 
^thdrawal was made.
These factors led CPF members to use the CPF savings for the purchase of HDB 
Oats, particularly during the last five years of the 1970s as shown in <Table 8.2> and 
f ig u r e  8.»>. In conclusion, the combination of subsidised HDB mortgages with the 
availabi!ity of CPF contributions triggered an upsurge in the withdrawal of the CPF 
balances and a striking increase in the demand for HDB flats. To the PAP
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government, it was the success in the expansion of home ownership triggered by the 
availability of CPF balances that provided the new circuit to answer the question of 
how housing could be integrated to their developmental plans without significant 
damages to the economy as well as heavy outlays on housing.
< ' fable 8.2 > The CPF withdrawals under HOS (1970-1980)
Year Amount contributed to CPF (S$ million)
Amount withdrawn 
under HOS (S$ 
million)
Number of 
withdrawals under 
HOS
1970 156-4 22.9 6,836
1971 223.6 23.2 5.607
1972 330.8 25.1 5.Q26
1973 474-7 50.6 11,809
1974 686.7 92.8 16,488
1975 886.6 134-8 20,185
1976 1,008.0 275.2 40,308
1977 1.H4-7 383.5 48,765
1978 1.352-0 488.4 48,680
1979 1,753-1 438.6 43,430
1980 2,296.0 _______ ____________ 47.212
Source: Lin and Tyabji (1991: 20)
< Figure 8.1 > Proportion of new applications to rent and buy HDB flats
■  Percentage of rent ■  Percentage of buy
Source: Lin and Tyabji (i99i; *7)
8.2.3 Evaluating the PAP’« early public housing programmes
As soon as the PAP government came to power, it enthusiastically devoted itself to 
laying down the foundations of a public housing sector where the vast majority of 
Population could own a house. It has been frequently pointed out in previous studies 
(Goh, 1988:161, Lee, 2008: 276-278, Lee and Vasoo, 2008: 277-281, Vasoo and Lee, 
2oo 1; 280-281) that public housing, more broadly the Singaporean social security
1C8
system, was fully integrated to serve the objective of economic growth. More 
concretely, this study has identified how the specific mechanisms of the integration 
were embedded by the PAP government. Firstly, the creation of a sound public 
housing sector was sought not only to form the core of the projects for a well- 
organised infrastructure, but also to create extra employment in indigenous industry 
when opportunities for employment were limited during the initial industrialisation 
of an export-led economy. Secondly, public housing programmes contributed to 
stabilising the multi-ethnic and immigration society. Pursuing a stake-holding 
society through home ownership in the public sector, the PAP government was able 
to attract immigrant workers and secure their attachment to the new country. 
Instilling a sense of national identity in both the native population and new arrivals, 
and producing compliant workers in a stable political environment, also ensured 
that the government’s attempt to entice foreign capital would be successful. In terms 
of social control, large-scale public housing programmes dismantled natural racial 
settlements and relocated minority ethnic groups that might have undermined the 
PAP’s political supremacy. This tactic of “furtive gerrymandering” effectively 
nullified political opposition to the ruling party. Finally, the most critical impact was 
triggered by the invention of a new circuit connecting the CPF with the financing of 
public housing. Given the absence of redistribution effects between CPF contributors 
and the fact that few retirees were drawing pensions at this early stage of the Fund’s 
development, the temptation to tap into the fully-funded system was irresistible for 
the government, which used the Fund to finance both supply of and demand for 
housing, without significant negative impacts on the growing economy. In particular, 
the non-redistributive pension benefits and fully-funded system made social 
consensus on the withdrawal of the funds easy to accept for the home-owning public 
sector. Hence the PAP government ‘accidently’ owed the British colonial government 
because the British government did not intend to link the fully-funded pension 
scheme to financing public housing when taking account of the form of the national 
Pension scheme. Unking the CPF to public housing programmes was an ‘unintended 
consequence.' The inherited residual polity acted as the primary vehicle crystallising 
the prior objectives the government sought without serious social conflicts over the 
P°hcy process. In conclusion, the framework underpinning this unparalleled 
increase in public housing was created and entrenched by the extraordinary 
synthesis of the PAP's developmental strategy and the institutional arrangements 
inherited from British colonial rule.
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8.3 Structuring the state-governed system
8.3.1 Opening the resale market in the public sector
During the 1960s the institutional foundations of the Singaporean public sector 
were laid in accordance with development strategy. In the 1970s and 1980s 
governance of the public sector was solidly established although the government 
made occasional mistakes. The first major policy of the 1970s was the creation of a 
regulated resale market for HDB flats. Before creating a resale market, significant 
limits were placed on the asset values of HDB flats for resale and it meant that 
homeowners were not able to sell the flats they occupied on the open market and did 
not anticipate capital gains from sales. However, the resale market was not activated 
throughout the decade and the consequence was a small number of transacted units 
in the market. In 1979, the total number of transacted units in the resale market was 
773, a mere 3 per cent of owner-occupied public housing sales (Phang, 1992: 92-94). 
The lack of interest in the resale market was partly due to the characteristics of the 
property rights of public housing, which were based on the unique concept of lease- 
ownership and subject to HDB rules. Comprehensive regulations of property rights 
and entitlements to HDB fiats enabled the government to curb speculation activity 
and to maintain controls on the public sector. Hence the meagre performance of the 
resale market was mainly due to the stringent rules on minimum occupancy period, 
debarment condition and levies on the resale price.
Nevertheless, the policy was critical to make sure that the prospective windfall 
gains could be expected by retaining the asset of home ownership. This essential 
perception of the values as profitable assets substantially occurred from the 1980s 
when the resale rules were relaxed. With the relaxation of the rules, the number of 
sold resale flats rose to 13,436 in 1987. which represented 37 per cent of owner- 
occupied public housing transacted compared with just 3 per cent in 1979 (Phang, 
1992: 92-94). Therefore, opening the resale market fuelled demand for public 
housing and enhanced the commodification of public housing (Goh, 1988: 153. 
Castells et al., 1990: 241-242). As public housing could be sold in the resale market, 
the tenure of home ownership became the dominant tenure in the public sector 
through the 1970s and the 1980s. The establishment of a transferable commodity, 
coupled with aforementioned preferential factors such as favourable mortgage terms 
*nd rising disposable income, augmented the rate of HDB home ownership to an 
nnprecedented level. As a consequence, HDB home ownership rate increased from
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21% in 1970 to 87% in 1990 (Phang, 2001: 451).
The other attempt to expand the public sector was the provision of HUDC flats. 
This new type of public housing was arranged for the emerging upper-middle class 
located between HDB flat owners and the owners of private properties. However, the 
HUDC flats experiment was not particularly successful because the price gap 
between HUDC flats and HDB flats was narrowing whereas the quality of HDB flats 
were improving with the adjusted higher income ceiling (Teo and Kong, 1997: 447). 
Provision of HUDC flats was quickly terminated and the HUDC absorbed into the 
HDB. The government had failed to properly differentiate the status of HUDC flats 
in terms of price and quality from the HDB flats available to the general public, 
insofar as the differences between the two types were seldom exclusive. Finally, the 
differentiation of public housing turned out to be a failure, at least through the 
provision of HUDC flats in the decade from the mid-1970s.
8.3.2 Restructuring the economy and reinforcing legitimacy by public 
housing
The PAP government was committed to reinforcing state-governance in the public 
housing sector, as public housing was popular and accommodated a large proportion 
of population by the 1980s. As state-governance consolidated in the public housing 
sector, it then turned attention to harmonising mounting aspirations for private 
property ownership with the management of the public sector. First of all, the HDB 
rules were occasionally adjusted to reflect the changing social conditions caused by 
prosperous economic growth. Maximum income levels were steadily lifted to keep 
up with rising income levels as a consequence of economic growth. Income ceilings 
were fully removed in the resale market and the owners of resale flats were allowed 
to invest in the private property market. These alterations were arranged to 
maintain the coverage of income cohorts including upper-middle class and to 
provide more opportunities for gaining profits with homeowners in the public sector. 
Meanwhile, some cases illustrated that the new policies were carefully designed not 
to collapse the established principles in the public sector. For instance, the levy 
system was useful for stabilising the resale market by collecting windfall gains from 
the sale of flats. The system simultaneously served the principle that the subsidy on 
the first-time purchase should be bigger than that on the second-time purchases 
from the HDB (Phang, 2007: 23). Without the levy system, the resale market should 
have been heated by the homeowners benefitting from more generous subsidies on
171
the second-direct purchase of HDB flats.
Moreover, there were parallel measures in the private sector as well as the public 
sector to meet rising demands for high quality housing. The most influential policy 
was the ‘Approved Residential Properties Scheme (ARPS)’ by which the CPF 
contributors could pay for a private residential property with CPF balances. With the 
scheme, the discrimination between the public sector and the private sector 
regarding the availability of the CPF for housing finance was officially abolished. The 
scheme contributed to keeping the private sector a viable option and to making it 
more affordable for the upper-middle class who aspired to purchase private 
properties in future.
The coherent endowments to public housing as valuable assets could be viewed as 
evidence that the government intended to compensate the population with 
guaranteed housing values while amending the past developmental strategies. The 
necessity of restructuring the economy was raised from the mid-1970s after the 
economy suffered from the first oil crisis. The plan to reorganise the economic 
structure was put into action around the turn of the next decade. The ‘Second 
Industrial Revolution’ was launched in 1979 to shift the central engine of economic 
growth from labour-intensive industries to high value-added industries based on 
advanced technologies and a highly-skilled workforce. The policies pursued in the 
new plan were to (Murray and Perera, 1996: 23-24):
1) Release controlled wages and rationalise them with 3 years of double digit 
increases to the extent that the level would correspond with the new high- 
valucs creating economy
2) Change industrial relations to improve productivity
3) Increase investment in education and skills training programmes
4) Provide favourable incentives for global capital in high-tech industries
Tlie new project seemed to work and the economy grew considerably before 1985- 
But with the onset of sharp recession in 1985, the first severe recession since WW2, 
many people realised that the government might not be able to ensure continuous 
high growth as it had done in the past (Peebles and Wilson, 1996: 37)- Policy-makers 
and business leaders as well as the general public were shocked by the recession, 
"hich was regarded as a ‘massive jolt’ and many blamed the government (Murray 
and Perera, 1996: 24). To cope with the economic crisis, the government
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implemented policy packages to reduce increased business costs since the launch of 
the second industrial revolution. The employers’ rate to the CPF was cut from 25% to 
10% and other costs were reduced such as tax and utility for business activities. On 
the other hand, temporary wage constraints were enforced to keep labour costs 
down.
When it came to supporting the new development strategy in the fluctuating 
economy, public housing again played the role of major pillar upholding political 
support for PAP rule. Since the official operation of the National Wages Council 
(NWC) - the tripartite wage negotiation institution in 1972 - Singaporean workers 
had tolerated considerable wage losses in return for competitiveness in the global 
market. Temporarily free from wage constraints just after the Second Industrial 
Revolution, the plan to restructure the economy, the workers were returned to the 
regulatory system due to the severe 1985 recession. In this unfavourable 
environment, the PAP government had to offer satisfactory compensation; otherwise 
acute discontent about the regime might be provoked. The upgrades to public 
housing, as Tan et al (2008: 17) argued, was offered along with Medisave - a public 
medical savings scheme - as a reward for sacrificing pay rises before and after the 
industrial restructuring phase. The quality of HDB flats and high-quality HUDC fiats 
was improved, but the increasing availability of private property was the main 
strategy for rewarding the populace through housing. The ARPS and the provision of 
HUDC flats were the major steps paving the way to the high-end property’ market 
respectively in the private sector and the public sector, meeting rising aspirations 
stimulated by the pursuit of more advanced economic structures. Nevertheless, the 
public sector continued to play a vital role in the provision of housing in relation to 
the private sector and its centrality in this respect is confirmed by statistical studies 
reporting the high price correlations between the public sector and the private sector. 
Private housing prices were highly correlated with public housing prices set by the 
HDB from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s (Phang and Wong, 1997:1828).
Moreover, the government actively used the established public housing to embody 
the desired values across the society in order to consolidate their legitimacy. Castclls 
et al (1990: 244-246) argue that the PAP government introduced or changed the 
HUB rules in order to instil the desired values into society and to internalise social 
e°ntrol from the late 1970s. According to their analysis, the attributes of social 
engineering* can be distinguished in a series of housing schemes summarised in 
«Table 8.$>, which aimed to maintain traditional family values and the extended 
family system. What did the PAP government hope to achieve by emphasising the
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traditional extended family? As the excerpt below so succinctly puts it, the 
government wanted to build a welfare system where traditional Confucian values 
were stressed and the principle of self-reliance was supported. Hence there was a 
political motivation behind encouraging neighbourly kinship networks, which 
functioned as a mutual care mechanism between ageing parents and their married 
children.
Watching the ever-increasing costs o f the welfare state in Britain and 
Sweden, we decided to avoid this debilitating system. We noted by the 
1970s that when governments undertook primary responsibility for the 
basic duties o f the head of a family, the drive in people weakened. Welfare 
undermined self-reliance. (...) We thought it best to reinforce the Confucian 
tradition that a man is responsible for his family - his parents, wife and 
children (Lee, 2000:104).
< Table 8.3 > Schemes relevant to extended family system
Schemes (Year) Aims and Contents
Joint Balloting Scheme 
(1978)
To enable parents and married children to live nearby 
through joint allocation
Reside Near Parents/ 
Married Children Scheme 
0979)
To enable applicants and tenants to live near their 
parents or children
Mutual Exchange of Flats 
Scheme (1981)
To allow HDB lessees occupying more than a year to 
exchange their flats with others nearby their parents
Multi-Tier Family 
Housing Scheme (1982)
To give a 3-year headstart to parents and married 
children who decide to live together and apply for HDB 
flats
Source: Castells et al (1990: 245)
Other arrangements were made to secure the dominance of PAP rule after the 1985 
economic recession broke out. The government had succeeded in collapsing racial 
enclaves at the early stage of public housing development, but minority ethnic 
groups began to gather together again as with the activation of the resale market. In 
1989 the HDB imposed a racial quota on each block of flats as well as HDB 
neighbourhoods to promote ethnic integration. According to the government, this 
'Ethnic Integration Policy’ was to encourage integration and harmony between 
different ethnic groups. However, the controlling characteristic of the policy was 
often revealed in the statements of PAP elite politicians. Just before the 
implementation of the policy in 1989, the Minister of National Development in 
charge of the HDB condemned the recreation of communal enclaves as seedbeds of
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communal agitation” (Lai, 1995: 121 cited in Chua, 1997: 143), The implicit 
motivation, therefore, cannot be denied - the policy prevented a specific ethnic 
group from overpopulating a residential block and kept the density of minority racial 
groups below levels that might cause electoral upsets.
The other controlling element was the operation of town councils. The system of 
town councils was introduced in 1988 to undertake management activities of estates 
including common facilities as well as public housing units. In terms of funding 
management costs, town councils relied on the government grants and service 
charges from the residents. Since the resident representatives were involved in the 
activities of town councils, the organisation was often described as a ‘grass-roots’ 
arrangement. Nevertheless, there were strong limitations placed on the system’s 
constituent elements and financing preventing the pursuit of pure democratic 
decision-making. First of all, town councils, chaired by a Member of Parliament of 
each political constituency, rarely opposed government policy or guidelines insofar 
as they depended on grants from the government under a one-party dominant 
political system. It was highly likely that a council led by opposition MPs would be 
heavily penalised for ‘inappropriate improvements’ to properties if they defied 
government policy. In an extreme scenario, it can be assumed that “if the enemy is 
assisted, the whole village is punished” (Tremewan, 1994: 65) under a one-party 
system.
8.3.3 Evaluating policy changes in the 1970s and 1980s
The housing policies of the two decades concentrated on the promotion of home 
ownership as a profitable asset and the provision of varying housing types within the 
public sector. The government allowed the transaction of housing units in the resale 
market, although buyers and sellers had to comply with numerous resale rules. The 
permission to sell at market price transformed home ownership in the Singaporean 
context into a lucrative asset beyond mere shelter. As the economy became 
prosperous and income levels rose, the government wrestled to maintain the 
dominance of public housing while the asset values of home ownership were being 
promoted in the public sector. In particular, it strove to keep the exodus of upper- 
middle class to the private sector to a minimum by providing opportunities to own 
high-quality residential property with preferential terms in the public sector. 
Although some of its policies were not entirely successful, the government succeeded 
•n accommodating a higher proportion of the population over the period. While the
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public sector accommodated the bulk of the population, the private market 
remained the preserve of the richest households and foreigners. The central status of 
the public sector in Singapore contrasted with many European welfare states where 
the public sector became residualised only for the lowest income earners or the 
unemployed while the bulk of the population met housing needs in the private 
market (see Emms, 1990, Forrest and Murie, 1991, Lowe, 2004, Malpass, 1999 for 
the cases of residualisation of public housing in European welfare states, especially 
Britain).
In the nexus between economic development and public housing, the integration 
of public housing into economic development remained basically intact during the 
two decades. Yet more weight was placed on the stabilising function of housing 
policy than its infrastructure or employment generating functions. As Singapore 
suffered from severe economic recession and the occasional failure of the 
restructuring plan in the 1980s, the government needed an effective stabiliser to 
guarantee the loyalty of the majority of the population to the regime and to control 
the potential sources of social unrest. The PAP government embraced a conciliatory 
approach towards affordable home ownership, which was placed within the reach of 
the middle-class and the property value of public housing was maintained to ensure 
its continued loyalty. Tying the destiny of Singapore’s home-owning society to PAP 
rule proved quite effective. As well as preserving the home owners’ alliance with the 
PAP, the government further restored the traditional caring network between 
parents and married children. Preferential advantages over the neighbouring 
generations, in turn, contributed to the reinforcement of the family ideology through 
which PAP elites were able to avoid resorting to Western welfare models and 
provoking reliance on public benefits and increasing costs. In addition, the 
government enforced racial quotas to prevent minority ethnic groups taking over 
residential blocks. Given the huge size of the public housing sector, racial quotas 
could control every inch of a multicultural society in combination with grass-roots 
organisation of the town councils. These controlling elements served the PAP s 
interests to steer their welfare system away from Western welfare models and 
stabilise a society during the period of restructuring the economy.
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8.4 Fine-tuning of public housing and partial privatisation
8.4.1 The features of housing policy during the post-Lee era
As the public housing system matured, accommodation capacity and home 
ownership rates reached their maximum levels during the post-Lee regimes. The 
estimated percentage of HDB residents to total population (<Figure 8.2>) reached 
its peak in 1990 and the figures were largely stagnant throughout the decade. In 
terms of home ownership rate, at its highest, as <Figure 8.3> indicates, about nine 
out of ten HDB residents were home owners in 2000. Having achieved the realistic 
maximum level of accommodation capacity and home ownership rate in the public 
sector, the post-Lee PAP governments led by Goh Chok Tong and Lee Hsien Loong 
were committed to the maintenance of the current system. Meanwhile, the 
governments drove partial privatisation of the public sector and encouraged the 
participation of private agents in public housing, affected by the general trend in 
governance.
After Goh Chok Tong took over the premiership From Lee Kuan Yew in 1990, 
Goh’s government undertook large-scale upgrading projects and increased the 
availability of housing finance for home ownership. The relevant policies largely 
took over the direction of previous policies in operation since the last decade. The 
upgrading of old flats and affiliated facilities was timed to boost the depreciated 
values of properties in the public sector. Guaranteeing the value of public housing 
was essential in current and prospective terms, as far as the rationale for the regime 
relied upon rising house prices. To fund home ownership, the government permitted 
the relaxation of HDB rules on mortgages. The main target of the relaxation was the 
lower income groups as the public owner-occupied sector absorbed most middle- 
and upper-middle class groups. The deregulation aimed to increase the volumes of 
available mortgages, especially for low-income households. For the higher income 
groups, the government created the 'hybrid' sector of Executive Condominium and 
selective privatisation of HUDC estates with the approval of residents. These two 
actions were designed to satisfy’ the higher expectations of contemporary 
Singaporeans for whom the provision of mass public housing no longer sufficed and 
''■ ere eager to possess residential property in the private sector (Teo and Kong, 1997- 
4 4 8 ).
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< Figure 8.2 > Estimated percentage of population residing in HDB flats
Source: HDB (2007: 79)
Source: Department of Statistics (2011)
There was continued adherence to the desired societal values, with favourable 
terms for married children neighbouring their parents. For instance, eligible 
purchasers of HDB resale flats who resided near their parents could apply for a grant 
of up to §50,000 under the 1994 CPF Housing Grant Scheme, which was higher 
than the standard maximum amount of $40,000. However, deregulated mortgages 
and increasing consumer subsidies stimulated house prices in the early 1990s in a 
positive economic environment. To curb real estate speculation, the government 
implemented anti-speculation measures in 1996, primarily through property 
taxation such as capital gains tax or stamp duty, and this immediately cooled down 
the property market (Phang, 2007: 27). Moreover, in 1997 the rules on HDB 
mortgages were tightened, in terms of the conditions of the subsidised mortgages 
and maximum repayment period, when the economy fell into a sharp downturn 
caused by the Asian Financial Crisis. This sort of unpredictable coincidence tends to 
exacerbate the cooling effects of anti-speculation policy and Singapore is no 
exception to this tendency since its property market underwent an acute slump.
In the 2000‘s PAP governments under the premierships of G0I1 Chok Tong and
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Lee Hsien Loong, had to deal with low demand for housing in the matured market, 
combined with the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. With many new flats left 
unsold, the government substituted the registration system with a new ‘Built-To- 
Order’ scheme. The new system was better at predicting actual demand than the 
past system and was thus able to minimise the discrepancy between supply and 
demand. Another common feature of the 2000’s governments was the partial 
privatisation they brought to the public sector and their promoting of private agents 
in the provision of public housing. The Singapore governments had been gradually 
privatising the statutory' boards and government-linked companies since the late 
1980s in accordance with the worldwide trend, as the ideology of neo-liberalism was 
prevalent in the era of globalisation. Yet Singapore differed from other countries 
where comprehensive privatisation was undertaken across a wide range of sectors. 
In general, Singaporean privatisation reform was slower and more partial in scope 
(Haque, 2004: 232). The motivations for privatisation were also quite different from 
the prototypical projects of privatisation. The main motives for privatisation, as seen 
in the case of SingTel, were to prepare selected targets for global competition and to 
encourage the development of the stock market rather than to reduce budget deficits 
or correct inefficient management (Heracleous, 1999: 4 4 0 -
The public housing sector had witnessed several privatisation measures and the 
introduction of market principles by the mid-2000s. Firstly, the HDB - the giant 
public housing authority - was partially privatised and the separated organisation, 
the Surbana Corporation Private Limited, steered towards the consultancy business 
and township development. This partial privatisation separated the non-essential 
sections and their functions from the public organisation of the HDB. The rationale 
for the privatisation was that the HDB would focus on its role as a public housing 
authority', with its other ancillary roles devolved to subsidiary firms or the private 
sector (Ho and Hui, 2008: 153). Secondly, the government induced the increased 
participation of private builders in public housing projects by the introduction of the 
'Design, Build and Sell Scheme’ (DBSS). Finally, the government transferred the 
HDB's role as mortgage lender at market rates to the private financial institutions 
from January, 2003. Buyers ineligible for subsidised mortgages must now obtain 
mortgages from private banks or financial firms, even when they purchase HDB flats.
Notwithstanding these partial privatisations such as the principle of competition 
»nd greater consumer choice, they were generally too limited to fundamentally 
*01 pair the non-market allocation of housing that the HDB has adhered to since the 
foundation of the public housing sector. However, the last of these reforms, the
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limited privatisation of public housing finance might be influential in future, 
because it will probably change the way home ownership is financed and thus the 
Singaporean interpretation of public housing in the long-run. The proportion of 
mortgages at market rates was approximately 37% of the HDB’s total outstanding 
mortgage balances in 2001/2002 (Sing and Ong, 2004:173). Given this considerable 
share of market-rates loans and the highest ratio of interest to total revenues in the 
portfolio of the HDB (<Figure 8.4>), the organisation lost a major source of income 
i.e. incurring interests of mortgages by the withdrawal of mortgage lending role at 
market rates. The loss of this income basis means that the HDB has to find 
alternative sources of revenue in the near future. Otherwise, the government will 
have to make up the loss with more grants from the central budget. Higher subsidies 
might threaten the principle of minimum direct government outlays on housing, 
with which the PAP government has underpinned the operation of the public 
housing sector since the 1960s. An even bigger impact would be felt if the mortgages 
of private financial institutions manage to facilitate the creation a secondary 
mortgage market, where residential mortgage-backed securities are issued and sold. 
There can be no doubt that the up-until-now durable entity of public housing will 
confront its toughest challenge when the issue of MBSs are allowed and the 
secondary mortgage market is activated in Singapore.
< Figure 8.4 > The structure of HDB revenues: 2003/2004
■  Interest
■  Rental
■ Car park charges
■  Levy on resale flats and 
sales premium
■  Others
Source: HDB (2005:105)
8.4.2 Evaluating policy changes during the post-Lee era
Despite the privatising policies, the general nature of limited privatisation in 
Singapore was mirrored when reforming the public housing sector. In the trend of 
Privatisation, most public housing units, especially HDB flats are still heavily subject 
to » number of different rules, in contrast with private properties, as is illustrated in
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<Table 8.4>. From the analysis of the former section, it seems unlikely that the 
reforms of the last two decades will tear down the existing system in which the 
public sector dominated the provision of housing.
< Table 8.4 > Terms and conditions of HDB flats and private properties
HDB Flats Private Properties
Requirements 
for selling flats
Owners must occupy their flats for 
a minimum period before selling 
the flat on the resale market (5 
years for new HDB flats, 2.5 years 
for resale flats)
Owners can freely sell their 
properties without restraints
Source of 
mortgage
Mortgage loans can be taken from 
the HDB at concessionary rates for 
eligible purchasers, or from banks 
and financial companies licensed 
by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore at market rates
Mortgage loans can be taken from 
banks or financial companies at 
market rates
Use of CPF 
savings
CPF members can use their 
savings for HDB housing up to 5% 
of the property price
CPF members can use their 
savings for HDB housing up to 5% 
of the property price
Resale levy
Resale levy should be paid in the 
resale market only if sellers 
benefited from concessionary- 
rates loans
No resale levy
Income ceiling
Various income ceilings depending 
on the size of HDB flats, but no 
income ceiling for the purchase of 
resale flats
No income ceiling
Source: Hui ct al (2009:198)
There would be steadily mounting calls for both far-reaching deregulation and the 
government assuming more responsibility for welfare in the future. These 
possibilities are grounded on the assumption that it will become almost impossible 
for the Singaporean government to stabilise the asset value of home ownership in a 
volatile and open economy without well-equipped public safety nets. Firstly, the key 
conditions for the success can no longer be fulfilled in the future and thus it will be 
extremely difficult to sustain the value of home ownership without considerable 
negative effects on the society. When Singapore accomplished industrialisation and 
high rates of economic growth based on manufacturing industry, full employment 
and regular incomes enabled most of the employed population to purchase a house 
and amortise their mortgage loans over their lifetimes. Yet the basic formula is not 
valid in the current post-industrial society- where full and stable employment is not 
Plausible and consequently inequality is being reinforced in both income and wealth. 
Secondly, stabilising the housing market is almost impossible in the era of
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globalisation, given that the economy is closely correlated with global factors, most 
of which are unpredictable and uncontrollable by a nation-state government. It has 
become even harder to maintain the stability of the public sector in Singapore under 
these circumstances, as the events just before and just after the Asian Financial 
Crisis demonstrate, when the government unintentionally aggravates the cooling of 
the property market with anti-speculation policies or overheats the property market 
with stimulus packages.
A number of constraints imposed on public housing mean that homeowners are 
not free from executing the right of home ownership, which is the essence of 
property rights in capitalist society. Singaporean people have tolerated these 
regulations, because the vision of the home-owning society was only attainable with 
the government’s generous policies and subsidies. On the other hand, they know 
that the building of this home-owning paradise relied on their enduring 
contributions from regular income and homeownership was the reward for a 
lifetime’s hard work. Once large shares in disposable incomes and the CPF balances 
were drained into home ownership, Singaporean retirees frequently became 'cash 
poor, asset rich’, as they are depicted in the literature (e.g. Wong and Yap, 2003: 378, 
Tu, 1999: 112, McCarthy et al., 2002: 197). In the absence of other public benefits for 
the elderly except for the low-balanced CPF, homeowners have depended upon their 
owner-occupied house becoming a major income resource in post-retirement life, 
through reverse mortgages or the capital gains from moving to smaller units. Since 
the prospective values of housing will be more fluctuating than in the past, given the 
changing circumstances, policy makers must diminish the heavy reliance on a home­
owning public housing system. Otherwise, the government will have to augment the 
public welfare system to successfully handle the new social risks of life in post­
industrial society. In brief, the task the contemporary Singaporean government now 
faces is finding a way “to reduce the dominance of housing welfare without adversely 
affecting housing asset markets" (Phang, 2007:44).
8.5 Concluding remarks
The PAP government has been committed to building and running the public 
housing vector since it came to power at the early stage of independence. This strong 
initiative in public housing was aimed at serving economic development strategies 
and nation building processes, rather than creating entitlement to social rights. As a
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result, the ratio of HDB flat residents skyrocketed from 9% of the total population in 
i960 to 83% in 2005 in less than a half of century. This outstanding performance is 
even more remarkable when one considers that it is the highest rate of home 
ownership (92% in 2000) amongst matured capitalist societies. The historical 
analysis of this study demonstrates that the unprecedented public housing system 
has been embedded by a combination of the persistent efforts of the PAP with 
complex institutional factors. In the case of Singapore, the institutional and 
ideological legacies of British colonial rule were inherited by the PAP elites and 
integrated into the development plans. The CPF, in particular, was the fulcrum of 
the mechanism that directly linked pension scheme to public housing finance. This 
was the new nexus that the PAP government innovated to solve housing finance 
without much expenditure from the budget. From an institutionalist perspective, 
most schemes of British colonial rule were fundamentally residual in social policy. 
Yet the CPF rendered the PAP government institutional advantages, because the 
non-rcdistributive and fully-funded pension scheme made social consensus on the 
withdrawal of the funds easy to accept for the home-owning public sector. This kind 
of institutional advantage was an ‘unintended consequence’, because the British 
government did not intend to link the fully-funded pension scheme to financing 
public housing when taking account of the form of the national pension scheme. In 
addition, the case of Singaporean housing policy illustrates that a critical juncture at 
the very initial phase of policy' development narrows down the consecutive policy 
choices and, when coupled with a dominant political power i.e. a single party state, 
can structure the path-dependent route in the long run.
When it comes to the bigger picture of the welfare states, the entity of public 
housing has become a symbol of the Singaporean welfare state in its own unique way, 
so much so that it can be called the first genuine ‘asset-based welfare state’ in the 
world. Despite the limitations of a city-state, the Singaporean model, to which the 
transferred institutions contributed, has been exported to other developing 
countries, in what amounts to a "double policy transfer." For instance, the financing 
of the Singaporean housing system through the CPF affected the foundation of the 
Housing Provident Fund in China, firstly in Shanghai in 1991 and later across the 
whole of urban China at the unit of the city (Chen et al., 2010: 879). However, the 
conditions surrounding the pillar of public housing have been fundamentally 
changing since approximately the late 1980s. While the first three decades saw the 
building of a home-owning society in the Singaporean context, the first decade in the 
°cw millennium and the last decade of the 20th century were a period of managing 
established system. The home-owning public housing sector has been exposed to
uncontrollable risks and in turn the potential tension between homeowners and the 
government is growing around this pillar of Singapore’s welfare system. It is time for 
policy makers to rethink how to reform the current system in order to ensure the 
welfare of the Singaporean people in a mature capitalist structure.
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Chapter nine
Integrating the findings into the key theoretical concepts 
in comparative context
9 »i Introduction
This thesis undertakes comparative historical analysis using the theoretical 
frameworks of developmental states theory and historical institutionalism. In order 
to arrive at a basic understanding of the cases, Chapter 5 a»d 7 described how the 
housing policies and related arrangements of Korea and Singapore developed with 
contextual knowledge of the countries’ political economy. To increase the validity of 
the ‘historical’ analysis in an Asian context, the temporal coverage of the study was 
extended to the colonial era when significant institutions were transferred or newly 
introduced, a period disregarded by previous studies. The chapters provide general 
accounts of housing arrangements, but are not intended not to be exhaustive 
explanations. Chapters 6  and 8  illustrate how the housing schemes and 
interconnected arrangements were designed and gradually embedded in a 
complementar)’ manner with arguments and evidence from varying sources. These 
chapters relate housing developments to the questions of why and how housing 
was handled by two developmental states pursuing economic growth and poli 
stability. In addition, the emphasis on the contents of institutions and the mutual 
relations was designed to demonstrate how path-dependency dominated m 
housing policy developments in Korea and Singapore, because the variable 
'institutions’ was an important factor reinforcing path dependency.
In this chapter, the findings from the previous chapters are used to analyse how 
housing institutions originated and evolved at the comparative level. Key theore 
concepts are assessed and applied to the findings from the case study of Korea and 
Singapore. There is also some additional analysis of the implications of the finding, 
for the key theories, especially when the findings arc connected with the concepts of 
Path dependency and critical junctures. The intention here is to contribute to the 
refinement of the adopted theories adopted in the thesis by integratmg the 
comparative evidence into the theoretical debates on core concepts. The latter parts 
of the chapter critically evaluate previous studies of Asian housing regimes based on
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the results of the case studies and locate Korea and Singapore within the broader 
regional context of housing systems in Asia.
9.2 Key theoretical concepts and their application to the cases
9.2.1 Colonialism and the developmental states
One of the main concerns of this thesis is how institutions established by colonial 
governments affected the developments of post-colonial housing policy. Colonial 
authorities laid down institutional foundations in colonies in order to forge the 
identities of new nation-states and the institutions continued to exert long-term 
effects ever since (Mahoney, 2010: 1-2). The analysis undertaken in this thesis 
suggests that colonial governments should be added to Dolowitz and Marsh’s (1996: 
347-348) list of key enforcing agents making ‘coerced policy transfer.’ The thesis 
identifies which institutional arrangements were transferred or newly introduced in 
housing and related fields by colonial governments and examines their survival well 
into the post-independence era.
Korea and Singapore were colonised by Japan and Britain respectively. In terms of 
characteristic of colonial housing policy, this study argues that Japan and British 
colonial governments commonly embraced the ‘residual’ approach to housing in 
Korea and Singapore respectively. Major urban planning acts (including housing) 
and the organisation of a public housing corporation were imported from Japan in 
Korea. Japanese transferred or new policies were either simply copied or adjusted in 
experimental ways on behalf of imperialist’s interests. Japanese colonial authorities 
established controlling and experimental urban plans such as the ‘Remodelling City 
Blocks Act’ and the ‘Chosun Planning Act for Urban Areas.’ The case study 
demonstrates that the Japanese colonial government preferred land readjustment 
projects in urban development not to allocate much budget and the Chosun Housing 
Corporation accommodated the limited portion of the working population serving 
Japanese imperial interests. Japanese powers controlled the overall process of 
housing provision, restrained public expenditure in housing and provided mass 
housing for the small portion of the population to support their imperial ambitions. 
The case study of Singapore reveals that British colonial government did not take the 
active responsibility in the provision of public housing to relieve housing shortage 
and insanitary’ housing conditions. The findings support the previous argument that
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the British colonial authorities maintained a la issez-faire approach to housing (Teh, 
1 9 7 5 :3 , Teo and Savage, 1991: 327, Teo, 1992: 167). It was not until the foundation 
of the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) that significant measures in housing 
began to be taken with the requisite financial resources. However, this thesis 
demonstrates that the operation of the SIT did not change a la issez-fa ire stance 
fundamentally, because its role was confined to the improvement of built stocks and 
did not carry out large-scale housing construction project. In the case of the Central 
Provident Fund (CPF), this study argues that British colonial government 
abandoned the idea of launching a comprehensive social insurance scheme because 
the government would not assume the full financial possibility of meeting the deficit 
in future. As a result, a fully contributed pension scheme was in force, although the 
majority of the commission appointed to investigate the public retirement benefits 
approved a social insurance scheme.
The case study shows that these residual housing schemes and related 
arrangements had influences on the post-colonial development of housing in Korea 
and Singapore. In Korea, the ‘Chosun Planning Act for Urban Areas’ and the 
‘Chosun Housing Corporation’ were identified as major legal and organisational 
legacies from Japanese colonial rule at post-Japanese era. In Singapore, the Central 
Provident Fund and the type of statutory boards were core institutional 
arrangements influencing the post-independence development of housing. 
Particularly, the type of a public firm, originated during the colonial period in Korea 
and Singapore, were established as a dominant organisation in the provision of 
public housing at the post-independence era. The Chosun Housing Corporation was 
founded as an independent public firm and the retitled corporation (the Korean 
National Housing Corporation) continued to be a central public agency. In 
Singapore, the type o f’statutory' boards’ was widely adopted at both the colonial era 
and the early post-independence era. Pensions (Central Provident Fund Board) and 
housing (Housing and Development Board) became the core fields where statutory 
boards took the major role of providing public welfare services. In conclusion, this 
thesis argues that the maintenance of a self-financing public corporation helped the 
colonial and early post-independence governments to provide public housing 
without much outlay from budget and simultaneously place public housing agency 
under the state’s control.
Notwithstanding the similar institutional legacies from colonial rule, different 
paths of housing systems were structured in Korea and Singapore after they 
achieved independence. The thesis argues that the impact of institutions established
187
by the colonial governments in Korea and Singapore depends on the developmental 
strategies that have been pursued and the role assigned to housing in the 
developmental model. Following Johnson’s (1982) refutations of the neoliberal 
thesis, a number of works (Amsden 1989, Chang, 2003, Cheng, Haggard and Kang, 
1998, Deyo, 1987, 2006, Evans, 1 9 9 5 . Haggard, 1990, 2004, Haggard and Moon, 
1990, Henderson and Appelbaum, 1992, Wade, 1990, Weiss, 1999, 2000, Woo- 
Cumings, 1999, 2007) have developed the thesis of the ‘developmental states’ 
focusing on the state’s autonomous intervention in the economy, the roles of elite 
bureaucrats loyal to political leaders and supporting institutions for the goal of 
economic growth in East Asia. In this thesis, the state’s strong governance was 
emphasised in order to steer national resources towards key industrial sectors and 
coordinate the activities of economic agents. The highest priority was placed on 
economic growth under the active guidance of central governments, but the there 
were considerable variations in details of the strategies used to accomplish the goal 
of economic growth. Both Korean and Singaporean models took advantage of the 
pool of cheap labour and relied on exporting the goods that they produced in core 
manufacturing industries at the outset of industrialisation. However, the Korean 
model focused on increasing exports by cultivating domestic firms whereas the 
Singaporean model was based on the export-led growth of foreign transnational 
firms (see Castells, 1992, Shin, 2005 for the comparison of Korea and Singapore).
The strategic role granted to housing was also different in the two development 
models. In the Korean model, the government gave selective assistance to key 
industries, but the channeling of public financial resources into the house-building 
industry was curbed to avoid crowding out financing export industry (Renaud, 1993: 
292-297, Kim, 1993: 278, Kim, 2004a: 324, Ahn, 2002: 255, Kim and Ahn, 2002: 
215). Once the Korean model was driven, this thesis argues that the early Park 
Chung-Hee government continued Japanese housing policy without many 
modifications such as ‘Chosun Planning Act for Urban Areas’ (including land 
readjustment project) and the ‘Chosun Housing Corporation’, which was designed to 
save money while maintaining tight control over the provision of housing. The 
regulator)' framework inherited from the Japanese continued to be enhanced in 
housing throughout Park’s and succeeding military regimes by creating new 
regulations. On the other hand, public housing was fully integrated to support 
economic growth and acted as an essential component of both the development 
strategy and social security system in the Singaporean model (Goh, 1988: 161, Lee, 
2008: 276-278, Lee and Vasoo, 2008: 277-281, Vasoo and Lee, 2001: 280-281). 
More specifically, this study argues that the PAP government saw public housing as
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an efficient stabliser in a multi-ethnic, immigrant society, helping to produce a well- 
organised infrastructure and to generate employment. When seeking a solution to 
financing large-scale public housing programmes without much outlay from the 
national budget the residual legacy of British colonial rule- especially the CPF and 
statutory boards- provided viable alternatives for the PAP government.
In conclusion, the cases of Korea and Singapore illustrate how similar institutions 
were utilised in different ways by post-independence governments relying upon the 
strategic role of housing in each development model. The evidence presented in this 
study suggests that the different models and inherited institutional arrangements in 
combination were the crucial factor determining the considerable variations in 
Korean housing and Singaporean housing.
9.2.2 Path dependency and critical junctures
Path dependency and critical junctures are concepts proposed by historical 
institutionalists in order to comprehend the features of institutional evolution. This 
thesis has examined how a series of housing policies and related arrangements have 
reinforced path-dependent developments in Korea and Singapore by “treating 
institutions as themselves important objects of explanation" (Pierson 2004: 103). 
Given the purpose of the research as well as the supporting evidence, this thesis has 
emphasised those elements enhancing the sta tus quo  and what Pierson (2004: 142) 
calls "the issue of institutional resilience."
In order to compare the characteristics of institutional resilience in the two cases, 
this section examines the assumption behind and key concepts generating self­
reinforcing paths and links them to the cases of Korea and Singapore in their 
comparative contexts. Firstly, there is the issue of maintaining the status quo. 
Historical institutionalists regard political actors as 'rule-following satisfies’, not 
rational utility' maximisers, and assume that most people obey social rules even 
when following the rules might not be in their self-interest (Thelen and Steinmo, 
»992: 8). This assumption suggests that political actors will tend to observe existing 
rules (or policies), even when reforming existing ones is the utility-maximising 
option for a society. In this thesis, we have seen that no housing policy was radically 
reformed by systematic political demands of organised non-state actors in Korea and 
Singapore. In particular, general controls on labour movements and the 
organisation of the working classes in Fast .Asia (see Deyo, 1987, Haggard and Moon, 
‘990, Pern pel, »999 for the issue), meant that no major critical demands were made
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by labour for the reform of the existing system governing the housing policy process 
in Korea and Singapore. This study argues that non-state actors were just consumers 
and suppliers in the provision of home ownership in Korea and Singapore and 
became ‘rule-following’ actors under the strong and authoritarian states.
Secondly, the thesis argues that rule-following behaviour was reinforced in Korea 
and Singapore by the respective institutional frameworks, which placed strong 
constraints within housing and related institutions to hinder radical shifts and 
provoke institutional inertia. Pierson (2004: 142-153) identifies four major elements 
that make revision difficult: coordination problems, veto points, asset specificity, 
and positive feedback. The latter two elements -asset specificity and positive 
feedback- are examined here. Regarding the first concept, ‘asset specificity’, Pierson 
(2004: 148) argues that actors tend to be “more committed to the continuation of 
the activity where those assets are applied” when their assets are specific. When 
actors are heavily invested in the specific assets of an institution- e.g. expectations, 
privileges, knowledge of procedures, they will avoid the risk of institutional changes 
incurring high costs and stick with the current institution (Gourevitch, 2000: 144- 
145).
< Figure 9.1 > Asset-specific elements in Korean housing schemes
IV 4?'. •»*
«Housing Related Saving Scheme>
Account holders perceive they are exclusive 
beneficiaries to apply for new apartments
«Price ceiling system» 
Prospective home 
purchasers expect 
windfall gains from the 
gap between market 
price and controlled 
price
1 ........... .................. ✓ Asset
specificity
«Advance sales system»
Contractors enjoy the 
prospective asset values of 
home ownership with the 
expectation of profits
¿ j
Asset specificity was pronounced among prospective and existing homeowners in 
Korea and Singapore. «Figure 9.1» summarises the benefits with which the scheme
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provided prospective homeowners and contractors in Korea. With these benefits, 
many families who aspired to purchase new apartments were engaged in the housing 
schemes. First of all, there was an increase in the households possessing the 
Housing Related Saving Scheme (HRSS) accounts. The total number of Housing 
Related Saving Scheme accounts increased from 15,820 in 1980 to 2,538,352 in 
1990 (KNHC, 2003:126). In terms of the price ceiling system, the system aggravated 
the housing shortage due to the insufficient supply of new apartments and distorted 
the distribution of new apartments in size (Kim and Kim 2000: 1159-1160). Despite 
the negative impacts, public opinion was not critical of the system. For instance, in a 
public opinion poll from the early 1990s, 66.3% of respondents were in favour of the 
price ceiling system whereas just 24.8% wanted to see it abolished (The Kyunghyang 
Shinmun, 1991). The huge investments in HRSS and supports for the price ceiling 
system were not simply justified by the rationale of efficiency, because the schemes 
generated considerable social costs overall (see <Table 6.3>). Therefore, it should be 
noted that asset specificity was reinforced amongst prospective homeowners and 
contractors by offering potential profits or granting preferential status within the 
individual scheme.
< Figure 9.2 > Asset-specific elements in Singaporean housing schemes
<Home Ownership for the People Scheme»
Purchasers of HDB flats obtain a long-term 
mortgage at a fixed interest rate (6.25%)
< CPF Approved 
Housing Scheme»
CPF members could 
withdraw CPF savings 
to pay downpayment 
ami instalments 'only* 
for the HDB flats'
Asset 
specificity
< HDB first-come-first- 
served allocation rule >
Registered applicants will 
be given higher priority 
over time
There was even stronger asset specificity in Singapore as <Figure 9*a> sums up. 
The asset specificity of Singaporean housing schemes took effect when potential 
homeowners applied fo r and purchased public housing. Families meeting HDB
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requirements could be registered in the queue for the purchase of public housing 
under the first-come-first-served system. This bureaucratic allocation system 
frequently produced a long queue, especially at the early stage of development. 
According to Castells, Goh and Kwok’s data (1990: 232), the annual number of 
applications to buy HDB flats was higher than the annual number of sold flats 
between 1968 and 1974, and 1980 and 1983 in the 15 years after the CPA Approved 
Scheme was implemented (Castells et al, 1990: 232). When demand for home 
ownership of public housing outstripped supply, registered applicants simply bided 
their time in the queue. After a while, they would move to the top of the waiting list 
and their patience would be rewarded. Families registered in the queue would, 
therefore, tend to be against drastic reforms of the allocation system, because they 
had already made a considerable investment in the current arrangement. This 
advantage continued to be available and specified insofar as applicants followed 
HDB allocation rules.
The self-reinforcing process produced by asset specificity was also bolstered by the 
purchase of public housing with the assistance of subsidised loans and CPF savings. 
Qualified families were entitled to obtain concessionary rate loans from HDB and 
withdraw savings from CPF account only when they purchased flats provided by 
HDB. Particularly, the People’s Action Party (PAP) government could take 
advantage of the CPF as a source of housing finance for consumers without 
additional outlays from budget. In terms of institutional structure, there was no 
problem to create the relationship between the CPF and public housing programmes. 
The CPF was designed as a fully-funded and defined contribution plan without 
redistribution and the structure made social consensus on the withdrawal of the 
funds easy to accept for home-owning public sector. After the scheme was in force, 
the balances of the CPF accounts were rapidly channeled into the purchase of home 
ownership (see cTable 7.2>).
Once large amounts of savings had been withdrawn from individual CPF accounts 
and used to buy public housing, prohibiting the use of savings was not a plausible 
option in the future when reforming the scheme. Such a reform could not be 
pursued, as prospective homeowners counting on the CPF would be strongly 
opposed to any prohibition on the withdrawal of savings, unless other direct benefits 
were given to compensate for their loss, for example, a further reduction in HDB 
mortgage interest rates. However, this compensation would pose another equity 
issue between current homeowners who had their obtained mortgages at the existing 
higher interest rates and prospective homeowners who would obtain mortgages at
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lower interest rates in the future. Because of these complicated equity issues, it was 
unlikely that the use of CPF balances would be barred in the development process. 
Finally, the thesis argues that strong asset specificity made the CPF Approved 
Housing Scheme self-reinforcing and led to the expansion of coverage by the 1981 
Approved Residential Properties Scheme allowing CPF members to use their 
balances for the purchase of private properties.
‘Positive feedback’ is another self-reinforcing influence on developmental process 
towards path dependency. ‘Self-reinforcing sequences’ (often called ‘increasing 
returns’ in economics) are characterised by the continued reproduction of an 
existing institutional pattern and thus investigating the sequences is a primary topic 
in studies of path dependency (Mahoney, 2000: 508). When it comes to ‘positive 
feedback’, the most obvious concept is that of ‘regimes’ demonstrating the 
interlinked relationships between institutions (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999, 
Hall and Soskice, 2001, Huber and Stephens, 2001, Kitschelt et al., 1999, Pierson, 
2001). The presence of complementary institutions enhances the value of each 
institutional arrangement in a regime and generates positive feedback between 
institutions (Pierson 2004: 150). Similarly, “institutional complementarities” 
defined by Hall and Soskice (2001: 17) captures positive feedback between 
institutions. Once complementarities are formed between institutions, abolishing 
one institution may increase the cost of institutional revision by reducing the 
benefits of other existing institutions (Pierson, 2004:150).
Based on these arguments, this thesis contends that the Korean housing regulator)' 
regime was created in the 1970s and persisted because of positive feedback between 
housing policies in a complementary framework. The case study demonstrates that 
the individual policy mutually complemented other policies by compensating those 
who lost in specific policies (see cTable 6.3>) and formed a complementary package 
in regulating ways. The individual schemes initially were not designed to operate as 
parts of a well-integrated entity, but they became components of the ‘regulatory 
regime’ over time. Yet it should be noted that the complementary policies brought 
about negatin’ effects in society' as whole, while they served the developmental 
strategy- that authoritarian states made up (see Chapter 6). As even rational choice 
theorists (e.g. Miller, 2000, Bates, 1990. North, 1990 cited in Pierson, 2004: 105- 
106) admit, specific institutions might be functional for powerful actors whereas 
they might be dysfunctional for society as a whole. Its interlocking features mean 
that Korean housing can be seen as a ‘regulatory regime’, a term which appropriately 
Capturcs not only the positive feedback between policies but also the negative
impacts that the regime has had on the housing market. The regulatory regime 
functioned as a key mechanism in the provision of new apartments through mutual 
complementarities until the 1980s. The mutual complementarities, this thesis 
argues, helped the related schemes to survive or to be revived even when post-AFC 
governments were pushing deregulation.
Path-dependent developments can of course be fundamentally changed by crucial 
turning points or ‘critical junctures’, a concept discussed in Chapter 4. Despite the 
contributions of this concept to historical institutional studies, it is empirically 
limited because it has not been neatly defined or identified in previous case studies. 
Many studies of critical junctures lack a well-organised explanation of what 
produces such turning points, although some historical institutionalists identified 
economic crises and military conflicts as the most likely causes (Hall and Taylor, 
1996: 942). Either way, the literature on critical junctures tends to treat institutional 
change as a response to exogenous shocks and fails to precisely account for “how 
institutions emerge from disequilibrium at such junctures” (Hall, 2010: 205).
The concept of ‘critical junctures’ needs to be refined using complementary ideas 
but without losing the insights of the original idea. First of all, the critical junctures 
are necessarily defined as ‘specific events.’ Insofar as the duration of critical 
junctures are “brief relative to the duration of the path dependent process it 
instigates" (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348), the concept can be defined as 
‘lengthy periods’ “during which there is a substantially heightened probability that 
agent’s choices will affect the outcome of interests” (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 
348) rather than ‘specific events.’ Furthermore, the claim that old paradigms are 
denied and thoroughly replaced by new ones at critical periods cannot be sustained; 
as thesis demonstrates. Old institutions are not always substituted with totally new 
ones and are often “either recalibrated or functionally reconverted in part” at critical 
junctures (Thelen, 2004:34). In other words, there is often “considerable continuity 
through and in spite of historical break points" (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 8-9) in 
institutional changes. Regarding the explanations of institutional evolution, Streeck 
and Thelen (2005: 19-30) suggested four types of institutional changes; 
displacement, layering, drift and conversion. Following these suggestions, Mahoney 
and Thelen (2010; 16) sum up the key characteristics of each type shown in <3 able 
91 >. With these concepts, we can further our understanding of institutional 
development during periods when institutional changes are crucial, but are not 
accompanied by the wholesale replacement of all rules.
< Ta Die 9.1 > Types of institutional changes
Displacement Layering Drift Conversion
Removal of old rules Yes No No No
Neglect of old rules - No Yes No
Changed impact 
/enactment of old rules - No Yes Yes
Introduction of new 
rules Yes Yes No No
Source: Mahoney and Thelen (2010:16)
<Figure 9.3> Key housing policies in Korea and Singapore
Korea
■ Chosun Planning Act for Urban Areas (Land Readjustment Project) 
•Chosun Housing Corporation
• Land Readjustment Act, Public Housing Act
»Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC), Korea Housing Bank (KHB)
• Housing Construction Promotion Act
• Price ceiling system, Advance sales system, Housing Related Saving Scheme, 
Designated builders
•National Housing Fund, Bond-bidding system 
•Price ceiling system -* Cost-linkage pricing system
•The abolishmentsof1 cost-linkage pricing system and bond-bidding system 
•The privatisation of KHB, Mortgage-Backed Securities Company Act 
•The revival of price ceiling system, Gross Real Estate Tax_____________
Singapore
•Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT)
•Central Provident Fund (CPF), Statutory boards
• Housing and Development Board (HDB)
• Land Acquisition Act, Home Ownership for the People Scheme, CPF Approved 
Housing Scheme
•Creating the regulated resale market and its activation
• Human and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC) flats
•llie adjustment of HDB rules (income ceiling, resale restraints and allocation 
rules)
•Levy system, CPF Approved Residential Properties Scheme
•targe-scale upgrading projects, Uvecutive Condominiums (l*£5
• Partial privatisation of HDB and HUDC flats
•Build-To-Ordcr (BTO). Design, Build and Sell Scheme ___________
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The case study of Korea identified two critical periods in the development of 
housing. The first one is the 1970s when the regulatory regime was cemented and 
completed. As summarised in <Figure 9.3>, the Park Chung-Hee government 
legislated a new central act (Housing Construction Promotion Act) and framed the 
regulatory housing regime through the introduction of new policies while 
maintaining the existing acts and public housing corporation from Japanese colonial 
rule. ‘Displacement’ was prevailed in the 1970s with the introduction of totally new 
introductions of housing acts and schemes. These changes were driven by the 
authoritarian state in pursuit of continuous economic growth and political stability 
on the basis of the existing developmental strategies. The second period was the 
1990s before and after Korea was subject to the bailout plans of the International 
Monetary' Fund (IMF). The decade is easily identified as a ‘critical juncture’ in that 
deregulations of the economy including housing were initiated or accelerated by 
‘economic crisis’ (the Asian Financial Crisis), a typical exogenous shock. Given the 
widespread shocks across the society and consecutive reforms substantially enforced 
by IMF, ‘displacement’ was the dominant but not the only type of institutional 
change in housing. While key regulations were removed, new pro-market measures 
were undertaken (<Figure 9.i>). However, this did not mean that the regulatory 
housing regime was not fully dismantled. Because all complementary components in 
a given set of institutions were not eliminated in housing, the abolished price ceiling 
system was revived and the regulatory' regime was restored in the Rho Moo-Hyun 
government coupled with other new regulations (e.g. gross real estate tax).
In Singapore, a single critical juncture was identified at the early phase of 
development. This thesis argues that the introduction of the ‘Home Ownership for 
the People Scheme’ and ‘CPF Approved Housing Scheme’ in the i960 was a crucial 
turning point in the development of Singaporean housing. The case study shows how 
the development of housing schemes involved a gradual evolution of institutions 
mainly through layering’, particularly after the resale market was created. Layering 
is differentiated from displacement, because it involves amendments or additions to 
existing rules rather than the creation of totally new rules (Mahoney and Thclen, 
a«io: 16). In the case study of Singapore, there was a scries of minor reforms 
(<Figure 9,3») in which the PAP government made up complementary' rules or 
»djusted existing rules to activate or control a state-governed public housing system. 
The characteristics of layering were distinguished in the rules of the resale market 
*«ch as the minimum occupancy period, levy rates, income ceiling. The technique of
layering was used to manipulate speculations or slumps in the resale market to 
maintain the stability of the whole public housing sector. Additionally, in terms of 
the timing of the events, key historical institutionalists (Mahoney, 2000: 510-511, 
Pierson, 2000: 263) argue that earlier events tend to be more critical than the later 
ones in a sequence where a path-dependent pattern is framed. The case of Singapore 
supports this argument by demonstrating that a critical juncture at the initial stage 
of policy development narrows down the consecutive policy choices and 
consequently structures path dependency in a political situation where a single party 
state is dominant without serious political challenges. Concretely, a critical juncture 
caused by housing schemes in the 19760s and their reinforcing asset specificity 
made the alternative of the private sector unattractive for the vast majority of the 
population. As a consequence, the private sector has catered to the highest income 
groups who were not eligible for public housing and rich foreigners (Lum, 2002 
cited in Bardhan et al, 2003: 85-86).
9.2.3 The necessity’ of “multiple angles”
Mahoney and Rueschemever (2003: 21) argue that comparative historical 
researchers are necessarily “pluralistic in the use of overarching theories”. The 
openness of comparative historical analysis promotes synergy and innovation 
between not only theories but also methods (Skocpol, 2003: 419). Therefore, 
comparative historical analysts can call upon other theories for assistance and do 
not hesitate to embrace “multiple angles" (Pierson 2004: 178) when analysing social 
reality. Given the advantages of adopting multiple theories, the main concern of 
Chapter 9 is to ascertain the path-dependent development of housing in Korea and 
Singapore by relating the findings of the individual case studies to key theories at the 
comparative level. When it comes to the theoretical implications of the 
developmental states, this comparative housing study reveals how similar 
institutions originated from colonial era were differently utilised by post- 
independence governments depending on the strategic role of housing in each 
development model. This understanding of Korean and Singaporean housing can be 
furthered in combination with the concepts and ideas from historical 
institutionalism. Given the strong governance of the states and controlled civilian 
forces demonstrated by the developmental states thesis, institutional analysis guides 
fhU research to refine the understanding of cases by investigating how the status 
?uo was enhanced mainly by resilient elements of asset specificity and positive 
feedback. This study shows that the multi-theoretical approach is a practical way to
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use the different strengths of various theories and create synergic effects for the 
analysis of social phenomena.
9.3 Situating the cases in the discourse about housing regimes
9.3.1 Implications for Asian housing regimes study
The findings of the case study carry significant implications for comparative 
housing study and they provoke discussions about the Asian housing regimes. First 
of all, the developments of housing in the two cases illustrate that the divergence 
theses are more appropriate than the convergence theses to account for existing 
housing systems over the globe. The two countries have walked paths distinctive to 
the ones predicted by the old and new convergence theses, and have cultivated 
distinctive housing systems with their own policies under internal and external 
forces that might lead to the convergence of housing. Furthermore, in terms of 
discussions about housing regimes, the results offer evidence of how the Asian 
housing regimes are differentiated from the ones developed in Western welfare 
states. When housing systems in Europe and America are clustered into several 
housing regimes, the structures and roles of the rental sector are highlighted by the 
previous analyses. Whether case studies of housing regimes advocate Esping- 
Andersen's framework or Kemeny’s, they commonly scrutinise how both public and 
private rental sectors have been organised by policies and what roles the rental 
sectors have played in the developments of housing. In particular, the contrasting 
political choices about matured cost renting were vital in Kemeny’s (1995) typology 
to bifurcate housing systems in Europe. Consequently, the dissimilar directions 
toward cost renting led the advanced economies to form two housing regimes: a 
du a list ren ta l system  a n d  a unitary ren ta l m arket. Hence examining the history of 
the rental sector- its emergence, growth and decline- and related policy reforms has 
become essential when analysing Western housing regimes.
The results of this study indicate that the Western experiences and analytical 
frames arc not suitable for unravelling the developments of Asian housing when 
discussing housing regimes at the comparative level. As we have seen with the cases 
of Korea and Singapore, housing has been established by the unique points of view 
and policies of these Asian NICs. When these two states commenced 
industrialisation projects, public housing was designed to serve economic 
development strategies and nation-building processes, whether the tenure of public
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housing was rental or home ownership. Its purpose was not to embody values of 
social rights. As a result, the public rental sector was extremely residualised for the 
marginal population and there was little public assistance to renters and suppliers in 
the private rental sector. Only home ownership was targeted for promotion when the 
governments started to intervene in the housing market. Since then, most major 
housing schemes and regulations have been developed to manage the home owning 
sector in Korea and Singapore. In addition, there were significant differences in the 
influence of the main actors especially between Europe and Asia. The working class 
and its representative organisations - labour unions and leftist parties - were the 
main actors driving the developments of the public or non-profit rental sector in 
Europe. On the other hand, authoritarian leaders and bureaucratic elites steered the 
housing system in the two Asian countries into directions intended to consolidate 
legitimacy and create economic growth compatible with the individual 
developmental models. Moreover, in terms of the design of housing schemes and 
regulations, the Asian Tigers either transformed the relevant institutions originated 
by the Western imperial powers into more suitable vehicles for local policy delivery 
or invented new ones in unique ways as time passed. Therefore, it would be wrong to 
see Asian housing regimes as mere hybrids of Western housing regimes despite the 
significant policy transfers made by the colonial powers and the long-term impact 
these have had in the region.
9 -3.2 Locating two cases to the previous housing regimes
Although the Asian housing systems share much in common, the outcomes of this 
study indicate that they will not cluster into a homogeneous regime. Considerable 
variations in Asian housing were identified by the analysis and while there are 
common elements in Korea and Singapore’s housing policy, such as the connection 
of housing with developmental strategies, the low proportion of direct subsidies 
from central budget and regulations on newly built apartments. The historical 
analysis undertaken in this thesis reveals more dissimilarities than similarities in the 
two cases, both in housing development and its consequences. Therefore, Korea and 
Singapore respectively are located in different housing regimes and this means that 
there are at least two housing regimes amongst the Asian industrialised states.
The implications of the research offer empirical rationales with which to evaluate 
the current debates about Asian housing regimes reviewed in Chapter 3 - Above all, 
•hey suggest that the arguments for an identical Asian housing model should be 
Ejected, given the variations between Korean and Singapore identified in this
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analysis. The possibility of plural housing clusters in Asia undermines the validity of 
the homogenous regional models that several scholars (Doling, 1999b, Ronald, 
2007) have proposed. Yet the results also call into question the multiple clusters 
posited by other students (Ramesh, 2003, Groves et al., 2007c) at least until further 
in-depth investigations into the history of housing experiences in individual states 
have been undertaken. For example, Groves, Mûrie and Watson (2007c) single out 
Korea and its ‘innovative dual approach’ distinguished by the coexistence of 
preferential finance to home ownership and a reinforced public rental sector. 
However, according to this thesis, Korean’s dualistic approach is a recent 
phenomenon and it remains to be seen whether Korean housing will maintain the 
unique path it has been following over the last decade to the extent that its approach 
can be separated from other market-dominant housing systems categorised as the 
‘unmoderated private sector model.’
In summary, the research undertaken in this thesis on housing in Korea and 
Singapore illustrates the strength of the divergence theses represented by ‘housing 
regimes’ in accounting for ‘real’ housing experiences. It supports the interpretation 
that Asian housing regimes with a couple of sub-groups can be differentiated from 
Western housing regimes in many respects: e.g. viewpoints on housing, the roles 
and structures of the rental sector and policy measures for the promotion of home 
ownership. By confirming the validity of the divergence theses and the possibility 
that there are several Asian housing regimes, the research reminds us of the 
importance of identifying and comparing the various ways in which housing has 
been developed, which can be effectively achieved by focusing on how individual 
housing systems have been structured by policies and pertinent institutions in Asia.
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Chapter ten 
Conclusion
lo .i Introduction
Housing has been a major constituent of the welfare state ever since it was 
structured to handle the social risks posed by industrial society. Therefore, housing 
is subject to the principles of ‘welfare capitalism’, the term which Esping-Andersen 
(1990) uses to encapsulate the working mechanism of the welfare state. Esping- 
Andersen (1985: 179) argues that housing policy is a good field for observing how 
political mobilisation has affected the development of the welfare state, particularly 
in Scandinavian countries. Yet, despite widespread acceptance about the importance 
of housing in discourses on the welfare state, housing has for some reason not been 
one of the prime concerns in comparative social policy research and this lack of 
interest has left many issues of housing veiled. For example, as we have seen in 
Chapter 2, it has commonly been characterised as the ‘wobbly pillar under the 
welfare state’ (Torgersen, 1987: 1x6) and this might be a defensible conclusion. Yet 
this idea is drawn from deductive inferences without sufficient investigation o f‘real’ 
cases and it is not a conclusion based on the findings of a range of case studies using 
plausible theoretical frameworks. This recognition lies at the heart of this thesis. The 
necessity for scrutinising reality lies in how differently each nation state embodies 
‘welfare capitalism’ in varying contexts. The history of the modern welfare state 
demonstrates that pure la issez-fa ire  capitalism was modified by the political 
demands of various social groups and mass democracy but not to the extent that the 
system of capitalism was overthrown.
Welfare capitalism is diverse and each state has shaped its own way of running 
economic and political systems. Hence, the arguments about housing in Asian 
countries will differ from those in Western welfare states insofar as their housing 
systems in practice are structured by variations in welfare capitalism. The newly 
industrialised Asian countries (Asian NICs) have distinctive histories of capitalism 
and democracy, which can be differentiated from those of the Western developed 
countries. There have been considerable variations in the colonial experiences, the 
post-independent developmental paths and the formation of welfare capitalism 
between Asian NICs. Therefore, housing studies of Asian Tigers need to start by
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identifying these regional variations and analysing how the combinations of these 
causal factors framed different housing systems and brought about current 
outcomes in housing and more broadly the welfare states found in Asian NICs.
10.2 Contributions of this thesis to housing research and theories
The main criticism of housing research is, as pointed out in Chapter i, that housing 
studies fail to refine a theoretical framework, particularly at the comparative level. 
Many housing studies are criticized “either for being atheoretical, or for not making 
explicit the framework adopted” (Clapham, 2005: 7). In terms of the theoretical 
underdevelopment in housing research, another problem should be noted that 
housing studies address narrowly defined dimensions and housing analyses are not 
systematically integrated into other theories in the social sciences. This problem is 
well-summarised in the next excerpt from the introduction of Kemeny’s (1992: xv) 
book.
A  cen tral p roblem  o f  m uch o f  housing studies is that it retains a m yopic  
a n d  narrow focus on housing p olicy  a n d  housing m arkets, and neglects  
broa der issues. H ousing studies is still f a r  too iso lated  fr o m  debates and  
theories in the oth er socia l scien ces a n d  w hat is n eed now  is fu rth e r  
in tegration  into these.
Influenced by Kemeny’s (1992) call for theoretically oriented research, the 
necessity of theorising housing research has been perceived, but it has still a long 
way to go.”  Considering the existing theoretical limitations in housing research, this 
thesis intends to accomplish the analytical pluralism (or eclecticism) of comparative 
historical analysis (CHA) by using various evidence and arguments from the theories 
and integrating them for the analysis of housing policy developments. Due to this 
explicit recognition of theoretical and methodological frameworks, this thesis 
contributes to promoting the productive interaction between housing research and 
other theories in the social sciences. As <Figure io.i> shows, housing research and 
two key theories- historical institutionalism and the developmental states mutually 
benefit from the case study of Korea and Singapore in this thesis.
Some prominent housing theorists began to pose various theoretical issues in housing 
study (e.g. The 2009 special issue of Housing. Theory and Society 26 (1))
202
< Figure îo.i > The productive interaction between housing research and theories
r\
Housing Research Historical institutionalism 
and the developmental states
i.The two theories expand the
i. Contemporary social theories can
provide a useful framework for 
analysing the developments of 
housing policy in a comparative 
context (scope of analysis into housing research and thus enhance the validity of the theories
2. The choice of theoretical 
framework should mirror similar 
and contrasting historical elements 
jn regional contexts.
2. Key concepts of the theories are
supported and refined by the case 
study
Firstly, in housing research, the thesis shows that contemporary social theories can 
proride a useful framework for analysing the developments of housing policy in a 
comparative context. It raises the possibility that housing studies will be integrated 
into common theoretical frameworks in the other social sciences. In addition, the 
thesis illustrates that the choice of theoretical framework should mirror similar and 
contrasting historical elements in regional contexts. While this thesis basically 
accepts core arguments and evidence from the theory of the developmental states, it 
demonstrates how Korea and Singapore embraced different housing systems 
depending on the strategic role of housing in each development model. Most of all, 
the adoption of the developmental states thesis helps us recognise that Western 
experiences are not suitable for understanding the development of Asian housing 
(see 9.3.1 for concrete implications). Furthermore, it helps us clarify the relationship 
between housing and other pillars of the welfare state in Asian contexts (see 10.3 for 
more details), which differs from that of the Western welfare states. When it comes 
to historical institutionalism, key concepts such as path dependency and critical 
junctures are applied to the cases in order to analyse how housing institutions 
evolved over time. In particular, employing concepts from historical institutionalism 
ensures that housing researchers can ascertain how institutions in themselves have 
reinforced path-dependent developments.
The two théories also benefited from the case study in this thesis. Firstly, historical 
the developmental states thesis and historical institutionalism expand the scope of
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analysis into housing and thus enhance the validity of the theories. Secondly, key 
concepts in the theories, especially historical institutionalism, are supported and 
refined by the case study. As mentioned in Chapter 4, most of the theoretical and 
empirical knowledge in historical institutionalism has been accumulated by 
numerous case studies in wide-ranging topics. However, the representative case 
studies of policy developments in historical institutionalism concern the Western 
welfare states and thereby Asian countries are rarely examined within the explicit 
framework of historical institutionalism.20 Given the lack of case studies of Asian 
countries, this thesis illustrates that concepts and ideas from historical 
institutionalism are appropriate to account for policy developments in Asian Tigers 
beyond the Western democracies. In particular, the ideas of asset specificity and 
positive feedback are effective to demonstrate how self-reinforcing developmental 
paths of housing were structured by the variable of ‘institutions.’ Besides the 
concepts of asset specificity and positive feedbacks, the definition of ‘critical 
junctures’ is adjusted in this thesis and it is designated as ‘critical lengthy periods’ 
rather than ‘specific events.’ Moreover, this thesis adopts the debates about various 
‘types of institutional changes’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, Mahoney and Thelen, 
2010) to complement 'critical junctures.’ This challenge reveals how the concept of 
critical junctures can be adjusted without losing the implication of the original idea. 
In summary, the achievements in this thesis contribute to the improvement of 
historical institutionalism by refining the ideas of institutional evolution.
10.3 The relationship between housing and other pillars of the 
welfare state
A set of significant changes in housing, e.g. the growth of home ownership, the 
development of new techniques in the global capital market, have been critical 
elements in reconfiguring welfare states across the OECD economies (Lowe, 2011: 
200). Most of all, the relationship between home ownership and other pillars of the 
welfare state has been investigated amongst housing researchers. As reviewed in 
Chapter 2, the debate between Kemcny and Castles captures the essence of the 
relationship in Western contexts. Kemcny, the first scholar to raise the issue of the 
relationship, suggested that there might be an increasing correlation between high
' '  For example, there was no case study of Asian countries in Pierson and Skocpol’s (2002: 
694) and Mahoney and Rueschcmeyer’s (2003: 4) literature review of historical 
institutionalism.
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rates of home ownership and low commitment to public welfare as private home 
ownership grows due to privatisation (Kemeny, 1980: 372). Castles (1998a, 1998b), 
however, cast some doubt over Kemeny’s (1981) explanation of the causal path of the 
inverse relationship, that the main reason for the trade-off might be the resistance of 
home owners (and prospective home owners) to the rising tax base necessary for the 
expansion of public welfare. He, on the contrary, argued that the withdrawal of 
welfare provision might provide people with an incentive to buy into home 
ownership. The Kemeny-Castles thesis continued to be tested or discussed in other 
housing studies (see Castles, 2005, Conley and Gifford, 2006, Doling and 
Horsewood, 2003, Fahey, 2003, Kemeny, 2005). The debates reveal that the growth 
of home ownership can reshape attitudes towards taxation and outputs of welfare 
reforms across the Western developed economies or the other way around.
Besides these general debates on the nexus in Western contexts, this thesis 
suggests that the different relationship between housing and other corners of the 
welfare state can be formed in Non-Western contexts. The roles played by social 
policy in the Asian NICs have been often linked to the tendency for Asian 
development models to prioritise economic growth. Many studies argued that social 
policy in these countries was either fully integrated into the developmental models 
or undeveloped in a repressed and piecemeal manner so as not to hinder economic 
growth. The case studies of Korea and Singapore support this argument by 
illustrating that housing policy in these Asian Tigers was promoted or regulated 
according to their developmental models and directly or loosely related to other 
fields of the welfare state in different developmental strategies. The most important 
relationship identified was that between national pension funds and public housing 
programmes. In this sense, the crucial difference between the East and the West is 
that the complicated relationship between pensions and housing is more obvious 
and visible in the Asian states.
In Singapore and Korea, national pension schemes were explicitly mobilised to 
fund public housing programmes, even though there were significant variations 
between the cases in terms of mobilisation scale, timing of mobilisation and 
beneficiaries. The Singaporean case shows quite clearly how closely a pension 
system can be related to the construction of the housing system. The CPF became 
the principal source of not only development loans for suppliers, but also down 
payment and mortgage instalments for consumers. The CPF contributed to the 
supply side through development loans to the HDB or investments in government 
•ecuritirs, which were to cover construction costs for public housing programmes.
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On the demand side, withdrawal of pension contributions were allowed for the 
purchase of HDB flats by the 1968 ‘CPF Approved Housing Scheme’ and this was 
later extended to private properties. However, the prime goal of any pension scheme 
i.e. providing a stable income for retirees was sacrificed as the CPF became tied-up 
with public housing. This made the problem of ‘cash poor’ retirees or mortgagers 
worse, because the pension balances were drained into the purchase of home 
ownership.
The Korean case, on the other hand, reveals a weak and temporary framing of the 
relationship between pension fund and public housing. The temporary but new 
relationship was begun in the 1980s when the Chun and Rho governments 
conceived welfare policy packages to enhance their weak legitimacy. When the 
National Housing Fund (NHF) was established by the Chun government, a minor 
source of the NHF was short-term deposits from the occupational pension funds. 
The relationship became clearer as the Rho government utilised reserves of the 
national pension scheme for house-building projects. The succeeding Rho 
government issued short-term NHF bonds for public housing programmes and the 
national pension fund was supposed to purchase them. However, this relationship 
between public housing and national pensions only lasted for about a decade and the 
Kim government terminated the issue of NHF bonds. In addition, the mobilisation 
of the pension fund was confined to investment in NHF bonds for the construction 
of public housing. It was relatively limited compared with that of the CPF which was 
mobilised as development loans to the HDB and consumers’ payments for the 
purchase of home ownership.
The case studies of Korea and Singapore are empirical tests of a new hypothesis 
about how the relationship between housing and other welfare pillars might vary 
dependent upon developmental progress, political situations and relevant 
institutional structures, which can be differentiated from those in Western contexts. 
However, the conclusion does not mean that the relationship in Western welfare 
states is not valid in Asian contexts. The Kemeny-Castles thesis, for example, has to 
be carefully investigated in the contexts of Asian Tigers, because it could be more 
complicated in these countries. The correlation between high rates of home 
ownership and low commitment to public welfare can have profound social 
implications for the overall welfare state, as far as the above new relationship holds 
true, and Asian NICs have been generally pursuing the home owning society in their 
own ways. The Asia-Pacific region is a rich source of distinctive cases and because of 
this the discourse on the nexus between housing and other pillars of the welfare
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state is likely to grow if its countries are scrutinised further.
10.4 Limitations of this thesis and suggestions for future research
The analysis of the study should be complemented by further research because it 
leaves the key dimensions of housing still veiled. This limitation is somewhat 
inevitable given that the aim of the thesis was to analyse crucial institutional 
dimensions in comparable levels. Nevertheless, the following analyses should be 
undertaken in future studies. Firstly, there was not enough analysis of key actors in 
this study to comprehend the dynamics of the policy processes. Compared with the 
focus on the political elites and institutions, the role of bureaucrats and bureaucratic 
organisations was left largely unexplored in the development of housing. Secondly, 
the impact of related arrangements at other stages should be integrated into the 
analysis, given that the provision of housing goes through various stages, especially 
when building large scale housing units. Amongst the many stages of this process, 
special attention should be paid to the land development stage. It is therefore 
necessary to analyse land development schemes and relevant regulations, although 
many of these are too complicated to be clearly defined and measured for 
comparison between states. Finally, in the relationship between high rates of home 
ownership and low development of public welfare, more studies have to dedicate 
themselves to reveal what social implications have been embedded in the Asian 
contexts.
10.5 Final remarks
This study of housing development in Korea and Singapore demonstrates how the 
housing system in each country' has been structured by individual development 
strategies and housing institutions in a comparative context. In terms of the manner 
in which the evidence has been uncovered, this comparative historical analysis 
(CHA) does not contend that ‘narration’ can produce more significant findings from 
history' than 'statistics.* This study, on the whole, suggests that ‘narration’ and 
’statistics’ can provoke productive dialogue by complementing each other’s 
Weaknesses and strengths, especially given the fact that comparative housing studies 
hampered by a lack of credible comparative data and the many difficulties in
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defining key concepts. In relation to theoretical frameworks, CHA in this thesis 
embraces multiple theories- the developmental states and historical 
institutionalism- and thus furthers the understanding of housing developments at 
the comparative level. As a result, this thesis shows that the multi-theoretical 
approach is a practical way to use the different strengths of various theories and 
create synergic effects. Finally, CHA in this thesis reveals that productive dialogue 
between theories as well as methods enables researchers to make strong arguments 
in the social sciences.
When it comes to practical implications for housing reforms in Korea and 
Singapore, this thesis makes a conclusion by citing parts of Katzenstein’s (1985) 
conclusion. In the excerpt below, Katzenstein (1985: 211) summarises how the small 
states in Europe adapted to changing internal and external conditions with an 
allegory. The small Asian states also had to cope with crisis conditions when they 
became independent in the aftermath of WW2. They had to continuously adjust 
their developmental strategies for survival in an open economy without natural 
resources or strong influence on international politics. Small Asian ‘frogs’ 
surrounded by big ‘snakes’ acquired jumping skills and continued to prosper just as 
the small European states did. Ultimately, they developed their own unique 
approaches to living with change.
F ea rfu l o f  being devou red  by the snake, the fr o g  asks the ow l how  he m ight 
survive. The ow l's respon se is b r ie f  a n d  cryptic: learn how  to f ly . N on e o f  
the sm a ll E uropean sta tes has lea rn ed  to so a r  like the eagle. W hat they  
have lea rn ed  to cu ltiva te is an am azing capacity  to ju m p . (...) Frogs can 
esca pe sn akes, a n d  the sm a ll corp ora tist states can con tin ue to p rosp er  - 
not beca use they ha ve fo u n d  a solution  to the p roblem  o f  change but 
beca use they have fo u n d  a w ay to live w ith cha n g e (K atzenstein , 19 8 5 :2 11).
In housing, the research suggests both societies have to get over the negative 
impacts of past institutional legacies. Korea should deconstruct the regulatory 
framework built up by previous authoritarian governments and based around the 
myth of a state-sponsored, home-owning society. This framework and the myth have 
significantly reduced the possibility of affordable housing for all and aggravated 
wealth inequality at most stages of the country’s industrialisation process. 
Singaporean society, on the other hand, has to reconsider the home-owning public 
housing system, which w’as built by sacrificing the other welfare pillars. Singapore 
should reduce its over-reliance on the system, because it is getting difficult to 
manage the gigantic public home-owning sector without adverse effects on post-
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industrial society. In conclusion, it is time for both small states to think over how to 
live not only with ‘changes’, but also with ‘legacies.’ The first step towards proper 
solutions should be to precisely understand how housing institutions originated and 
evolved.
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